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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the role of South African business as non-state actors (NSAs) in South 
Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy. The work is an empirical contribution to the 
debate within diplomacy studies asserting the importance of NSAs in diplomacy studies and 
that the inclusion of economic considerations in diplomacy studies is crucial. Whilst a 
broader agenda in diplomacy studies is increasingly being recognised by diplomacy scholars, 
there is limited case-based evidence of the increasingly active role being played by NSAs in 
diplomacy generally and economic diplomacy more specifically.  
 
The research uses a multistakeholder diplomacy framework to analyse the extent to and ways 
in which corporate actors engage in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy. This 
study explores specific business activities around economic diplomacy, expounds why South 
African business adopts different strategies at different times and crucially examines how 
corporate actors do this. The thesis identifies three distinct modes of corporate diplomacy: 
consultative, supplementary, and entrepreneurial.  The thesis concludes that corporate 
diplomacy warrants far more scholarly attention than has hitherto been the case, both in 
developed and emerging economies, on the basis that corporate actors in South Africa play a 
crucial role in economic diplomacy, both as consumers and producers of diplomatic 
outcomes. 
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CHAPTER	ONE:	INTRODUCTION	
 
“As a leading mining company across the globe, Anglo American seeks to play a leading role 
in global affairs” ( Carroll 2008).1 In addition, Carroll asserted that international companies 
are now important global economic and political actors, with a significant role to play in 
furthering trade liberalisation, alleviating poverty and influencing climate change policy. It is 
apparent from statements like these that South African companies have every intention of 
engaging with global political and diplomacy processes and affecting policy outcomes. This 
thesis explores the role of South African business non-state actors (NSAs) in South Africa’s 
post-apartheid economic diplomacy.2 The work is an empirical contribution to the debate 
within diplomacy studies asserting the importance of NSAs in diplomacy studies and that the 
inclusion of economic considerations in diplomacy studies is crucial. Whilst a broader agenda 
than diplomacy as state-craft concerned with matters of high security is increasingly being 
recognised by diplomacy scholars, there remains limited case-based evidence of the 
increasingly active role being played by NSAs in diplomacy generally and economic 
diplomacy more specifically.  
 
The research employs the use of multistakeholder diplomacy as an analytical framework to 
assess the extent to which and ways in which corporate actors engage in South Africa’s post-
apartheid economic diplomacy. The central research question posed by this thesis explores 
specific business activities around economic diplomacy, expounds why South African 
business adopts different strategies at different times and, crucially, examines how corporate 
                                                      
1
 AngloAmerican is one of the largest mining corporations in the world and head-quartered in London, but 
started as a South African mining company in 1917 (Anglo American 2011b). 
2
 The term business will be used interchangeably with terms such as firms, private actors, private authority and 
MNCs to refer to all private authority entities, firms, corporations or private economic actors. ‘Business’ is 
used to refer to the group of actors in the economic sphere engaging in privately owned enterprise, whether 
such be multinational, local/domestic and/or, publically listed. 
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actors do this. The study identifies three modes of corporate diplomacy: consultative; 
supplementary; and entrepreneurial.3  Finally, the thesis concludes that corporate diplomacy 
warrants far more scholarly attention than has hitherto been the case, both in developed and 
emerging economies, on the basis that corporate actors in South Africa play a crucial role in 
economic diplomacy, both as consumers and producers of diplomatic outcomes. This would 
indicate that the same pattern is possible in other countries and so this research is a precursor 
to future scholarship on NSAs in economic diplomacy within other countries or other 
institutions. 
 
Scholars of diplomacy studies have tended to focus fairly narrowly on states as the primary 
unit of analysis in diplomacy and on issues of ‘high’ politics or security as the most relevant 
issue around which diplomacy takes place. Contemporary diplomacy scholarship argues that 
traditional or classical (and realist) accounts of the practice of diplomacy are both limiting 
and erroneous (Hocking 1999b; Lee and Hudson 2004; Murray 2008). The neglect of 
research around actors other than the state in diplomacy and a tacit relegation of economic 
issues have resulted in the paucity of a conceptual and analytical framework within which to 
understand diplomatic systems and the influence of private interests in the practice of 
diplomacy today. 
 
This thesis argues that research into economic diplomacy must begin to give account of the 
increasingly important role being played by business NSAs. Furthermore, such research 
needs to extend beyond the confines of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) or triad economies to give account of emerging multinational 
corporations (EMNCs) which are increasingly important players in the global political 
                                                      
3
 I am indebted to Andre Broome (Senior Lecturer, University of Birmingham) for suggesting a form of 
classification as a way of presenting the empirical themes. 
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economy. 4 There is burgeoning research on NSAs within international society and global 
governance scholarship (Aguiar and Bhattacharya 2006; Das 2007; Saner and Yiu 2008; 
Nolke and Taylor 2010).5 The proliferation of NSAs in international society are increasingly 
developing a form of diplomacy in interacting with one another and with sovereign states 
(Langhorne 1998; Burt and Robinson 1999). The changing face of global economic power 
with the rise of China, India, Brazil and South Africa provides an impetus for scholars of 
economic diplomacy to rethink the narrow focus of who is engaging in economic diplomacy 
beyond states and NSAs in the developed world (Das 2003; Sally 2005b; Goldstein 2007; 
Alden 2009; Beeson and Bell 2009; Mukherjee and Malone 2011; Schweller 2011).  
 
This is not to suggest that private commercial interests were less significant in the past. For 
example, the influence of the Rothschild bankers during the Napoleonic war and thereafter or 
of arms manufacturers such as Nobel in Europe during the 1800s (Fant 1991). Or the role of 
the British East India Company in the opium wars of 1839 to 1842 and 1856 to 1860, which 
resulted in British merchants forcing China into conceding unrestricted trade access as the 
cession of Hong Kong to Britain (Hanes and Sanello 2002; Bernstein 2008: 286).  Cecil John 
Rhodes and his mining interests in Southern Africa during the latter part of the 19th century 
are another case in point (Meredith 2007).6 What this does signify is that, despite significant 
evidence that business or private commercial interests were heavily engaged in matters of 
high politics as well as in the pursuit of trade through broader economic diplomacy (or 
                                                      
4
 Triad economies are the USA, the EU and Australia/Japan. EMNCs are multinational corporations with their 
roots or early founding in developing countries.  It is not the intention of this thesis to engage in the debates 
about how the national identity of a MNC should be determined, as the very nature of a MNC is that the 
company or entity has points of operation across more than two countries and often also has multiple stock 
exchange listings. See discussion in Goldstein (2007: 7-10) for more on this debate.  EMNCs are also sometimes 
also referred to as non-triad MNCs (NTMNCs). For the purpose of this thesis I will use assume national identity 
of a corporation as South African if that company had its origins in South Africa whether or not such 
corporation has now merged with other corporations and/or holds multiple Stock-exchange listings. 
5
 The literature is reviewed in greater detail in Chapter Two. 
6
 The influence of Rhodes on South Africa’s mining and political economy did not of course cease after his 
death and is part of the founding story of the South African political economy which is detailed further in 
Chapter Three.  
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perhaps because of the pursuit of trade) throughout the history of human interactions and 
state engagement, economic diplomacy scholarship has been slow to offer any meaningful 
analytical debate about this phenomenon.  
 
The research uses a single country case study, of South Africa, for a few reasons. First, South 
Africa is a regionally dominant economy, not just in Southern Africa but also in sub-Saharan 
Africa (IMF 2011).7 South Africa produced 35 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) (IMF 2007). In 2007, some 28 percent of gross national product 
(GNP) produced in the whole of Africa is produced by South Africa. Second, following the 
transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa is held up by the international community as an 
important role model for democracy and human rights on the continent (Schoeman 2003). 
Third, for various reasons South Africa plays a significant role in multilateral institutions and 
as such is often ‘punching above its weight’ given that South Africa’s share of the world 
economy is a minuscule 0.5 percent (World Bank 2011). South Africa is cited as being one of 
the influential large developing countries in the world and this is evident in South Africa’s 
alliance with the BRICS as well as the role played by South Africa in the G20 (Alden and 
Vieira 2005).8 As part of the BRICS, there is potential for South Africa to continue to ‘punch 
above its weight’ in the global economy (Jopson 2010; Haibin 2011; Meyer and Pronina 
2011; Wagner and Jackman 2011, April 2). Finally, as this thesis demonstrates, business has 
played a key role at various junctures in South Africa’s political economy historically and 
continues to do so, on the international stage. South Africa has enjoyed a high international 
profile as the economic power-house of sub-Saharan Africa, as a leading democratic light on 
the African continent and as a large developing country player in the World Trade 
                                                      
7
 Sub-Saharan Africa refers to the geographic region of Africa which lies South of the Sahara. It includes 47 
countries comprising East, West, Central and Southern Africa. The region is economically dominated by South 
Africa and Nigeria with rising influence from Angola. The latter two are oil-producing countries while South 
Africa is an oil importing country. 
8
 After invitation by China, South Africa became the S in BRICS on the 24
th
 of December 2010. Brazil, Russia, 
India and China are the four other members of the BRICS axis. 
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Organisation (WTO) (Nolutshungu 1994; Brummerhoff 1998; Bleany et al 1999; Vale and 
Taylor 1999; Nel et al 2001; Taylor 2001; van der Westhuizen 2001; Keet 2002, May; 
Schoeman 2003; Botha 2004; Alden and Soko 2005; Lee 2006; Taylor and Williams 2006; 
Lynch 2006, November 13; Nayyar 2008; Vickers 2008a; Meyer and Pronina 2011). In 
selecting the case study, the research does not intend to imply that the modes of engagement 
identified here apply only to South Africa. It is likely these modes of engagement are present 
among NSAs from other countries and at play in other diplomatic settings.  
 
While there has been significant research on South African business-government relations, to 
date there has been little or no study of South African business in economic diplomacy 
(Handley 2002; Grobbelaar 2004; Fig 2007b; Goldstein and Pritchard 2008; Grobbelaar 
2008; Handley 2008; Kganyago 2008; Nnadozie et al 2008). The extant literature on South 
African business and politics provides a useful secondary resource, but lack of research into 
business and economic diplomacy in South Africa, necessitates a more empirical approach to 
this study.  What then is our understanding of economic diplomacy? 
 
1.1		 Defining	the	concept	of	economic	diplomacy		
The term economic diplomacy begins with the premise that diplomacy as a practice can 
include economic issues. This is not a given in the diplomacy studies literature and this thesis 
maintains that there is a need to extend traditional definitions of diplomacy to include a 
broader array of issues than has historically been the case. Although the earliest records of 
diplomatic practice from ancient civilisations in the Amarna Age, through the Machiavelli era 
and Renaissance diplomacy indicate that commercial ties were a critical part of the reason for 
diplomatic relations, diplomacy has been formalised as a practice focused primarily on 
matters of security and high politics (Cohen, 1999). Theoretical conceptualisation has at 
6 
 
times ignored nuances in diplomatic practice or failed to give account of shifting practices in 
modern diplomacy (Bayne and Woolcock 2007a: 1).  
 
Much of the diplomacy literature tends to be in the form of a narrative which is positioned in 
particular historical context, and so we might expect to find very different historical 
conceptions of diplomacy. Far from it, in fact, as Mattingley (1955) noted, there is a 
surprising continuity in the range of definitions. From a statist perspective diplomacy refers 
to the process of achieving peaceful relations between sovereign states through regular, 
official negotiations in an ordered way, involving agents such as ambassadors or envoys 
(Nicolson 1957; Satow 1979; Richardson 1994; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995).9 In this vein, 
Berridge (2002: 1) defines the primary purpose of diplomacy as “to enable states to secure 
the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda or law”.  
 
Although an ancient practice, the term diplomacy was first employed in 1796, by Edmund 
Burke, prior to which it was generally referred to as ‘negotiation’ (Berridge 1995).10 For 
traditional scholars, diplomacy is the means by which co-operation is achieved, essential to 
the difference between peace and war (Nicolson 1951; Kissinger 1994). Diplomacy is the 
‘bulwark against international chaos’ both a civilizing as well as a civilized activity and, 
practically, a means of achieving foreign policy (Berridge 2002; Berridge and James 2003: 1; 
Commynes 2004; Lee and Hudson 2004: 354). Traditional approaches to diplomacy see 
diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument where diplomacy remains the preserve of the state, 
and in realist thinking, has a “constitutive function”(Lee and Hocking 2010 : 1218). 
                                                      
9
 This classical or traditional view of the centrality of the state to diplomatic processes is widespread and finds 
resonance in the work of numerous other authors, such as Ernest Satow (1979), Harold Nicolson (1951) 
Foreign Office diplomat turned journalist, and Henry Kissinger (1957). See also Berridge and James (2003) ; Bull 
(1977);  Watson  (1982) tellingly entitled “Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States”. 
 
10
 Diplomacy was practised by the ancient Egyptians, Greeks and Byzantines. See Nicolson (1957) and Cohen 
(1995; 1999) for descriptions of early forms of diplomacy.  
7 
 
Diplomacy is seen as a means of ordering the anarchical chaos of the international system, by 
providing a balance of power (Morgenthau 1966; Watson 1982; Marshall 1997).  
 
Sharp (2010: 1045) argues that diplomacy was evident before the advent of the modern 
Westphalian states system and as such makes the ‘exclusive association’ of diplomacy with 
the state invalid. Other diplomacy scholars are also challenging the statist emphasis of 
classical diplomacy. A number of these scholars are turning to sociology to theorise 
diplomacy, using constructivist or post-modernist approaches (Wendt 1999; Neumann 2002; 
Sharp 2002; Jonsson and Hall 2006: 19; Sharp and Wiseman 2007). The English School, for 
example, frame diplomacy as a social practice (Reus-Smit 1999; Buzan 2004). Der Derian 
(1987) describes diplomacy as a mediation between groups of people removed or separated 
from one another and the diplomatic system as the means by which relations are maintained, 
mediated and reproduced.  Building on the contributions of these emerging theoretical 
approaches, Jonnson and Hall (2006: 37) present an analytical framework for understanding 
diplomacy which is premised on three crucial elements: communication, representation and 
reproduction of international society, which in turn take place within the institution of 
diplomacy. In this conceptualisation, diplomacy is understood as a process (thus able to 
change) grounded in certain rituals which are defined by specific roles, norms and rules 
(Jonsson and Hall 2006: 39). These perspectives are grounded in the rejection of the notion 
that sovereign states are the only and best way to conceive of plurality in international society 
(Constantinou 1996; Hoffman 2003). Arising from this logic then, is the idea that diplomacy 
can be practised (and indeed has historically been practised) by NSAs (Barston 2006; Sharp 
2010). Hedley Bull’s (1977: 156) definition concurs: diplomacy is “the conduct of relations 
between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by 
peaceful means”.  
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Furthermore, diplomacy is not simply about the prevention of war. Diplomacy is certainly 
engaged in ‘high’ politics but also extends to the conduct of numerous broad ranging 
negotiations and interactions at different levels within the international system (Cohen and 
Westbrook 2000). This is evident in emerging literatures exploring diverse issues such as 
celebrity diplomacy (Cooper 2007), public diplomacy (Sharp 2005; Fitzpatrick 2007; van 
Ham 2007; Zaharna 2007), commercial diplomacy (Kostecki and Naray 2007), citizen 
diplomacy (Sharp 2001; Nye 2010, October 4), cultural diplomacy (Gienow-Hecht and 
Donfried 2010), tourism diplomacy (Germann Molz 2010), human rights diplomacy 
(Mullerson 1996) climate change diplomacy (Skodvin 2000) and economic diplomacy 
(Bayne and Woolcock 2007a).  Diplomatic services today engage in political and economic 
work to much the same extent - when and where the two elements can even be distinguished 
from one another - such that ‘economics permeates diplomacy’ (Rana 2002). This is 
supported by the fact that commercial activities are dominant in terms of resource allocation 
within current diplomatic systems (Lee and Hudson 2004: 345).  Neo-realist scholars 
embrace the idea of economic diplomacy but retain the notion that as a process, diplomacy is 
still the preserve of state actors and does not constitute a new type of diplomacy (Berridge 
and James 2003: 91). In this conception economic diplomacy is part of the toolbox of state-
craft to be used strategically as a positive or negative sanction (Hanson 1988; Davis 1999).   
 
New contributions to diplomacy studies focus on the importance of commercial diplomacy 
and trade diplomacy in the international system. Scholarship by Kostecki and Naray (2007) 
differentiates between trade diplomacy and commercial diplomacy. Commercial diplomacy 
refers to government activity aimed at servicing the needs of business communities, through 
information gathering, trade promotion, business advocacy and business intelligence 
(Berridge 2002; Coolsaet 2004; Rana 2004b). Trade diplomacy refers to trade policy making 
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and negotiation (multilateral trade negotiations, consultations and dispute resolution) as 
opposed to the provision of ‘business-support’. Trade diplomacy is the process of influencing 
policy and regulatory decisions that impact on trade and investment (Lee and Hocking 2010 : 
1221).  The trade diplomacy literature is primarily focused on exploring multilateral 
negotiation processes such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/ World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and there is a large body of work on the role of developing 
countries in these processes and the use of coalitions and collective bargaining power within 
multilateral diplomacy (Tussie and Glover 1993; Narlikar 2003; Narlikar and Tussie 2004b; 
Draper 2005a; Narlikar 2005a; Clapp 2006; Odell 2006; Cooper et al 2007; Rana 2007; 
Narlikar 2008).  
This scholarship also takes cognisance of the increasingly important role being played by 
business as NSAs (Mc Guire 2004; Hocking 2004c; Pigman 2005).11  NSAs participate 
directly along-side official representatives at economic negotiations often involved as part of 
a negotiation team/delegation at economic interchanges such as Davos, G8 summits, the 
WTO and others (Pigman and Vickers 2010). Rana (2007: 201) provides a useful definition 
of economic diplomacy that encompasses the need to incorporate economic considerations as 
well as the role of NSAs in economic diplomacy as “the process through which countries 
tackle the outside world, to maximize their national gain in all the fields of activity including 
trade, investment and other forms of economically beneficial exchanges, where they enjoy 
comparative advantage; it has bilateral, regional and multilateral dimensions, each of which is 
important”. In line with the contributions being made by the emerging scholarship on 
economic diplomacy, this thesis adopts a broad and inclusive definition of economic 
diplomacy that acknowledges a process covering a wide agenda of issues and engaged in by 
                                                      
11
 The involvement of NSAs is not new in diplomacy, as the role of traders as diplomatic envoys during the 
Amarna era evidences (Cohen and Westbrook 2000).  
10 
 
both state and NSAs. This thesis thus contributes to the burgeoning literature in diplomacy 
that supports a broader agenda for economic diplomacy as well as the importance of 
including analysis of agency beyond (but not to the exclusion of) the state.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis economic diplomacy scholarship is defined as the study of the 
methods and processes of multiple stakeholders interacting across various levels 
(domestically and internationally) around economic issues. This emphasis on diplomacy as 
process rather than simply outcomes of diplomatic engagement is a crucial point of 
differentiation. In analysing economic diplomacy it is not simply the outcomes that matter, as 
it is often difficult to pinpoint direct causality in diplomatic outcomes.  At what point in a 
series of engagements and relationship building events is it possible to say that a ‘diplomatic 
outcome’ has been achieved? Diplomatic outcomes are often the result of a series of meetings 
and events and interactions. Diplomacy is really about a process and building of layers of 
trust in order to bring about a desired outcome to mutual satisfaction, if the diplomatic 
process has been particularly successful. Sometimes diplomacy results in no outcome at all, 
this could be regarded as a diplomatic failure – but does not mean that no diplomacy has been 
taking place up to the point of breakdown or failure to accomplish an outcome. For example, 
one could not regard the past 11 years of diplomatic activity around the Doha Round of the 
WTO and widely accepted dead-lock as an outcome; and yet there has clearly been a 
significant level of diplomatic activity. This is usefully described as ‘diplomacy as process’ 
and as such is no less relevant to diplomacy than a specified outcome. It would therefore be 
counter-productive to refer to or seek evidence of diplomatic outcomes as the sole 
confirmation of diplomacy. In the context of this thesis it is particularly important in the 
analysis of the three modes of engagement: consultative, supplementary and entrepreneurial; 
business is engaged in numerous forms of economic diplomacy but many of these are not 
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identifiable as diplomatic outcomes. This does not diminish their importance as forms of 
economic diplomacy processes. By observing patterns of engagement we can surmise 
diplomatic processes at work in this instance. 
 
The thesis will apply Odell’s (2000: 11) broad definition to describe the issues of economic 
diplomacy as the “production, movement or exchange of goods, services, investments, 
money, information and their regulation”. This thesis is specifically focused on the role of 
business as NSAs in economic diplomacy but does not, as a result, intend to ignore or 
diminish the importance of other actors in the economic diplomacy process such as other 
NSAs or the State and its representatives.  
 
As this thesis is focused on the role of non-state actors in economic diplomacy it is useful to 
understand what is meant by the term at the outset. Non state actors are defined as actors in 
international society representing various interests and able to exert influence either 
domestically or internationally on a range of issues (Calhoun 2002). Another term for such 
actors might be actors with private authority or in some terminology transnational actors 
referring to those private actors able to transact across national borders such as individuals, 
MNCs or advocacy networks (Lake 2008).  The focus of IPE literature on non-state actors 
through research into the role of MNCs was a significant influence on the emerging 
importance of non-state actors in international relations research in the early 1960s and 1970s 
(Ravenhill 2008). In essence the notion of non-state actors emerged as a challenge to realism 
and state-centric theory with its emphasis on states as the critical component of international 
relations (Keohane 1972; Keohane and Nye 1977). For the purposes of this thesis non-state 
actors will refer to those actors that are not specifically identified as part of the state 
apparatus. Thus the ANC is analysed as a non-state actors since the party also has an identity 
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separate from the mechanisms of state and government. The ANC party has meetings and 
policy discussions apart from those that constitute its activities as the leading and governing 
party of South Africa. The same is thus true for COSATU and the SACP which are also 
social partners in the government of South Africa.  
 
State actors then are defined as those representing the characteristics of legal sovereignty and 
control of territory and people. This refers to government departments, ministers and official 
government representatives.  How we understand the kind of state South Africa represents 
may tell us something of the role of business as non-state actors in South Africa’s economic 
diplomacy. This thesis clearly identifies the ongoing importance of the state, despite 
emphasising the role of NSAs. In this regard a more liberal state (such as the UK or the USA) 
is likely to be more susceptible to globalisation processes, whereas a more centralised form of 
government (such as Russia or China) may present a less susceptible form of state. The 
nature of statehood can also be differentiated in terms of weak or strong states; those that 
control access to a greater or lesser extent. For example non-democratic regimes are deemed 
to represent a stronger (or more controlling) state whereas more democratic states are often 
regarded as weaker states which are more easily influenced by outside pressures and often are 
more liberal in their positioning (Lake 2008). This is not the same as identifying failed states 
which are unable to exert the necessary control over territory and people that lend the 
necessary legal sovereignty to statehood. In the case of South Africa it can be argued that the 
form of state that has emerged has leaned closer to that of a liberal state, easily influenced by 
the ideas of globalisation and the influences of individuals, corporations and advocacy 
networks (Kahler and Lake 2003). 12  
 
                                                      
12
 See the discussion of South Africa’s post-apartheid ‘liberalisation’ in section 3.5 of chapter three.   
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1.2		 The	Thesis	Argument	
The thesis argues that NSAs are critical elements of diplomacy studies and demonstrates this 
through the empirical evidence of the role of business in South Africa’s post-apartheid 
economic diplomacy. Integral to this argument is that economic diplomacy is not market-
centric (structural) but that the role of agency is vital to the various levels and processes at 
which economic diplomacy is taking place. Furthermore, the study contends that diplomacy 
is about a far wider range of issues than just state security, among which is economics. The 
thesis demonstrates empirically the extent to which business as agents of economic 
diplomacy are as much consumers of diplomatic outcomes as they are producers of economic 
diplomacy. 
 
The ontological basis of the research also means that, while not directly engaging in the 
structure/agency debate, the research of necessity touches upon the debate because it is 
premised on the importance of actors (for which read agency) in processes of economic 
diplomacy (Archer 1982; Giddens 1984; Wendt 1987; Jessop 1996; Hay 2002). The study 
adopts a strategic relational approach to the structure/agency debate which acknowledges any 
distinction between structure and agency as analytical, rather than substantive (Jessop 1990; 
Jessop 1996; Hay 2002:127).  This approach enables us to provide a contextual setting for 
agencies in such a way that agents consciously interact with the context in which they are 
situated and by such actions are responsible for altering the structure or contextual setting at 
the same time (Hay 2002: 129). Strategic relational proponents point to the co-constitutive 
nature of agency and structure in a relational existence, such that structure and agency 
interact but also transform each other (McAnulla 2002: 281).  
 
In the context of diplomacy, Wiseman (2004: 36) argues that International Relations (IR) 
theory has neglected the link between diplomacy theory, precisely because of the emphasis 
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diplomacy scholars have tended to place on structural characteristics of the international 
system, rather than on “diplomatic agency, roles and relationships”. The empirical data of this 
study builds a picture of corporate diplomacy that contributes significantly to our 
understanding of the agency/structure relationship in economic diplomacy as well as 
International Political Economy (IPE) more broadly. All four diplomatic roles discussed in 
the empirical chapters, a consultative, supplementary, substitutive and producer or activist 
role adopted by business through various strategies at different levels in South Africa’s 
economic diplomacy, point to a very specific role for business as agency in economic 
diplomacy. They also show the importance of structure in the form of the contextual political 
economy within which both business NSAs and the state are interacting. Corporate diplomats 
are created by and also create markets; business NSAs are agents of globalisation as well as 
being constrained by the same process.  
 
This research conceptualises South Africa as an emerging power with an active number of 
corporate diplomats. The thesis unpacks the where, how and why of corporate diplomacy 
filling a much needed gap in the diplomacy studies literature which tends to be abstract or 
comprises the heroic memoirs of ambassadors. The empirical evidence presented 
demonstrates that business NSAs are engaged in three modes of economic diplomacy:  
consultative, supplementary, and entrepreneurial. 
 
1.3	 Analytical	framework		
The section above, defining economic diplomacy, presents the basis for adopting a 
multifaceted approach to conceptualising economic diplomacy that recognises a wider and 
deeper definition of economic diplomacy. Such a polycentric or multi-actor framework can 
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be found in Hocking’s (2005) Multistakeholder Diplomacy (MSD).13 This study draws on a 
MSD approach combining these insights with other relevant contributions such as the 
triangular diplomacy proposed  by Stopford and Strange (1991), polylateralism presented by 
Wiseman (Wiseman 2004) and multi-actor diplomacy described by Saner and Yiu (Saner and 
Yiu 2008) to formulate an analytical framework. In doing this, it is important to note that 
while the analytical framework refers to multiple actors including a variety of NSAs, for the 
purposes of this study the framework is applied only to business as NSAs in economic 
diplomacy. This does not detract from the importance or relevance of other NSAs or the state, 
and these stakeholders are referred to where they are pertinent to the discussion of business 
NSAs in the empirical chapters. This approach provides a necessary focus that enables the 
research to fully explore the extent to and ways in which business engages in South Africa’s 
post-apartheid economic diplomacy (and why). 
 
In particular the research contributes to MSD as a framework, by identifying three 
distinguishing modes of engagement business in economic diplomacy, namely a consultative 
role, a supplementary role, and an entrepreneurial role. In addition, the thesis makes a 
valuable contribution to the approach by providing much needed empirical evidence of the 
utility of a MSD approach. Going forward, the study uses the acronym MSD to refer to the 
array of approaches described above that encompass multi-actor or polycentric perspectives.  
 
Key features of MSD  
 
Hocking (2005) identifies a number of areas in which MSD differs from the state-centric 
model of diplomacy. These form the key features of a MSD approach which is used to 
                                                      
13 Other scholars also resonate with a MSD approach, such as  Susan Strange’s (1992) reference to two new 
dimensions of diplomacy (beyond state-state diplomacy), namely, state-firm and firm-firm diplomacy  Also see 
John Ruggie’s (1995) conceptualisation of two ‘cultures’ of diplomacy, the ‘old’ or traditional secretive and 
state-centred understanding and the ‘emergent’ modernist culture, with an emphasis on transparency and 
including a broad range of stakeholders (Ruggie 1995, January 24). See also Saner and Yiu (2003; 2005). 
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analyse business NSAs in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. The analysis evaluates the 
empirical themes against the key features of MSD in order to analyse the extent to and ways 
in which business as NSAs engage in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy. 
 
The first of the key features of a MSD framework is that actors in diplomacy represent a wide 
array of stakeholders beyond (but including) the state, engaging across domestic and 
international boundaries arenas. Private actors, referred to in this thesis as NSAs (including 
Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and firms or business) are significant players in a 
MSD approach. In this way, both the State or NSAs (or grouping of these) may lead 
diplomatic initiatives and neither leading party will necessarily exclude the other actors from 
the diplomatic process.   
 
Second, in a MSD approach diplomats are facilitators and entrepreneurs and stakeholders 
(state or otherwise) can perform multiple functions. This differs from the traditional state-
centric model which sees diplomats as a distinct professional class, who derive their authority 
from sovereignty where NSAs are confined to the role of “consumers of diplomacy” 
(Hocking 2005: 7).  MSD allows for NSAs to move beyond the consumer role and become 
producers of diplomacy as well.  
 
Third, the inclusivity implicit in MSD challenges traditional perspectives of diplomacy which 
emphasise the closed-club nature of diplomatic circles within a state-centric model, wherein 
the diplomat is a “gatekeeper or mediator” between the domestic and international context 
(which is artificially separated) (Hocking 2004a). In the MSD approach the role of the 
diplomat is extended from gate-keeper to facilitator in keeping with the next feature which 
emphasises inclusivity (Rana 2004).  
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Fourth, MSD embraces a complex and networked policy environment rather than the state-
centric approach’s hierarchical structure. Interdependence is emphasised with openness and 
inclusivity characteristic of communications within the MSD approach. Conversely a state-
centric model is premised on government-led communication and a top-down ‘out-reach’ to 
other stakeholders in diplomatic processes (Reinicke 1998).   
 
Fifth, in a state-centric model, diplomacy functions are focused on managing relations 
between states and defining and promoting the national interest. In contrast MSD finds that 
the complexity and broad range of agendas require input from various actors including NSAs 
and other government departments than just those focused on formalised diplomatic 
processes directly. This takes the form of an exchange of resources to address deficits of 
legitimacy, knowledge and access. This can be achieved through an exchange of information 
and technical expertise; particularly in trade policy-making and negotiations, input from 
business is regarded as crucial. The national interest is defined and promoted via a network of 
input requiring a coalition of actors functioning in tandem.   
 
Sixth, whereas the state-centric model attempts to artificially separate the domestic arena 
from the international, MSD recognises that the reality of diplomacy is far more complex and 
often transcends neat distinctions of location. Business NSAs can be pursuing domestic 
objectives simultaneously with their international ones and using different fora to achieve 
specific goals; sometimes in conjunction with government diplomats or officials and 
sometimes independently of these. MSD emphasises the diversity of sites of diplomatic 
engagement rather than confining such sites to formal arenas.  
 
Seventh, traditional state-centric models refer primarily to formal and permanent missions, 
whereas contemporary diplomatic processes see representation as occurring as and when 
needed. This is because diplomacy is increasingly conducted around technically challenging 
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issues such as environmental issues or intellectual property rights, rather than pure market 
access-type negotiations of old.  
 
Eighth, the rules governing MSD are fluid; in a state-centric model protocol and formality 
provide a structure and defined expectation in diplomatic processes. The relative newness of 
MSD and the multiplicity of actors in the MSD mean that there is not always a clearly 
defined norm of behaviour which can prolong negotiations while each party grapples with 
their shifting roles and expectations. Differing ideas about diplomacy between sovereign 
actors and NSAs can lead to misunderstandings. However, MSD is premised on transparency 
and accountability (particularly from civil society NSAs). This may in turn present 
difficulties in negotiations that formerly depended on confidentiality to overcome political 
sensitivities. Such disagreements can give rise to new tensions in the diplomatic process, but 
MSD approaches necessitate the need for new rules and norms that encompass the complex 
reality of multiple new actors in diplomacy across a multiplicity of issues.  
 
Triangular Diplomacy 
 
Stopford and Strange (1991: 19-23) refer to the interdependence that is driven by increasing 
cross-border competition, for firms as well as states, in terms of triangular diplomacy. This is 
stimulated by technological advances, capital mobility, reduced communication costs and 
improved transport links (Strange 1997: 61). In triangular diplomacy, the ‘old’ diplomacy is 
being transformed. National boundaries no longer define the arena of interaction. Traditional 
diplomatic representatives in embassies and foreign ministries are no longer the sole agents 
of diplomatic practice and are now joined by business representatives and other government 
ministries. These actors are all engaged in domestic, bilateral and multilateral processes. The 
triangle of diplomacy is also three-dimensional in that the three interacting relationships also 
each interact upon the other. So state-state interaction, firm-firm and state-firm negotiations 
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inform the processes in play upon one another too. However for Strange (1997) triangular 
diplomacy appears to be more about the declining power of the state and the imperative for 
states to compete in attracting foreign investments, than the more balanced multi-actor 
diplomacy proposed by MSD or polycentric approaches. 
 
Unlike polylateralism, Stopford and Strange also do not seem to give account of a broader 
range of NSAs such as Labour Unions and civil society in the form of NGOs, which is 
addressed by the other multidimensional approaches. Although this study is focusing 
primarily on business NSAs, this is done with the understanding that other NSAs are also 
important stakeholders in the economic diplomacy process. The focus on business is made in 
order to give full expression to the specific modes of engagement undertaken by business 
NSAs; it is anticipated that other stakeholders may engage in different modes of engagement 
(which would be the topic of further research). 
 
Polylateralism 
 
Wiseman (2004: 36) contends that polylateralism is a response to the implications for 
diplomatic practice of the increasing activity of transnational actors in international relations.  
Polylateralism is a new form of diplomacy which requires diplomats to respond to bilateral 
and multilateral diplomatic processes as usual but also to polylateral levels which include 
“relations between states and other entities” (Wiseman 2004). Diplomacy is defined by him 
as “relations between states, international organisations and non-state actors” – but contrary 
to Stopford and Strange’s triangular diplomacy, Wiseman does not include relations between 
NSAs as characterised by the firm-firm diplomacy above. This is not NGO-diplomacy, but 
how states and NSAs interact with one another. Thus, Wiseman contends that polylateralism 
does not imply the decline of the Westphalian states system (as Strange (1992) argues), in 
line with the argument put forward by MSD and this study, that including NSAs in our 
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analysis of economic diplomacy does not mean the exclusion of the state; on the contrary, the 
state remains a key player in the conduct of diplomacy as both a participant and target of 
diplomacy.  
 
A	Multi-actor	diplomacy	
 
Addressing the issue of economic diplomacy specifically, Saner and  Yiu (2008) propose a  
multi-actor diplomacy building on the contributions of MSD and polylateralism. A multi-
actor diplomacy is characterised by different diplomatic functions and roles for the various 
entities engaging in economic diplomacy. These roles are separated between State, business 
NSAs and NGO-NSAs. State actors fulfil the roles of economic diplomats and commercial 
diplomats; business NSAs are either corporate diplomats or business diplomats and NGOs are 
national NGO diplomats or Transnational NGO diplomats. This thesis is concerned with 
business NSAs, and thus focuses on the diplomatic functions and roles of business NSAs 
identified by Saner and Yiu (2008).  In their typology, corporate diplomacy refers to the 
internal relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries of transnational corporations. 
Business diplomacy is the conduct of relations between the transnational corporation and 
external constituencies such as NGOs, trade unions, cultural groups and political parties. A 
weakness in this typology is that they do not refer to the conduct of diplomacy between 
business NSAs and state diplomats, or to the possibility that business NSAs which are not 
transnational in nature may also be relevant entities for examination in economic diplomacy 
processes. This thesis also differs with Saner and Yiu’s (2008) definition of corporate 
diplomacy referring to internal relationships and business diplomacy as the external relations. 
This study holds that internal dealings are the concern of management studies, and that 
diplomacy more properly refers to external relations (referring here to Der Derian’s (1987) 
conception of the estrangement between groups and others). Furthermore, the research 
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disagrees with the implication of their typology that commercial and economic diplomacy are 
roles confined to state actors. This seems to imply that diplomacy between state actors and 
business NSAs is a one-way process driven by states, since there is no reference to a 
corresponding role for business NSAs in seeking investment opportunities. This research 
adopts a broader understanding of the term corporate diplomacy and uses the term to refer to 
the multiple roles engaged in by business NSAs in pursuing economic diplomacy initiatives 
across multiple venues (domestically and internationally). 
 
Tools, methods and functions of economic diplomacy 
 
The tools, methods and functions of economic diplomacy include a wide range of activities.  
These include information gathering and sharing, policy advice, reporting, communication, 
dialogue, negotiation, lobbying, compromise, mediation, symbolism and representation, 
(Berridge 2002; Wiseman 2004: 41; Hocking 2004a: 149; Murray 2008: 23). The empirical 
chapters that follow identify three modes of engagement, a consultative role, a supplementary 
role,  and an entrepreneurial role, by corporate actors in economic diplomacy that illustrate 
how NSAs are engaging in economic diplomacy.  
 
A MSD framework is useful to this study because it opens up the way in which we 
understand diplomacy, so that multiple actors or stakeholders are included in the analysis, 
thus facilitating research into business NSAs in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. 
Incorporating insights from triangular diplomacy also enables us to account for diplomacy as 
a multi-dimensional process with stakeholders interacting on one another, including the 
notion of diplomacy as an activity occurring between various NSAs, which is evident in the 
supplementary and entrepreneurial modes of engagement this study identifies. Polylateralism 
specifically provides for diplomacy between state and NSA entities, beyond the consultative 
role of NSAs, which is evident in the entrepreneurial mode of corporate diplomacy in South 
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Africa’s economic diplomacy. Furthermore, MSD accounts for interactions that transcend 
domestic and international distinctions, in the way that South African business demonstrates.  
In adopting this framework the empirical research is presented around three key elements to 
enable an analysis of the extent to which and ways in which South African business engages 
in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy. First, the analysis examines the key 
stakeholders in South Africa’s economic diplomacy, exploring the role of agency in 
economic diplomacy. Second the thesis reviews the sites and locations of diplomatic 
processes including domestic and international fora. Third, the chapters analyse the modes of 
engagement employed by business NSAs. 
	
1.4		 Methodological	approach	
The focus of this study is to explore the extent to which and ways in which South African 
business engage in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. The research relies on a single-
country case-study to enable an in-depth analysis of business NSAs. The analytical 
framework applied in the research is based on empirical observation derived from semi-
structured interviews and secondary literature reviews and adopts an inductive approach, 
using a qualitative method, of semi-structured interviews.  
 
Case studies are particularly useful in instances where there is not much known about a 
particular phenomenon, current perspectives are insufficient as they are not grounded in 
adequate empirical findings,  or there is a need for a new perspective (Eisenhardt 1999: 
535,548; Simons 2009: 20). The value of the case study method is that it enables data 
collection across a wide range of variables on a single group, enabling a thorough account to 
be given of a particular phenomenon (Burnham et al 2004: 55).  In this study, by focusing on 
a single-country the researcher was able to conduct a significant number of in-depth 
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interviews across a broad spectrum of stakeholders, with the primary focus on business NSAs 
given the theme of the research question. There is very little, if any, data in the secondary 
literature on South African business and economic diplomacy thus making the argument for 
using a case-study methodology. Case studies are particularly useful where the research 
context is highly complex and not suited to experimental or survey research, as is the case in 
this thesis (Bloor and Wood 2006: 27). In this instance the definition of a case study 
employed by Yin (2003: 13) as an empirical enquiry that “investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon with-in its real-life context” is particularly relevant. 
 
The data was gathered using a mixed-method approach. A series of semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with representatives across a broad spectrum of groups in South 
Africa. These included large and small firms as well as Multinational Corporations (MNCs), 
BEE groups, business and industry associations, think tanks (South African Institute of 
International Affairs; Third World Network; Trade and Industrial Policy strategies); research 
institutions, government officials and trade negotiators.14 In total some 41 interviews were 
conducted over three field trips (2006, 2009, and 2010).15   
 
The diversity, seniority and standing of the interviewees are of significant value to the 
research and thus constitute a meaningful sample. The interviewees were sourced from both 
lareg MNCs, smaller businesses as well as business and industry associations representing 
                                                      
14
 There is ongoing debate about whether Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and MNCs constitute the same 
thing. Some maintain that TNCs are those that operate globally without any strong link to a national home 
state, whereas a MNC is also a corporation that operates globally and with ties in more than one country but 
still identifiable as emanating from a particular national parentage. To some extent this debate links to the one 
around what constitutes corporate nationality discussed earlier under FN 3. For more on the discussion of TNC 
versus MNC see Perlmutter (1994: 295-308). Through the duration of this thesis I will therefore refer to MNCs 
and TNCs interchangeably.  
15
 A full list of interviews is included in Appendix 1. All interviewees were willing to be identified but some 
preferred not to be directly referenced or quoted in the thesis. Throughout the thesis where interviews are 
referenced the abbreviation Int: in italics will preface the surname of the relevant interviewee and the year of 
interview. For example (Int: Surname 2009). The reader can find full details of the interviewee in Appendix 1. 
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both larges as well as small and medium sized enterprises. In addition, interviews were 
conducted with a range of government representatives both within the DTI and DIRCO to 
gain a different perspective form that presented by business interviewees. Finally a select 
number of interviews was conducted with people within think tanks working across a range 
or related issues to this thesis and links to a wide variety of stakeholders relevant to the topic. 
As such, given that business representatives of the key business associations (BUSA and 
BLSA) as well as individual MNCs such as Sasol, MTN and Absa as well as SMEs 
represented by SACCI and the JCCI were interviewed along-side academics, think tanks, 
civil society groups and government representatives a broad range of perspectives were 
included.  Using semi-structured interviews enabled a more open-ended and informal 
process, guided by the interviewer’s topic schedule but free to follow any direction opened up 
during the interview itself (Silverman 2001; Bloor and Wood 2006: 104). This adds to the 
depth and validity of the interview process as part of a case study methodology (Cicourel 
1964; Fontana and Frey 2003; Holstein and Gubrium 2004).  
 
This format of interview was selected due to the advantages offered in keeping the interviews 
open-ended which facilitated the requirements of the case study method. Since such 
interviews are not rigidly formatted they “permit greater scope for respondents to answer 
questions on their own terms” (May 1993: 93). The methodology used is intended to 
engender qualitative and in-depth semi-structured interviews and was ideal for eliciting 
responses free from restrictions and for gathering data not available through other data 
sources (Grant 2000: 16; Burnham et al 2004: 219). Semi-structured elite interviewing is 
suited to a research design that is flexible and open to new ideas. This format also enabled he 
researcher to gather possible sources for other interviews during the interview process, thus 
enhancing the ability to gather broader perspective son the same issue where possible. The 
limitation of a ‘snow-balling’ approach was that it could lead to interviewing like-minded 
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people, or interviewees with a single perspective on the same issues. This was counter-
balanced by the attempt to ensure that a broad range of data was employed including official 
documentation (via minutes, press releases or websites) and media coverage as detailed 
below. 
 
In addition to the interviews, other data sources included attending conferences in South 
Africa, following press reports and reading business media (including internet sources as well 
as exploring reports and research by South African scholars (much of it not 
published/available in the UK or outside South Africa); following relevant parliamentary 
proceedings; reading minutes and organisational manifestos and annual reports. Using more 
than interviews, as a single means of data gathering, enabled me to avoid relying solely on 
interviews, thus circumventing some of the problems associated with the subjective 
perceptions common to interview-based methods (Bryman 2001: 274). It was also vital to 
gain the perspectives of people from different aspects of the same issue, for example 
interviews were conducted with National Economic Development and Labour Council 
NEDLAC organisers, government department officials and business representatives about the 
same elements related to consultation. The interviews, of necessity, included many more 
business representatives than any other group, by virtue of the focus of this research on 
business NSAs in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. 
 
1.5  Thesis outline 
 
The thesis is structured to provide the contextual setting for South Africa’s economic 
diplomacy, both historical and contemporary, to analyse the actors engaging in diplomatic 
processes, and to describe the fora or sites of diplomatic engagement. The thesis assumes a 
strategic relational interplay between structure and agency in South Africa’s post-apartheid 
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economic diplomacy, identifying three specific modes of engagement for business NSAs 
(Jessop 1996).  
 
In order to place the research into context in the relevant literature, the Chapter Two outlines 
the theoretical approaches relevant to analysing business NSAs in economic diplomacy. 
Chapter Two reviews the relevant core conceptual literature covering economic diplomacy, 
various theoretical approaches to the study of economic diplomacy and their utility for the 
research question. The chapter focuses on addressing the inclusion of the economic in 
diplomacy as well as how we might conceptualise the role of business NSAs in economic 
diplomacy. Finally, the chapter outlines a multi-faceted approach to analysing diplomacy that 
forms the grounding for the MSD analytical framework applied in this study.  
 
Chapter Three provides an essential historical background and the contextual setting of South 
Africa’s political economy supporting the empirical research. This chapter provides a 
contextual framework by presenting the political economy of South Africa’s political and 
economic transition at, and following, the 1994 watershed into the post-apartheid period.  The 
chapter sets out the political economy of South Africa’s trade within the global system in 
order to identify domestic issues and economic drivers in economic diplomacy processes. 
This provides a vital backdrop to the post-apartheid era relationship which is a crucial 
element of the discussion in the empirical chapters which examine the agency of business 
NSAs in economic diplomacy.   
 
Chapter Four analyses the stakeholders in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. First, the 
discussion explores the key state actors and processes of economic policy-making and 
diplomacy. Second, the chapter outlines the important NSAs in South Africa’s economic 
diplomacy, the ANC, trade unions, business and industry, think-tanks and research 
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institutions and NGOs. Finally the chapter links the discussion of the various stakeholders to 
the context of South Africa’s political economy, analysing the role of agency and explaining 
the constraints and opportunities for stakeholders dictated by the historical context.   
The next three chapters set out the analysis of the modes of engagement evident in South 
Africa’s corporate diplomacy. Chapter Five describes a consultative role for business NSAs, 
analysing the function of consultative mechanisms, and the diplomatic processes, tools and 
methods used by business in a consultative role. Again, the chapter brings into focus the 
significance of the historical context in understanding the dynamics of the consultative role 
played by business NSAs.   
 
Chapter Six analyses the supplementary role of business in economic diplomacy which is 
most evident in South Africa’s bilateral and regional diplomacy. The chapter investigates 
South-South diplomacy and the expansion of South African business interests through 
bilateral trade into Africa and other developing countries. The convergence between South 
Africa’s diplomatic agenda and commercial interests presents an opportunity for business to 
cooperate and work along-side state actors in pursuing diplomatic objectives.  
 
The entrepreneurial role of business NSAs as producers or activists in South Africa’s 
economic diplomacy is the focus of Chapter Seven. This chapter explores the sites of 
entrepreneurial diplomatic engagement for South African business, reviewing the extent of 
South Africa’s global corporate expansion and analysing the extent to and ways in which 
South Africa’s MNCs engage directly and independently of state actors in South Africa’s 
economic diplomacy. Business pursue commercial and economic goals through go-it-alone 
corporate diplomacy where business have become de facto diplomats in their own right, often 
taking government along after the fact in a flag-follows-trade diplomacy. An entrepreneurial 
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mode of engagement indicates that business stakeholders are no longer simply consumers of 
diplomacy but increasingly also producers of diplomatic processes and outcomes. 
 
Chapter Eight of the thesis concludes that the empirical evidence presented in the research 
supports the argument put forward that NSAs are producers as well as consumers of 
economic diplomacy and thus as corporate diplomats are important agents in the study of 
economic diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CONTEMPORARY COMPLEXITY OF 
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY 
2.1  Introduction 
The study of economic diplomacy highlights a variety of important and contested issues with 
respect to the international political and economic system during the post-war era. Many 
contributions to diplomacy studies remain focused, in theoretical terms, on a traditional 
realist perspective where only states matter and the key issue of concern to them relates to 
matters of security or ‘high’ politics. This does not reflect the complex reality of diplomatic 
practice. Until relatively recently, the bias towards the state in theoretical frameworks 
resulted in a tendency to neglect the conceptualisation of other vital issues in diplomacy, such 
as economic, cultural or environmental relations between states. There is also a tendency to 
overlook other important NSAs, such as private sector actors including business and civil 
society groups (Hocking 1999b; Lee and Hudson 2004: 353; Murray 2008). Returning for a 
moment to the definition of economic diplomacy outlined in chapter one, two key elements 
were identified as missing in traditional accounts of diplomacy: first, the importance of 
economic issues in diplomacy and, second, the role of actors other than the state in analysing 
diplomacy. These two aspects are crucial to this study by virtue of its parameters - exploring 
the role of business as NSAs in economic diplomacy. This also speaks to another dimension 
of interactions relevant to understanding diplomacy and that is between domestic and 
international levels. 
 
This thesis contends that economic diplomacy is an important element of diplomacy studies 
and that business as NSAs are an important component in the analysis of diplomacy. Using a 
single country case-study, the thesis addresses the role of South African business in South 
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Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy. This research question considers two important 
theoretical issues, namely:  
• Can there be a role for business as a NSA in the international political economy, 
expressed in this instance through the process of economic diplomacy? This question 
goes to the heart of ontological assumptions about what we may appropriately include 
as a unit of analysis in our study of IR and thus our enquiry into economic diplomacy.  
• If so, how do we explain their role? This question addresses the epistemological 
claims this thesis makes regarding how business engages in economic diplomacy and 
how we might explain this activity.  
 
Answering the above questions will require engaging with various theoretical approaches to 
diplomacy studies, as well as exploring the contributions of classical economics and IPE 
scholars. Various theoretical approaches currently used to analyse economic diplomacy will 
be reviewed and the extent to which these are helpful in understanding or explaining the role 
of business in economic diplomacy assessed. The literature review will then turn to include 
other approaches not thus far incorporated into the diplomacy canon so that a broader and 
more inclusive analytical framework for conceptualising the role of business as NSAs in 
economic diplomacy can be developed.  
 
In addressing the above theoretical issues, this chapter will concentrate on the emerging 
literature in economic diplomacy that seeks to refocus statist approaches. This refers to work 
by scholars exploring new approaches to diplomacy such as catalytic diplomacy, network 
diplomacy and polycentric/multistakeholder diplomacy which give particular reference to 
networks of diplomacy and inclusion of actors other than the state (Hocking and McGuire 
2002; Pigman 2007; Quick 2007; Saner and Yiu 2008; Pigman and Vickers 2010). Also of 
significance to the new conceptualisation of economic diplomacy is the inclusion of a broader 
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range of issues in economic diplomacy, such as tourism promotion, climate change, energy 
policy, investment agreements, commercial diplomacy, business/market intelligence, public 
diplomacy, human rights and intellectual property rights (Sell 2003; Capling 2004; Melissen 
2005; Kostecki and Naray 2007; MacNaughton 2007; Pigman 2007; Rana 2007; Wicks 
2007).  
 
The impetus for rethinking our approach to diplomacy arises out of the need to account first, 
for the economic in international relations, and second, the nature and role of actors beyond 
the state. The state/market debate in IPE literature is a mirror for the artificial dichotomy 
between politics and economics - the two disciplines are not discrete from one another. The 
first imperative to include economic considerations in our research into international relations 
also links into and informs the debate on including actors beyond the state in the study of 
international relations. The notion of the decline of state power in favour of private interests, 
while highly contested, remains a consistent theme in IPE debates (Korten 1995; Strange 
1996 ;  Cutler et al 1999; Klein 2000). This literature arises out of the proliferation in the 
number of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) as well as highlighting a spectrum of ‘new’ 
forms of political activity by business such as self-regulation, the rising prominence of rating 
agencies, numerous public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the privatisation of functions 
previously in the public domain (Stopford and Strange 1991: 13-19; Fuchs and Lederer 2007: 
3 and 43). 16 Despite this, there is a surprising lack of consistent theoretical frameworks in the 
literature to adequately conceptualise the increasing prominence of the role of private 
interests in International Relations (Lee and Hudson 2004; Fuchs and Lederer 2007: 43). In 
this regard, economic diplomacy has something also to offer IPE scholars by giving 
recognition to economic diplomats as significant contributors to a complex network of market 
                                                      
16
 As the empirical chapters following in this thesis will demonstrate the rise of MNCs is not confined simply to 
triad economies (USA, Europe and Japan) but extends very significantly to the large developing countries of 
the BRICs, including South Africa (Handley 2002; Goldstein 2007; Grobbelaar and Besada 2008).  
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forces and emphasising the often neglected relevance of agency in international society (Lee 
and Hocking 2010 : 1217-1218).   
 
These theoretical considerations provide the foundation for the empirical considerations of 
the research, namely understanding the ways in which and extent to which South African 
business engages in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. A critical aspect of this 
investigation is to explore where business engages in economic diplomacy activity, why it 
does so and crucially the modes of engagement that tell us more about how business is doing 
this. In so doing this thesis contributes valuable empirical evidence of business as NSAs 
engaging in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy, and also contributes to the 
further development of multi-actor approaches, such as polycentric or multistakeholder 
diplomacy.  
 
2.2  Theoretical perspectives 
Much of the diplomacy literature has been written by diplomats or historians, neither group 
being theory-focused (Jonsson and Hall 2006: 7). Traditional diplomacy is seen to lack 
analytical rigour in favour of descriptive narrative (Cooper and Hocking 2000: 363; Berridge 
et al 2001; Jonsson and Hall 2006: 1). A realist perspective of traditional diplomacy 
approaches tends to reduce diplomacy to an activity undertaken primarily by the state and 
engaging chiefly with issues of ‘high’ politics or security concerns (Cooper and Hocking 
2000; Lee and Hudson 2004: 347; Murray 2008: 29). The following sections will explore the 
dominant role of realist perspectives to diplomacy studies and then focus on contributions 
seeking to move beyond the realist assumptions of states as unitary actors in the system 
engaging primarily with issues of ‘high’ politics.  
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Realism  
 
In the realist tradition relative power is the key to understanding policy outcomes in 
diplomacy. 17  For realists, international relations are distinguished from domestic relations 
by the anarchical context in which they take place. This anarchy yields two possible tools for 
managing interactions in the absence of any over-arching authority – war and diplomacy 
(Kissinger 1994; Murray 2008: 7). According to Murray (2008: 28), a traditional realist 
perspective in diplomacy holds that “the central purpose of diplomacy (is) to overcome the 
anarchical nature of that system”.  Diplomats are the mechanism of the expression of a state’s 
foreign policy and the means by which states bring to bear the elements of their power in 
pursuit of their national interest (Morgenthau 1966; Kissinger 1994). In this 
conceptualisation, diplomacy is merely the antithesis of war; it does not define the 
international in any way and is simply a tool or mechanism for states to express their 
preferences or interests.  
 
Gilpin (1981) reflects that the international system is gradually evolving and is typified by 
negotiations, persuasion and conflict around particular and narrow interests. For realists, 
diplomacy is merely an instrument of power, which is why there is no need to theorise 
diplomacy; theory should be built around those wielding the implements i.e. states. Although, 
neo-realism takes account of different attributes of states in the international system and 
accounts for a variation in these power differentials, as far as neo-realists are concerned, the 
state is still a unitary actor (Milner 1998; Hay 2002: 17). Neo-realism brought rationalism 
into the fold in IR theory, seeking to reproduce the parsimonious mathematical rigour of 
rational choice theory from classical economics in IR (Hay 2002: 17; Steans and Pettiford 
                                                      
17
 For a review of realism as a mainstream IR theory see Steans and Pettiford (2005: 49-73), Baylis and Smith 
(2001: 161-183), Smith (1986), Grieco (1997), Walt (2002) and Guzzini (1998). Seminal works in the realist 
tradition include Carr (2001), Morgenthau (Morgenthau 1946; 1966),  Gilpin (1987), Keohane (1986), Waltz 
(1979). 
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2005: 235-236; Bayne and Woolcock 2007a: 30). 18 The rationalist approach within neo-
realism continues to privilege the state as a unified actor which is seen to behave predictably 
in pursuit of relative gains in the international system (Hay 2002: 17,37-40). 
 
A realist understanding of diplomacy is state-centric, with the purpose of overcoming the 
anarchic nature of the international system. It is focused upon a narrowly defined set of 
interests (primarily security - where low politics is at best peripheral) and is conducted by 
official diplomats in the pursuit of the foreign policy objectives of the state. Furthermore, 
states are regarded as rational unitary actors whose preferences or interests are fixed and thus 
predictable and rational. Some examples of rationalist approaches to economic diplomacy 
include but are not limited to Mastanduno’s (1991) work on the US and Japan, Durr and 
Mateo (2004) exploring treaties within the EU, Schneider (2005) examining capacity 
constraints and bargaining power in multilateral negotiations and Cameron and Tomlin 
(2000) discussing the negotiation of the North American Free Trade agreement. 
 
The primary failure of realist perspectives in the study of diplomacy begins with the narrow 
emphasis that realist thinking places on the issues with which diplomacy is concerned. 
Security concerns are privileged as central to diplomacy. Whilst some traditional diplomacy 
scholars do make reference to economic aspects in diplomacy they do so from the perspective 
of how economic issues will contribute to the relative gains of one state over another, or the 
extent to which economic gains will allow states to maximise their relative power position 
within the international system (Kindleberger 1970; Krasner 1976; Eichengreen 1989).  In 
this context neo-realism refers to hegemony to explain economic co-operation and the 
functioning of international institutions (Steans and Pettiford 2005: 66). For the seminal text 
                                                      
18
 Key scholars in the neo-realist tradition include: Gilpin (1981) , Kindleberger (1973) and Waltz (1979). For a 
review of rationalism in IR see Odell (2000) and Sebenius (1983), among others. Key texts in rational choice 
realism include the works of Grieco (1993a) and Krasner (1999). 
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on hegemonic stability theory, see Kindleberger (1970). Keohane (1984) presented an 
alternative neo-liberal approach to explaining international co-operation, arguing that 
‘embedded liberalism’ was evident in the failed Bretton Woods system as a result of 
embedded regime principles that continued, thus creating a continuity that has, for example, 
prevented the collapse of the trading regime. 
 
Since such approaches tend to assume that preferences or interests are rationally derived and 
that the state is a unitary actor, they neglect to account for the complex reality of the 
contemporary diplomatic system  (Der Derian 1987: 3; Reychler 1996; Kurbalija 1998; 
Cooper and Hocking 2000: 362; Woolcock 2007: 32).  Realist approaches do not explain how 
state preferences are formed or change over time nor do they reference the role of powerful 
agencies outside of the state. 
 
Rationalism 
 
One distinguishing feature of economic diplomacy is the role of markets, which can be both  
exogenous (shifting the context and environment within which negotiations are taking place 
and thus the preferences of the parties to the negotiations) and endogenous in that markets are 
an integral part of the economic diplomacy (Odell 2000: 60-67). In Odell’s language, 
negotiators or diplomats using ‘bounded rationality’ will attempt to respond to market 
conditions to advance their economy’s interests. Bounded rationality refers to a decision-
makers propensity to make rational choices which are curtailed or limited by imperfect 
knowledge and computational capacity. The actor will lack complete information such as 
market trends in the future, other sides’ true bottom-line or the impact on markets 
domestically or abroad of certain outcomes (Odell 2000: 18-19).  In this frame, the market 
itself will determine which actors (usually states) are likely to participate; so economies most 
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dependent on exports and imports of goods will likely participate most fully in liberalisation 
processes/negotiations.  
 
This conception of economic diplomacy is grounded in the notion of rationality. A rationalist 
approach to economic diplomacy would explain that if market conditions are such that any 
potential parties to an economic or trade agreement would fare better without any agreement, 
such parties would be unlikely to co-operate. Actors sharing a common interest, such as 
agricultural exporters who formed the Cairns Group in the WTO, are likely to form coalitions 
and use integrative tactics. Changing market conditions may also shift negotiating 
preferences during the process. This approach might argue that, in time, the agricultural 
subsidies in the US and Europe will no longer be necessary or politically expedient and so 
current negotiations over market access for non-agricultural goods that hinge so critically on 
reductions in such market-distorting subsidies will fundamentally shift (Odell 2000: 47-69).19  
 
Rationalism is problematic for two reasons. First, it presents the market as a separate and 
exogenous entity in the process which is one of the challenges we are seeking to overcome in 
our conception of economic diplomacy. Second, in presenting ‘market conditions’ as an 
entity in its own right, such an approach fails to take account of the enormously varied 
interests, configurations of power and spheres of influence that constitute the ‘market’. The 
‘market’ like the State should not be conceived of as a unitary actor with rational preferences. 
 
Rationalist approaches can be further critiqued on the basis that they are primarily concerned 
with the process of decision-making and negotiation rather than the structures of power or 
values and ideas shaping any outcomes (Morrow 1999; Blaydes 2004; Odell and Narlikar 
                                                      
19
 One such event could be the recent (2008) food crisis triggered by massive food price hikes and associated 
shortages in developing countries. Food price increases could provide the incentive for EU countries, Japan and 
the US to reduce their subsidies to farmers as markets provide a valid means for the survival of the 
agricultural/farming livelihoods in developed economies. 
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2006). In order to preserve their parsimonious character rationalist theories, of necessity, 
must simplify the issues in analysing negotiation trade-offs - which does not always reflect 
the complex reality of available issues (Eichengreen 1998).  The weakness inherent in 
rationalist approaches is the assumption of the state as a utility maximising unitary actor, with 
static preferences, when in reality domestic ‘interests’ and, in fact, also values and ideas can 
and do shift during negotiations (Sebenius 1983: 281; Woolcock 2007: 33; Capling and Low 
2010: 23). The primary silence left by rationalist approaches is to be found in the absence of 
any role for ideas in the analysis. While this silence may be expedient for elegant theorising 
that is capable of achieving the status of a ‘predictive science’ it does not accord with the real 
world complexity of international relations (Hay 2002: 197). Rationalism assumes that in a 
given set of circumstances two actors will share the same interests and will perceive of those 
interests in the same manner, which is unlikely in reality (Hay 2002: 196). Finally, and 
crucially for this thesis, they fail to account for the role of multiple other actors beyond the 
state (Milner 1998).  
 
Negotiation theories 
 
One of the key contributions in theoretical approaches to economic diplomacy has been 
negotiation theory. In this regard the work of scholars such as John Odell (2000; Odell and 
Narlikar 2006) and Amrita Narlikar (2002; 2003; Narlikar and Tussie 2008) has been very 
influential. These contributions are particularly valuable because they were developed 
specifically with international economic negotiations in mind. Negotiation analysis attempts 
to disaggregate the negotiation process into stages and then to ascertain specific and related 
tactics (Landau 2000; Crump 2007; Raiffa 2007). Negotiation literature focuses on two 
strategies or a combination of these two: interest-based (cooperative) bargaining and 
positional (competitive) bargaining (Burgess 2004). 
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Odell’s framework is based on the idea of resistance points. These resistance points represent 
the range of possible agreements that can be reached between parties. The point at which a 
negotiator would be better off without any agreement is just below this resistance point or as 
Odell (2000) terms it – their Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). 
BATNA’s, according to Odell, are far easier to determine than preferences or win-sets, since 
it is easier to see where a party may be better off with no agreement.   Lax and Sebenius 
(1991) argue that negotiating parties’ power is dependent on their available alternatives. This 
clarity of vision as to where a party may be better off without agreement relies on very 
narrowly defined interest identification and fails to take into account whose interests or 
preferences will be privileged in this way, even assuming that we can know what interests are 
best for the negotiating parties.  
 
If, as Odell acknowledges, actors behave within the restraints of ‘bounded rationality’ (which 
means they lack complete information or the means to compute optimal positions) then it is at 
odds with his claim that BATNA’s make it is easier to identify when a party may be better off 
without agreement.  A further lacuna apparent in applying Odell’s negotiation theory is that it 
relies on some over-simplifying assumptions about rationality and the unity of state 
preferences or interests (Hay 2002: 20-21; Higgott and Watson 2008).  
 
With such a strong focus on negotiation processes per se, despite taking market forces into 
account, Odell’s approach also does not really account for the role of non-state actors in 
shifting preferences or negotiating interests during the negotiation processes of economic 
diplomacy. It also does not account for aspects of economic diplomacy beyond the 
negotiation table such as those elements relating to information gathering and sharing or 
communication more generally. Recent work by Narlikar (2010) seeks to address this and 
builds on Odell’s theories of negotiation by incorporating more examination of a broader 
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range of actors in her analysis of the negotiating strategies of emergent great powers, China, 
India and Brazil.  
 
While contributions to negotiation theories of economic diplomacy have gone a long way to 
dispelling some of the bias towards issues of security and high politics in realist diplomacy 
approaches, even these fail to account for the increasing role of NSAs in the form of both 
private-sector actors (business) and civil society (NGOs) (Williams 1994: 46; Bhagwati 
2004: 4; White 2005: 393; Bayne and Woolcock 2007a: 11). 20 Furthermore, traditional 
approaches to the study of diplomacy are not adequately explaining the changes we are 
observing in the practice of diplomacy within the present context (Modelski 1972; Der 
Derian 1987; Riordan 2003; Lee and Hudson 2004;  Murray 2008).  
 
Non-statist diplomacy 
 
Critics of the realist perspective, such as world society proponent Burton (1972), argue for 
the displacement of the study of diplomacy altogether on the grounds that any focus on 
diplomacy retains the notion that governments are the main actors in the international system. 
An alternative perspective to diplomacy sees the state-centric view as an obstacle to 
achieving an alternative diplomacy and, indeed, an alternative world order (Murray 2008: 
30). Hocking (1999b: 24) explains this as offering “the prospect of an international order, 
transcending the state system”. Alternative diplomacy rejects the state altogether, preferring 
to emphasise instead non-state actors such as NGOs, transnational movements and MNCs 
and focusing on the so-called ‘low’ politics of humanitarian aid, environment and collective 
security. However, there are also strands within this approach that do not reject the role of the 
state outright; but maintain that NSAs are engaged with a distinct form of diplomacy 
(Langhorne 1997; Kurbalija 1998; Langhorne 1998; Bruter 1999; Hoffman 2003). This 
                                                      
20
 It must be noted here that consumers as additional entities in the market forces equation tend to be 
subsumed into civil society groupings, which can be somewhat misleading. 
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approach also includes unconventional NSAs such as a transnational organisation without 
geographical location, like Al Qaeda (Risse-Kappen 1995; Corbin 2002; Hoffman 2003: 
541). Modelski (1972) argues that a realist perspective represents an obstacle to resolving 
global problems since such diplomacy involves the system often at the root of the problem, 
highlighting the failings and shortcomings of the state system itself. 
 
Advocates of the alternative approach to diplomacy, who reject the state altogether, prefer to 
emphasise NSAs such as NGOs and transnational actors, which replace the state as the 
primary model or lens through which to view international relations and diplomacy.  For 
example, Diamond and MacDonald (1996: 2) point to the emergence of NSAs, which are 
better-placed to engage with the changing diplomatic processes presented by the global 
environment. In order to achieve a “reconstructed concept of diplomacy” it is necessary to 
first separate diplomacy from the state altogether (Hoffman 2003: 541). Taken in conjunction 
with their view of states as pariahs and anathema to a better world system, an alternative 
approach is transformational in character (Diamond and MacDonald 1996: 37). Some 
scholars in this tradition regard realist diplomacy as being in crisis and no longer in touch 
with contemporary problems (Der Derian 1987; Langhorne 1998; Riordan 2003). In 
Modelski’s (1972: 187) words “contemporary diplomacy...is redundant...uneconomical...and 
politically harmful to world society”.  
 
The idea of rejecting a state-dominated view of international relations is not new. In the 
1960s and 70s a wider critique of the concept of the state within political studies was taking 
place (Peterson 1992; Risse-Kappen 1995: 17).21 Nonetheless the impetus was not to last, and 
                                                      
21
 Among proponents of the challenge to state-centric politics were liberal pluralists such as Robert Dahl 
(1961), who argued that political systems were functions of societal pressures which constrained political 
authority such that the political process was reduced to constant bargaining among social interest groups. A 
second group of “power elite theories” disagreed, claiming that Western politics was dominated by a coalition 
of elite interests between business and politics. The third opponent of the state-centrism of contemporary 
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debates on a state-centred world versus a society-dominated world were superseded by a push 
to “bring the state back in” (Keohane and Nye 1972; Rosenau 1980; Skocpol 1985; Risse-
Kappen 1995: 7).22 Whilst an alternative perspective to traditional realist diplomacy 
addresses the problematic of the state-centric, security-driven diplomacy, it yields its own 
lacunae. Simply rejecting the state and its centrality to the study of international relations or 
diplomacy cannot remove the empirical reality of the existence of the state. If the state and its 
official diplomatic apparatus are indeed defunct, then the alternative approach has failed to 
explain their on-going presence (Murray 2008: 32). However, what an alternative approach 
does do is open up various questions regarding the supremacy of the state in diplomatic 
processes and in so doing prompts researchers to seek other avenues of exploration, such as 
the role of NSAs and the tools and processes engaged in pursuit of a new form of diplomacy 
beyond the statist view of realist approaches. As the empirical chapters of this thesis 
demonstrate, the state is an undeniably important element in diplomacy – it is along-side, 
through and with other state entities that business NSAs engage in corporate diplomacy.  
 
Social Constructivism 
Responding to the criticism of realist and rationalist assumptions that state interests are 
immutable and that the state is a unitary actor we can usefully turn to constructivism as a 
possible solution. As a social theory, constructivism has no one dominant strand or 
application (Baylis and Smith 2001: 259). It may not even constitute a school of thought in its 
own right, being that social constructivist thinking tends to be spread across a broad 
continuum of positions that overlap at the extended periphery with other approaches from 
materialism on one end to idealism on the other (Hay 2002: 206; Steans and Pettiford 2005). 
The key concepts of a constructivist approach are based in the notion that the world is how 
                                                                                                                                                                     
political studies was ‘instrumental Marxism’ which essentially viewed the state as an instrument of capital 
(Risse-Kappen, 1995: 17). 
22
 See section 2.4 for a deeper discussion of NSAs in the international system. 
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actors perceive it – reality is a social construction (Baylis and Smith 2001: 259). In the words 
of Alexander Wendt (1992): “anarchy is what states make of it”.  
 
The world is inter-subjective in that agents and the system interact with, and are shaped by 
one another as well as being co-constitutive of international society (Hay 2002: 25). A key 
concept of constructivism is the importance of identity which includes concepts such as 
values, norms and ideas, all important elements in shaping actors’ perceptions of the world 
(Ruggie 1998: 856). Important themes in constructivism include the idea that international 
society is transformative, inter-subjective and discursive. Crucial assumptions of this 
approach focus on the importance of non-state actors rejecting state-centric perspectives. The 
transformative nature of international society is indicative of the fact that the system is 
constantly in flux and changing. As a result, there are on-going opportunities for co-
operation, thus rejecting critical theory positions based on the assumption that power is 
ubiquitous and structural in nature. This is not to deny the importance of structural and 
material power, but to create the intellectual space for the inclusion of interests and ideas as 
motivators and reinforcing the notion that ideas, values and norms matter. Constructivism is 
engaged with the agency-structure problem, arguing that agency is not pre-formed; values 
and ideas can shift over time and space. Structure is not a constraining or defining element, 
but rather constitutive of agency in a given moment. 
 
The primary contribution of constructivism to economic diplomacy is in the emphasis placed 
on understanding how interests and identities shift over time through discussion and dialogue 
(Woolcock 2007: 33). This is often applied to processes of bargaining and negotiation and 
also to exploring how diplomatic agents use persuasion, threat or inducement, public 
diplomacy, and information to alter the negotiating positions of others (Ulbert and Risse 
2005).  In understanding trade policy developments, constructivism turns to sociological 
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approaches, revisiting the notion that interests are socially constructed by culture, location 
and historical point in time (Ford 2003).  Constructivists reject the notion of rational actors 
and emphasise that preferences are ‘socially embedded’ (Woll 2008).  
 
A constructivist approach offers valuable opportunities for analysing economic diplomacy 
beyond the constraints of the rationalist frameworks of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. The 
neo-neo schools as well as rational choice models have done much to obscure other social 
processes in international relations, by reducing the motivating forces of actors in the 
international to an aggregation of individual action for interest maximisation. This focus on 
material instruments of power and material wealth divert the focus of research away from 
other avenues of enquiry such as the role of norms and ideas.23 Furthermore, rationalism has 
neglected the importance of the extent to which social structures influence and inform actor 
choices, interests, preferences and perceptions of these (Ruggie 1998: 33). Human agents and 
societies do not spring forth with fully-fledged and fixed identities or preferences. Rather, 
these are formed and shift over time as a result of on-going socialisation processes, resulting 
from the inter-subjective nature of the world.  
 
A number of authors point to the neglect of applying principles of norms and actor network 
socialisation to firms or business actors (Sell and Prakash 2004; Kollman 2008). The reason 
for this neglect, they claim, has to do with a tendency among social constructivists to 
differentiate between NGO’s and firms on the basis of their underlying motivation. Scholars 
such as Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse-Kappen (1995) define transnational business 
actors in terms of their instrumental, material motivations. Sell and Prakash (2004) argue that 
differentiating transnational advocacy networks on the basis of their so-called underlying 
“good” values is too narrowly focused and unhelpful in explaining outcomes or the 
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  For a comprehensive discussion of materialism and idealism see Hay (Hay 2002: 194-215). 
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importance of strategies employed in achieving said outcomes. The tendency to differentiate 
between transnational networks - where firms are motivated by material interests and NGO’s 
or advocacy networks by values - presents an artificial split between ‘ideas’ and ‘interests’ 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993). It also entrenches the polarisation between the 
rationalist/materialist versus the constructivist/normative in IPE literature (Katzenstein et al 
1999). 24 Constructivism has hitherto failed to give adequate account of the role of normative 
socialisation in understanding markets and market actors in international society.  
 
As for analysing NSAs in economic diplomacy, despite constructivism placing much 
emphasis on the role of norms in international relations and the fact that there is increasing 
interest in private authority among IR scholars, little research is emerging on the role of 
norms in firm behaviour in international society (Kollman 2008: 397). 25 The absence of 
constructivist studies exploring transnational market actors is remarkable given that much of 
the early constructivists literature only uses firms as objects of study but emphasises the 
social aspect of market interactions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; March and Olsen 1984; see 
Thomas et al 1987). Kollman (2008) argues that whilst works by diverse scholars including 
Sell and Prakash (2004), Virginia Haufler (1999; 2001), Benjamin Cashore (2002) and 
Hevina Dashwood (2005; 2007) have contributed to scholarship on the role of norms in 
private regulation, they stop short of giving an account of the effect on firm norms of 
international socialisation processes and specifically changing their perception of articulated 
material interests.  
 
                                                      
24
 For a more in-depth discussion of the comparison of constructivist treatment of transnational market actors 
versus transnational advocacy networks see Sell and Prakash (2004). 
25
 There are exceptions to this such as the work of Woll (2008) which explores the role of firms in trade in 
services liberalisation and Sell (2003) which exposes the strategic use of values by private interests 
(Pharmaceutical industry) pursuing vested interests in the TRIPs negotiations.  
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A further critique of social constructivist approaches is the difficulty of operationalising 
research into aspects such as analysing the role of the ideational on international relations and 
systems. Indeed, constructivists themselves are not coherent about the best epistemological 
approach (Kollman 2008: 399). In part, the difficulty presented in researching a constructivist 
agenda flows from the very rigour imposed by constructivists themselves when evaluating 
evidence on firms and firm behaviour. There is no good reason to expect greater rigour in 
challenging the integrity of information obtained from firm representatives than any other 
actor being analysed. Yet this is precisely what some social constructivists maintain, perhaps 
in keeping with the bias that suggests that other transnational actors such as advocacy 
networks are driven by ‘purer’ motives. Nevertheless, the caution to validate factual claims 
made by market actors and to research public records as well as measure rhetoric, behaviour 
and policy over time are useful caveats in researching difficult areas such as norms, beliefs, 
values and identity whatever the nature of the actor (market, social or state) under analysis.  
 
Domestic theories  
 
Another silence of rationalist approaches is the influence of domestic issues on economic 
diplomacy. This is addressed, in part, by domestic theoretical approaches. These respond to 
the challenge of incorporating an understanding of how decisions are reached within national 
frameworks or national diplomatic systems (Hocking 2007). This section will explore in 
more detail three such approaches: societal factors, state-centred factors (institutional 
frameworks) and finally the foremost of these, Putnam’s Two-level Games.  
 
Domestic societal theories attempt to account for the importance of competing domestic 
interests in shaping national preferences (Milner 1997; Capling and Low 2010: 11). This 
enables an analysis of traditional factors such as labour, capital and land as well as newly 
emerging ideas and values represented by civil society groups (Hiscox 2005). A domestic 
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societal approach emphasises an analysis of societal factors that will take account of 
domestically competitive interests such as protectionist impulses from some industry sectors 
versus liberal leanings from export-led industries (Capling and Low 2010: 4). Such 
approaches explain the internal dynamics of power domestically as governments seek to 
balance the competing demands of different constituencies in delivering trade policy 
outcomes, while remaining in power themselves (Grossman and Helpman 1994). The 
national preference is assumed to be obvious from looking at the key positions of major 
domestic interests as well as giving an account of civil society participation in domestic 
preference setting (Bayne and Woolcock 2007a: 26-27).26 However, these approaches assume 
that domestic interests are material in nature and neglect to allow for the fact that ideological 
sympathies, cultural values and even fear can shape national preferences (Alt et al 1996).  
 
Whilst domestic societal theories offer a deeper analysis of underlying factors in policy-
making that might inform economic diplomacy, they fall short of providing a useful 
theoretical framework for assessing the role of NSAs beyond the realm of the domestic. Thus 
they would be unable to account for events such as the prominent role played by 
pharmaceutical firms in the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement at 
the WTO (Sell 2003). They do not fully address the inter-related elements identified earlier in 
the discussion of the key challenges facing our understanding of economic diplomacy, 
namely including economic considerations, accounting for domestic influences in the 
international system and the relevance of NSAs beyond domestic preference setting.  
 
                                                      
26
 See Ikenberry et al (1988) for a deeper discussion of domestic theories and Garret (1998) for an analysis of 
how domestic interests respond to globalization forces. More recent literature in this vein would include 
Evans, Jacobson and Putnam (1993) Goldstein and Martin (2000), Capling and Low (2010) Wallach and Sforza 
(1999), Barton et al (2006). For readings using domestic societal approaches see da Motta Veiga (2007), 
Paarlberg (1997) and Dür and De Biévre (2005). 
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State-centred domestic approaches refer to the institutional frameworks for giving expression 
to societal values, ideas and interests (Cowhey 1993: 300). The focus of state-centred theories 
is thus the institutional framework within which policies are made (March and Olsen 1989). 
This approach asks where policy decision-making takes place – in the legislature by elected 
representatives or in administrative departments by officials (Haggard 1988). For example, in 
the US this could be of particular relevance when Republicans control Congress and 
Democrats control the administration or vice versa; in this case it may result in the 
withholding of Trade Promotion Authority for the President, which in turn may restrict 
movements at multilateral negotiations such as the WTO or at a bi-lateral level (Goldstein 
and Martin 1993).  
 
Coalition governments, such as those between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative 
Party in the UK, the Labour-Independent coalition in Australia or the German centre-right 
coalition, may also present difficulties in achieving policy and diplomatic coherence 
(Cowhey 1993: 300). The particular structure of the EU as an institution presents unique 
challenges to understanding the process of preference and interest formation at a domestic 
level. The theoretical contribution of this approach is that it enables analysis of the competing 
tensions between different government departments where overlapping priorities and ideas 
come into play (Woolcock 2007: 27). So the role of foreign ministries, trade and industry 
ministries, labour ministries and others can be taken into account in determining the key 
national preferences (Hocking 1999a). This theoretical approach also gives account of 
domestic ratification of internationally negotiated agreements. For example, when the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) has exceeded his (or no longer has) Trade Promotion 
Authority, ratification by Congress becomes a vital factor in the analysis of economic 
diplomacy outcomes. 
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State-centred domestic approaches add a further depth to analytical approaches to economic 
diplomacy by accounting for particular institutional frameworks within the domestic setting 
and explaining how collective action problems that are stifling international trade cooperation 
can be resolved  (Keohane 1984; Milner 1999). However, the specifically institutional focus 
at the domestic level is not useful in explaining the role and importance of NSAs at the 
interface between domestic and international levels. This approach does not purport to offer 
such analysis; nevertheless, it remains a neglected area in the theoretical approaches 
discussed thus far – and essential to the aims of this study. 
 
Putnam’s ‘Two-Level Game’ bridges domestic theories and negotiation theories. The model 
was developed after observing the intricate negotiations on trade, energy and macro-
economic policy at the Bonn G7 summit in 1978. The major contribution of his approach to 
economic diplomacy is that it enables an analysis of the interchange between domestic and 
international levels (Putnam 1988). Like Odell’s negotiation theory it is based on rationality 
and Putnam’s primary purpose in the model is to explain how the domestic/international 
interplay shapes the outcome of negotiations (Odell 2000). Negotiating preferences are not 
static - changes are explained through the strategic linkages developed by negotiators to 
achieve an acceptable outcome both for their international counterparts (Level I game) as 
well as their domestic constituents (Level II game). The range of outcomes acceptable to each 
party is called a ‘win-set’. The strategy adopted by negotiators to gain strategic advantage is 
to present with a narrower ‘win-set’ than is actually the case. A wide ‘win-set’ is a weak 
negotiating position and negotiators will seek to influence the other parties’ win-sets as well 
as distorting their own.  
 
Another strategy is for negotiators to attempt to widen the domestic win-set such that overlap 
with international negotiating partners is easier to achieve (although of course trying not to 
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reveal so). In seeking common ground, at both levels, negotiators are likely to use side-
payments as an inducement to widen a win-set. Negotiators’ spheres of influence are not 
limited to their own domestic market. Thus, negotiators may also seek to influence other 
domestic preferences by engaging in debate in other fora. It is vital to try to monitor the Level 
II game being played out domestically for other negotiating parties as this offers opportunity 
for establishing real win-set parameters. Negotiators are limited by the fact that they must 
operate within the constraints of bounded rationality (limited information). Developed 
countries will also enjoy an advantage over more resource-strapped developing countries in 
their ability to engage with a broad range of priorities in other government departments, 
across domestic groups and covering a wide range of issues, by virtue of their ability to have 
greater numbers of permanent representatives or better trained skilled professionals in 
specific interest areas.27 Achieving a balance of being trustworthy in negotiations without 
revealing too much of one’s hand creates the negotiator’s dilemma, Trust, ultimately, is 
critical to achieving agreement.  
 
Putnam’s Two-Level game draws on several aspects of the other theoretical models, from 
societal approaches to state-centred institutional frameworks (Putnam, 1988).  Building on 
the contribution of the two-level game by Putnam, Evans et al (1993) developed the concept 
further to describe double-edged diplomacy which examines how diplomatic processes 
engage with domestic level bargaining and international negotiations simultaneously and how 
these two levels of diplomatic interaction influence one another (See also Milner (1997). 
Other contributions to this literature include Frieden and Rogowski (1996) who model 
                                                      
27
 For developing countries active in the WTO there is a major discrepancy in the number of personnel 
available in staffed missions to the WTO based in Geneva.  In 2001 the US mission had 14 professional staff, 
dedicated solely to WTO business, the EU had 18 (who also attend to other multilateral institutions based in 
Geneva) and Japan had 23 compared with Least developed Countries, such as Malawi, Mali or Mozambique 
who had no permanent representative and others such as Bangladesh, Congo or Tanzania with a maximum of 
4 or 5. The numbers difference creates a clear advantage for better resourced missions who can attend a 
greater number of caucuses and meetings and develop more specialised skills and expertise (Jawara and Ka 
2003: 20-21).  
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interest group preferences to predict how private interests influence policies on exchange 
rates and trade and Mosely (2003) who investigates the impact of private investment on 
national policies. 
 
One problem with both the two-level game and double-edged diplomacy is that it is difficult 
to determine ahead of the outcome what each negotiator’s win-set is (i.e. they assume 
knowledge). This limits the model’s predictive function, ignoring the power of knowledge in 
IR. Whilst the two-level game does account for domestic factors influencing international 
diplomatic processes via the national diplomatic system, it fails to account for the occasions 
when domestic pressure groups link up transnationally or engage directly at a supra national 
level in economic diplomacy processes. Nor does the approach explain, or allow for, the role 
of international organisations/institutions. As a model for negotiation analysis Putnam’s two-
level game is useful when applied to the consultative role played by South African business 
in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. However, the thesis is exploring a broader definition 
of economic diplomacy processes such as information-sharing, communication, and 
representation, which cannot be analysed using the framework of double-edged.  
 
It is evident from the above discussion of various approaches: realist, rationalist, alternative 
non-statist, constructivist, negotiation theories and domestic theories that no single approach 
can adequately describe the complex reality of economic diplomacy. Each offers a valuable 
insight that alone is insufficient, but if read in conjunction with other levels of analysis can 
together, provide a useful analysis of the messy reality that constitutes economic diplomacy 
in the international environment. This requires attention to the roles of agency (both state and 
non-state), institutions, interests and ideas, at domestic and international level.  Domestic 
theoretical approaches including societal, institutional and two-level games are especially 
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useful in helping to analyse the consultative role of business NSAs which is described and 
analysed in Chapter Five of the thesis. 
 
Before going on to discuss a synthesised or multi-dimensional analytical framework it is 
necessary to explore the literature that addresses both the inclusion of economics and NSAs 
in the study of diplomacy. The following two sections draw from the broader IR and IPE 
literatures in an attempt to bridge the gap between diplomacy studies and these disciplines. 
 
2.3  Including economics in diplomacy studies 
The confluence between the political and economic is central to the literature of international 
political economy (Hutton 1996). Students of both economics and politics, tend to take one 
another for granted. Economists, for example, often assume that markets can function despite 
the messy disruptions of social/political disorder, war or revolution. By the same token, 
politics scholars make assumptions that the economy will function smoothly, whatever form 
of economic organisation is dominant (Strange 1994: 9-22). Watson (2005) argues that the 
state/market or political/economic dichotomy upon which conventional IPE study is premised 
can be attributed to the fact that IPE has been seen as a sub-field of IR and thus has imported 
this dichotomy into IPE. This has meant that in traditional IPE literature the state could be 
considered short-hand for activities of a political nature and markets as referring to economic 
realm (Strange 1994: 14; Walter and Sen 2009: 1). 28 
 
Simply acknowledging the reciprocal nature of politics and economics does not eliminate the 
dichotomy IPE scholars speak of eradicating; in fact it serves to reinforce the artificial 
separation of the state and the market. In this regard, “the ‘states and markets’ approach thus 
                                                      
28
  In the words of Cohen (2008: 8) the ‘intellectual entrepreneurs’ of IPE scholarship include scholars such as 
Gilpin (1981), Strange (1994), Krasner (1976) Cox (1987; 1999), Katzenstein (1976; 1978a; 1978b), Keohane 
and Nye (1972)  Keohane (1977; 1980; 1984; 1986; 1996), Kindleberger (1970; 1973). 
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does nothing to address the possibility that political and economic activities are co-
constituted within a single social reality”  (Strange 1994: 14; Watson 2005: 21).  This gives 
rise to a tendency in IPE to focus on the causative nature of politics and economics rather 
than as a co-constitutive social reality. One consequence of this dominance in IPE has been 
the neglect of other disciplinary contributions to our understanding of the social construction 
of international economic and political relations, such as evolutionary biology, anthropology 
and cognitive neuroscience, although Cohen (2008: 171) warns that too much breadth also 
has pitfalls in a potential lack of focus.  
 
One possible reason for the on-going debate on ‘states and markets’, is that IPE scholars have 
failed to pay sufficient attention to reading classical political economy (Watson 2005: 27). 29 
Watson proposes a return to classical political economy in the form of Adam Smith, 
Thorstein Veblen and Karl Polanyi, on the basis that their concern with the moral status of 
the individual offers a way to understand the constitution of economic relations rather than 
just their management. For Strange (1994: 4), IPE was supposed to be an attempt to ‘rescue’ 
political economy from the economists who had also neglected political economy in the turn 
to neoclassical economics. Caporaso and Levine (1992: 1) see IPE simply as the study of the 
management of the economic affairs of the state. Other scholars also write in a similar vein 
about the politics of economic relations.  Only through understanding how economic 
relations are constituted can we analyse and make normative choices between different forms 
of economic relations with the purpose of satisfying the provision for society (Watson 2005: 
243).  In this way too, Watson offers a possible solution to the dichotomy dilemma, proving 
that the economic and political are co-constitutive elements of society, rather than separate 
causal entities. 
                                                      
29
 See Watson (2005: 11-43) for a detailed analysis of the various approaches to IPE including, realism, 
liberalism, Marxism, Feminism, Mercantilism, Ecological, Neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist. Other recent 
contributions to the state of the discipline include Walter and Sen (2009) and Cohen (2008).  
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The real-world of interconnectedness between politics and economics is particularly relevant 
to the study of economic diplomacy. In order to prosper, markets require the protections of 
regulatory environments, the public good of law and order and the protection of property 
rights among other stabilising factors provided by governments. Conversely, governments 
require economic growth and financial stability provided by the economic system (Strange 
1999: 345). Interactions between states are not only simply about political issues or ‘high’ 
politics. Increasingly, governments negotiate and interact about a broader range of issues and 
primarily about economic affairs. Pertinent to this discussion, the establishment of the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the Marshall Plan after World War II were primarily about 
political objectives – avoiding the causes of war and shoring up Western Europe’s defence 
against encroaching communism. Economic policies were the way in which these political 
objectives were being met. They were based on the idea that countries that were 
economically interdependent were less likely to go to war. Further evidence of state activity 
around economic issues can be found in the proliferation of IPE literature that focuses on the 
Bretton Woods Institutions of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World 
Trade Organisation (Irwin 1996; James 1996; Pauly 1997; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001; 
Hiscox 2002; Rudra and Haggard 2005; Woods 2006; Dicken 2007; Hoekman and Mavroidis 
2007; Walter 2008). Also significant in this regard is the increasingly active role being played 
by associations such as the G20 summits in the past 5 years around the global economic 
crisis.  
 
Increasing economic interdependence can be regarded as a constraint on governments 
(Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). For example, Susan Strange (1996: 4) controversially asserts 
that “where states were once masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many 
crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states. And the declining authority of 
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states is reflected in a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations.”  
Cable (1999: 15) concurs, and points to two factors driving factors of a “liberalization 
revolution”: the speed of communications and a reduction in the role of government in 
ownership and control of production.  This notion of the ‘decline of the state’ is hugely 
contested. 30 Whilst it is clear, that to some extent, the authority and legitimacy of the state is 
being challenged to varying degrees (thus rejecting the absolutist conception of the state as 
sole relevant actor in the study of international society), the extent and form of such is fluid 
(Higgott and Reich 1998). States continue to be important actors; they are neither passive nor 
irrelevant. At this point it also becomes apparent that IPE scholars and diplomacy scholars 
are talking in similar terms when challenging the centrality of the state in their disciplines 
whilst still acknowledging the on-going relevance of the state. 
 
States create the framework for economic integration (Cox 1999: 25). However, the 
importance of the economic in understanding the political is equally crucial. In the study of 
international society the political and economic spheres cannot be separated. “This 
Westphalian system cannot realistically be isolated from - indeed is inseparable from - the 
market economy which the states of Europe, from the mid-17th century onwards, both 
nurtured and promoted” (Strange 1999: 345).  In other words, the present state system exists 
because of the particular market economy that characterises international society today. As 
Watson argues above, the political and the economic are two mutually constitutive concepts. 
If we are to understand contemporary diplomacy we need a theoretical approach to 
diplomacy that gives us a framework that accounts for the importance of economic 
considerations in IR. 31  
                                                      
30
 Literature on the ‘retreat of the state’ and the implications of transnational relations for state legitimacy and 
authority includes  Strange (1996); Held et al. (1999); Higgott et al (2000).  
31
 Ironically, we return to the earliest forms of diplomacy in mankind’s political history to discover that pre-
state cultures engaged in a form of ‘polycultural’ diplomacy evident in the Amarna era (Cohen 1999: 1-2).  In 
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Although (IPE) literature gives attention to the importance of economic issues in international 
relations, this  had, until recently, tended to disregard the importance of non-state actors as 
entities in their own right, by subjugating these into the broader ‘institutional’ framework of 
‘markets’ (Strange 1994; Watson 2005). 32 Orthodox IPE has concentrated more on ‘states 
and markets’ tending to exclude key components of those markets and other driving social 
forces within states (Katzenstein et al 1999; Cohen 2007: 199).33 The separation of the 
disciplines of economic and politics is as much to blame for this as is the divide between 
scholars of IR who focus either on strategic studies or the politics of international relations. 
 
In contrast, critical IPE approaches are reflecting a growing recognition of the importance of 
components of the market and the state as well the urgency of introducing normative 
concerns to the research (Sen 1987; Watson 2005: 33). Cohen (2007: 199) points out that 
critical IPE is concerned with theory as judgment or the identification of injustice: it is a 
normative approach rather than a positivist one. Murphy and Nelson (2001) refer to this 
strand of ‘critical IPE’ as descending from the Frankfurt School (a collection of approaches) 
with an emancipatory goal.34 Other important contributions in this regard are to be found in, 
among others, Strange (1984); Brown (2001); Cox (1987). Proponents of the so-called ‘new 
political economy’  embrace a reformist agenda that rejects the over-simplification of 
classical economics-based orthodox IPE, whilst transcending old schisms of state/market, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
fact commercial and diplomatic activities were often accomplished simultaneously and sometimes by the same 
envoy, in contrast to the traditional notion of diplomacy as being confined to official/state representatives. 
32
 See for example Walter and Sen (2009), Spero and Hart (1997), Strange (1994), Grieco (Grieco 1988; 
1997)Keohane and Nye (1972; 1977), Keohane (1980), Gilpin (1975a; 1975b; 1987), Kindleberger (1973), 
Katzenstein (1976; 1978a; 1978b) and Krasner (1976). 
33
 The ontological position of orthodox IPE is state-centric.  
34
 In this regard Critical IPE (with a capital C to denote reference to a theoretical approach) extends beyond the 
Frankfurt School; for example Wyn Jones (1999), when tracing the intellectual influences of Robert Cox (a 
prominent Critical IPE scholar), does not refer to the Frankfurt School, instead relying heavily on neo-
Gramscian influences. Two other strands of intellectual thought are also regarded as important to Critical IPE: 
Feminism and various strands of post-structuralism (Rengger and Thirkell-White 2007). 
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structure/agency and ideational/material (Higgott and Watson 2008: 12). This enables an IPE 
which can account for a normative agenda, inclusive of historical, cultural and social issues in 
the international political economy (Blyth 2002). The ‘new’ political economy also takes 
account of the importance of both structural and relational power as a dialectical relationship 
– issues of fairness and justice are central to many of the critical issues which IPE seeks to 
address thus highlighting the importance of reference to political philosophy in IPE (Walter 
and Sen 2009:6). 
 
Not ostensibly engaging with diplomacy per se, IPE as a discipline touches on many aspects 
of economic diplomacy. In establishing the importance of the ‘economic’, the ‘domestic’ and 
‘non-state actors’ in building a case for studying economic diplomacy in a more meaningful 
way, we must guard against the tendency prevalent in common IPE approaches to reflect neo-
classical economic reliance on ‘markets’ as amorphous utility maximizing entities (Ravenhill 
2008: 19). The subjugation of whole ranges of social and economic entities or actors into the 
concept of the ‘market’ obfuscates much of value in unpacking the dynamics of international 
society including diplomatic processes in the multilateral trading regime.  
 
 By opening up given concepts of states and markets, Watson’s return to classical political 
economy makes possible, in fact desirable, the extension of analysis of economic diplomacy 
to actors beyond the state and the market. Emphasising the concept of states and markets as 
social arenas enables us to think about who the actors participating in these arenas might be 
as well as shifting the emphasis away from rational utility maximising entities towards 
“socially situated moral agents” (Watson 2005: 242).  This, in turn, asks us to question the 
fundamental determinants of the actions and choices of the ‘new’ agents or actors in the state-
market arena.   
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2.4  Business as NSAs in economic diplomacy 
IR theory and IPE approaches offer a more substantial literature analysing the role of 
business as NSAs in international society than does the canon of diplomacy studies. 
Traditionally, diplomacy as a practice tends to be regarded as a sort of epistemic community 
removed from IR theories by virtue of its ‘specialised’ nature and guild-like qualities (Ross 
2007). However, as the review of literature that follows in this section demonstrates there is 
much value to be drawn from broader IR and IPE literature that assists us to conceptualise the 
role of NSAs in economic diplomacy. 
 
A  significant contribution to the literature in the form of an edited volume by Cooper et al 
(2008) explores linkages between the disciplines of diplomacy and global governance, which 
have disregarded each other until now. Global governance as a sub-discipline of IR is a 
relative new-comer especially when compared with the historical pedigree of diplomacy 
studies. However, as Cooper et al point out despite early signs of a disconnection between the 
two disciplines there are also strong indicators that shifting demands in international society 
are driving global governance agendas and in turn impacting on diplomacy processes (Cooper 
et al 2008: 3-4). There is also a much broader literature on global governance that takes 
cognisance of the role of NSAs (Josselin and Wallace 2001; Fuchs 2007; Graz and Nolke 
2008; Katsikas 2010). 
  
Many of the factors influencing global governance are also producing seismic adaptations in 
diplomacy practice. There is evident contraction in time and space as a result of technological 
innovations in communications during the last century (Hocking 1999b: 26); increasing 
activism from various stakeholders in international society (Higgott et al 2000); and an 
increasingly complex agenda facing both disciplines (Bayne and Woolcock 2007b: 10). 
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Firms as non-state actors in international society 
 
Traditionally, the role of business as a private actor in international society has been confined 
to exploring the types of representation and modes of engagement of firms as actors in 
international society. As such, business actors are identified as acting as one of several 
pressure groups in a pluralist system (MacDonald and Woolcock 2007: 77). 35 Business 
actors might be represented at a corporate or firm level, through business interest groups such 
as confederations, sector associations or coalitions or transnational market networks, such as 
the World Economic Forum or international business organisations like the International 
Chamber of Commerce or the World Business Council.  
 
The aims and goals of these various entities differ according to the type of organisation. 
Sector associations such as steel or agricultural business groups will focus narrowly on 
representing the interests of a particular industry by engaging at relevant points to influence 
directly or indirectly the international policy making process (MacDonald and Woolcock 
2007: 80). Sector coalitions may come together at a specific point in time for a particular 
strategic purpose, for example the services industries in the 1990s which have coalesced to 
promote specific issues on trade in services in the WTO or pharmaceutical companies (in the 
USA) which co-ordinated their efforts around securing more stringent intellectual property 
rights in developing countries through the implementation of the TRIPs agreement in the 
WTO (Sell 2003). 36 
 
Modes of engagement also vary according to the goals of the specific entity in question. The 
most common traditional method of influencing policy is through lobbying and campaign 
finance at a domestic level. New forms of negotiations and opportunities presented by the 
                                                      
35
 Other pressure groups include transnational advocacy networks, NGOs, Labour groups, agricultural 
representatives and civil society more broadly (Borowiak 2011). 
36
 For a full discussion of pharmaceutical industry involvement in the TRIPs see Sell (2003).  
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increasing integration of economies internationally have opened new possibilities for action 
and policy intervention at the international level for non-state private actors, both as 
observers and as delegates to international negotiations (Saner and Yiu 2008: 89). 
Transnational actors increasingly engage in public advocacy as well as direct advertising 
campaigns (a form of public diplomacy) to construct a particular image, for example the 
wide-spread ‘Going Green’ campaign in which Shell engaged to re-brand itself as a ‘green’ 
company. Other strategies include corporate social responsibility initiatives both for 
environmental as well as social objectives, aimed both at image building as well as rule-
making initiatives. This extends as far as self-regulation through agreed industry-wide codes 
of conduct, such as the Global Compact and the Equator Principles (Young 1999; Shelton 
2000; Haufler 2003; Wright and Rwabizambuga 2006). 
 
All of this indicates that the level of influence which business has as a NSA in international 
society extends beyond the direct and structural market power of capital, investments and 
jobs (Korten 1995). Private actors, through their technical knowledge and expertise, are able 
to exert an enormous degree of soft power too, which is accomplished through participation 
in negotiation processes directly as well as indirectly through the provision of technical 
analysis and data for trade diplomats and negotiators at multilateral and bilateral talks (Cohen 
et al 1996). Business engages in more than just the hard currency of structural power 
highlighting the importance of understanding how soft power influences and directs the 
agenda as well as the outcomes of international economic relations.  
 
Private authority and global governance 
 
The literature on private authority in global governance is premised on the notion that 
business interests are privileged (although not unchallenged) in international relations, and 
seeks to outline how we might better analyse the role and power of private authority or 
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business. Cutler et al (1999) have focused on authority and reasons for business co-operation 
in international affairs, Fuchs (2007) has explored the notion of business power, Graz and 
Nolke (2008) explore the limits of transnational private governance and, in similar vein, 
Pattberg (2007) looks at institutional forms of transnational private governance in 
environmental politics. Other approaches from the environmental politics literature such as 
neo-Gramscian and neo-pluralist approaches also contribute to conceptualising the role of 
business in IR (Levy and Newell 2004; Falkner 2008). A neo-Gramscian multilevel analysis 
enables an analysis of the firm both as an agent as well as embedded within international 
governance structures (thus including the context of broader power relations). Such an 
approach resonates with Jessop’s strategic-relational approach to the structure-agency 
problem and presents a more balanced perspective taking into account both agency and 
context as co-constitutive in understanding the role of business as NSAs in international 
society (Jessop 1990; Jessop 1996). 37 Neo-pluralism advocates that business actors have a 
privileged position in liberal democracies (Heinz et al 1993: 371). Since business is central to 
market economies as a source of economic growth and a stimulus for technological 
innovation (Milliband 1976; Jessop 1982), firms need to be “induced rather than 
commanded” (Stopford and Strange 1991: 29). As a result of this dominant position in the 
political realm states, according to the neo-pluralist tradition, must defer and share authority 
(Falkner 2008: 1). 38 
 
Fuchs and Lederer (2007) set out a framework for assessing the role of business power in 
global governance on the basis that there are several critical facets of power that need to be 
understood in order to attain a systematic and theoretically grounded framework. Their 
                                                      
37
 Although neo-Gramscians might prefer to reference the role of agency in the international system, I 
deliberately refer to international society taking cognisance of the literature on diplomacy that highlights 
diplomacy as constituting and producing international society, drawn from the English School (Der Derian 
1987; Jonsson and Hall 2006: 33 & 37) .  
38
 For an overview of business power in contemporary politics in the neo-pluralist tradition see McFarland 
(2004). 
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strategy is to combine different levels of analysis in a three-dimensional assessment 
considering both actor-specific and structural dimensions, alongside material and ideational 
sources of power. They identify three major sources of power. The first is instrumental power 
which derives from methodological individualism. This emphasises the directly observable 
relationships of power of business most often expressed through lobbying activity (Higgott et 
al 2000; Ledgerwood and Broadhurst 2000). Second, structural power refers socio-economic 
power. This material and structural power is expressed through agenda and rule-setting as 
well as corporate bargaining power derived from business as a tax revenue source and 
provider of employment (Strange 1994; Cutler et al 1999). Technological change is cited as a 
major driver that has enabled capital mobility yielding exit power to capital agents as a form 
of structural power (Walter 2001: 153). While this option exists in principle, Walter (2001: 
154) contends that evidence of such a phenomenon is scant.  Consequently,  business actors 
rely far more heavily on lobbying (both direct and indirect) activities to achieve their 
objectives (Josselin and Wallace 2001: 255). Finally, ideational power refers to the discursive 
element focusing on communication and the importance of ideas in promoting particular 
interests or positions (Fuchs and Lederer 2007: 3-4). Actors use their discursive power to 
shape norms and ideas and thus promote their interests in the political arena. Cutler et al 
(1999) maintain that non-state actors are increasingly competing with state actors as sources 
of authority, which they achieve through a process of ‘naming, framing and campaigning’ 
(Levy and Egan 2000; Newell 2000). For example, companies promote their image as good 
corporate citizens using advertising to shape public perceptions and promote ideas. 
  
Fuchs’s three-dimensional approach offers a complementary strategy for analysing business 
power that incorporates the material as well as ideational elements whilst acknowledging 
structural power relations without neglecting the importance of agency. This approach does 
not seek to confirm or deny the rise of business power concurrent with a decline in state 
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power; rather the interdependence of state and business actors is emphasised leading to the 
idea of a business orientated transformation of statehood (Bieling 2007).  
 
These contributions to the debate on the role and influence of private authority or business in 
IR, offer some valuable insights to understanding the role of business/private authority in 
economic diplomacy. Indeed, it could be said that global governance is achieved through 
diplomatic processes. What is useful about extending the analysis more broadly to diplomacy, 
is that it enables scholars to explore beyond governance and understand the political process 
underpinning diplomacy towards governance even when such attempts fail in their initial 
objective, thus leading to a deeper level of analysis and exploring more nuanced activities. 
Ougaard (2008:402) calls for research to focus more on “an ongoing strategic relationship 
between a diverse set of public and private actors”. In short then, he could be saying research 
into the processes of diplomacy, such as this thesis. As Ougaard (2008: 402) points out: “the 
business-global governance nexus is more than private transnational governance and self-
regulation, and it is more than business power, whether instrumental, structural, or discursive, 
over global governance”. Josselin and Wallace (2001:12) and Levy and Prakash (2003) 
concur that the question is no longer whether non-state actors play a role in international 
relations, but rather how and to what effect. Similarly Navaretti and Venables (2006) assert 
that MNCs are theoretically and empirically important to IR and that they are a force for good 
in the global economy. Other contributions to this literature include work by Halpin (2005) 
on agricultural interest groups, Sell (2003) on the role of the pharmaceutical industry in 
global intellectual property negotiations and general work on private interests such as Klein 
(2000), Korten (1995) and Tarrow (2005).  O’Brien et al (2000) identify a new or complex 
multilateralism which describes the increasingly influential role of global social movements 
in multilateral institutions of global governance. Business associations and think tanks play a 
crucial role in complex multilateralism (Haufler 2003).  
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Resonating with comments made earlier in the section on political authority and business 
power Josselin and Wallace (2001:256) suggest that the new multilateralism or complex 
multilateralism “constitutes a significant reflection of the new ‘transnational diplomacy’, in 
which public-private as well as private-private partnerships supplement more traditional 
government-to-government relations in international relations” (emphasis added). Similarly, 
Burt and Robinson (1999: 42-43) point to a plethora of NSAs (business and NGOs) crowding 
the diplomacy milieu and exerting a direct influence on the outcomes of diplomatic 
processes. 
 
The preceding section demonstrates that there is a broad spectrum of approaches to economic 
diplomacy conceptualising private actors in IR.  Looking to the contributions of a wider 
literature that explores the role of NSAs in IR provides economic diplomacy scholars with 
useful insights.  Applying insights from these literatures that include economics and NSAs 
enables us to bridge the theoretical gap between diplomacy and IR theories (although 
empirically this gap is less obvious) developing an inclusive or multi-actor framework for 
analysing the role of business as NSAs in economic diplomacy. 
 
2.5  Multi-actor frameworks for diplomacy  
The above two sections have presented a strong argument for an approach to diplomacy 
studies that includes economic considerations as well as taking cognisance of actors beyond 
the state. Returning then to the diplomacy literature reviewed in section 2.2 this section 
argues the case for constructing a polycentric or multi-actor framework for diplomacy. The 
contradictions imposed by an exclusionary and narrow focus either of a statist perspective or 
of the non-state diplomacy epitomised by the alternative diplomacy approach are resolved by 
a middle ground. This is represented by the increasingly prominent work of scholars 
proposing a multi-actor diplomacy, or as Hocking (2005) defines it: multistakeholder 
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diplomacy (MSD). Other terminology for this phenomenon include 
polycentrism/polylateralism or networked governance (Wiseman 1999; Rosenau 2003; 
Slaughter 2004) . Cooper et al (2008: 3-4) argue that the imperatives and demands of global 
governance (with its pluralistic emphasis, that embraces civil society along-side state actors) 
are nudging diplomacy processes to evolve. A new framework for analysing diplomatic 
processes is necessary to respond to the complex multilateralism identified by O’Brien et al 
(2000). Globalisation pressures are also driving a decline in the hegemony of a Westphalian 
state-centeredness, drawing contemporary diplomatic practice closer to pre-modern forms 
with multiple actors and blurred domestic and international boundaries (Neumann 2008: 15- 
28). These insights support the valuable contribution of theoretical approaches outside the 
diplomatic canon discussed above.  
 
Scholte (2008: 49) identifies five key features of a multi-actor framework or polycentrism 
that contrast with a statist view of diplomacy. First is that a statist approach emphasises 
centralisation rather than the dispersion of processes characteristic of a polycentric approach. 
Second, statism emphasises the state as the sole actor in diplomacy, whereas polycentrism 
includes a range of actors. Third, statist diplomacy is confined to the geography of specific 
countries, whereas polycentric diplomacy transcends geographical confines. Fourth, related to 
spatial differences, statist approaches rely on neat jurisdictional definitions, while polycentrist 
approaches acknowledge a messier reality. Finally, statism by nature emphasises the 
centrality of sovereignty in contrast to polycentrism which recognises no such dominant role.  
 
Similarly, Saner and Yiu (2008: 85-86) conceptualise a polycentric approach as arising out of 
a “complex set of interconnectivities and interdependencies” involving multiple actors from 
business, civil society, various levels of government and a variety of international 
organisations that function at local, national and international levels.  They identify six forms 
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of diplomacy: first, economic diplomacy and second, commercial diplomacy are the preserve 
of state actors, third, corporate diplomacy and fourth, business diplomacy are the function of 
private NSAs, fifth national NGO diplomacy and sixth, transnational NGO diplomacy. It is 
not clear why Saner and Yiu (2008) do not give separate recognition to national and 
transnational business actors and this presents a weakness in their typology, despite their 
recognition of the wide range of overlapping connections and inter-dependencies 
characteristic of the complex diplomatic landscape.  Rather, they differentiate corporate 
diplomacy as occurring between business and government stakeholders, while business 
diplomacy refers to interactions between business and other constituencies such as labour, 
political parties and other business (Saner and Yiu 2008: 94). This mirrors two of the three 
diplomacies identified by Stopford and Strange (1991) in triangular diplomacy: that of firm-
state diplomacy (corporate diplomacy) and firm-firm diplomacy (business diplomacy).  
 
Recent work in an edited volume by Capling and Low (2010) presents useful insights from 
several case-studies focused on developed and middle income developing countries on the 
role of NSAs. These argue for the need to include an analysis of the role of NSAs in 
understanding trade policy-making processes as precursors to international trade negotiations. 
Technological opportunities have made it possible for a wide range of NSAs to reproduce 
what has traditionally been the preserve of state-state interactions, thus making crucial the 
recognition of the multi-actor nature of modern diplomatic processes (Hocking 1999b: 27; 
Bhagwati 2004: 3-31; Jonsson 2008: 31). For example Scholte (1993)characterises diplomacy 
as one part of a complex network of transnational relations, thus providing the opportunity 
for the inclusion of non-state actors not only to engage in diplomatic interdependence but 
even supplement or replace governments at different stages of engagement. Two of the 
empirical chapters in this study that explain the role of South African business in South 
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Africa’s economic diplomacy, illustrate these modes of diplomatic engagement as a 
supplementary role and substitution role.  
 
This middle ground between a statist focus and the complete rejection of the state proposed 
by the alternative approach is based on a point of departure that does not see the necessity of 
discounting the role of the state in order to include the role of non-state actors; it is not an 
either or choice for diplomacy studies (Hocking 1999b: 14-23). Indeed, Scholte (2008: 50) 
reminds us that moving beyond a narrow statist focus does not indicate the demise or even 
necessarily the contraction of the state. The state remains an important actor. Instead a 
middle-ground approach focuses on the observable practices of diplomacy in the interplay 
between state and non-state actors (an increase in the numbers and types of actors engaging 
in diplomacy), at various levels from domestic to bilateral, regional and global across an 
expanding range of issues (Hocking 1999c: 265; Thakur 2006: 1). 39 For example, Lee and 
Hudson (2004) point out that the practice of diplomacy as evidenced by diplomats and 
official government records is far more “complex and multifaceted” than the security-
dominated diplomacy of traditional diplomacy theorists . Ignoring the reality of diplomatic 
practice produces a ‘present but invisible’ status for economic diplomacy. A feature of this 
changing milieu in diplomacy is also the drive towards greater transparency being driven by 
NSAs in the process (Hocking 1999c: 265; Lee and Hudson 2004: 360). For example, NGOs 
have clamoured for greater transparency in the trade agenda of the WTO process that reached 
                                                      
39 There are currently 192 states operating in the modern diplomatic environment (defined by number of 
members of the United Nations), compared with 51 UN members in 1945 and 26 in 1926 (UN 2007). In 
addition there are now some 78,411 TNCs with 777,647 foreign affiliates recorded in 2007 (UNCTAD 2007: 
218). Over half of the world’s top 100 economies are corporations and not states. For example, in 2008 
General Motors had greater annual revenue than the GDP of Denmark, Poland, Norway, Indonesia and 
Thailand and ranked as the 23
rd
 largest economy in the world. Exxon Mobil (26
th
), Mitsui (37
th
) & IBM (53rd) 
had larger revenues than the economies of Singapore, Ireland, Philippines, Malaysia and Chile (Anderson and 
Cavanagh2000; Kegley and Wittkopf 2009: 173). 
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its zenith in the so-called ‘Battle of Seattle’ at the third WTO ministerial meeting in 1999. 40 
Scholars such as Barton et al (2006) and Wallach and Sforza (1999) refer to the lack of 
transparency around trade negotiation processes and O’Brien et al (2000) refer to the 
democratic deficit in global governance institutions.  
 
 Rosenau (1990) offers a possible synthesis of the realist/alternative divide through his idea of 
‘two worlds’ in international politics. Neither a state-centric nor a multi-centric world is 
superior, rather the two operate along-side one another and interact with one another. This 
evolution in understanding diplomacy is at the centre of the debate on ‘newness’ and 
‘decline’ in the discipline. 41 For Hocking (1999b) there are 3 layers of change to take into 
account: an increasing complexity in the agenda of foreign relations thus extending the scope 
of diplomatic interactions, escalating levels of state-societal interaction made possible by the 
proliferation of cheaper communications and technology and finally catalytic diplomacy, 
which refers to the symbiosis occurring between official and unofficial diplomats such as 
government and business.  
 
Hocking’s catalytic diplomacy is derived from Lind’s evocation of an evolving state system 
wherein the “catalytic state is one that seeks its goals less by relying on its own resources 
than by acting as a dominant element in coalitions of other states, transnational institutions 
and private sector groups, while retaining its distinct identity and its own goals” (Lind 1992: 
3). Catalytic diplomacy refers to the way in which strategic relationships and associations are 
formed between informal diplomatic players and official diplomatic representatives to mutual 
                                                      
40
 ‘The Battle of Seattle’ refers to the protests which took place at the 3
rd
 Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 
Seattle during 1999. Civil society and NGO groups, including trade unions, student groups, religious charities 
and anarchists,  gathered to protest what they saw as the role of the WTO in contributing to widening 
economic disparity between the developed and the developing world. Large corporations were the primary 
target of this action, as they were widely seen by civil society as using the WTO forum to further the global 
corporate agenda at the expense of developing economies. “Seattle (is seen as) the ultimate chance to stem a 
tide of international corporate greed that is destroying the environment, sending developing countries deeper 
into poverty and generally running amok” (Cooper 1999, July 16). 
41
 Authors such as Cooper (1997) and Sofer (1988) have suggested that diplomacy is an endangered species. 
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benefit in a functional symbiosis. One level of this engagement is the business-government 
interaction; in Reich’s ‘borderless’ world the globalisation of business has made the concept 
of the national firm superfluous (Reich 1991). However, the agenda is broadened beyond just 
commercial imperatives and extends to human rights, environmental issues and building the 
capacity of NSAs to operate more effectively at the side of government. Autonomy and 
resource limitations bind governments and NSAs together. In a world where governments are 
more often than not regarded with suspicion, NSAs have a unique opportunity to engage in 
diplomacy on behalf of or alongside their governments as sovereignty-free actors, with 
greater legitimacy (Rosenau 1990). Chapter Six on the supplementary role of business in 
economic diplomacy that follows presents evidence of South African business engaging in 
this form of diplomacy. This is complemented by the corresponding need for NSAs to gain 
access to political information and influence over policy decision-making leading to 
increased interdependence. The agenda for co-operation in catalytic diplomacy is not 
confined to ‘low’ politics either; Stedman (1995) points out that it encroaches on the 
traditional security agenda in the form of preventive diplomacy.  
 
MSD holds that diplomacy is better understood in a broader context than the state-system 
(Cooper and Hocking 2000: 362). The relevance of the state in diplomacy is not brought into 
question by MSD; but it does allow for a second culture to exist along-side and in 
conjunction with the traditional diplomatic process. This approach is founded in a modernist 
culture of transparency which precipitates engagement with a wide range of actors 
domestically and internationally.  
 
 A network model underpins the MSD approach and the diverse assortment of actors engaged 
in the international arena necessitates the inclusion of these into the analysis of diplomacy. 
The contemporary diplomatic milieu is characterised by several spheres of authority whose 
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representatives are required not only to understand at the domestic consultative level the 
values, ideas and priorities of their constituencies but also to engage at different levels 
wherever it is most suitable to attain particular goals and objectives (Rosenau 1990). MSD 
allows for NSAs not only as consumers of diplomacy but also as producers of diplomatic 
outcomes (Hocking 2005).  A MSD framework allows for a broader agenda than traditional 
diplomacy theories as well as enabling us to account for economic issues in diplomacy. As 
such MSD is a particularly analytical framework for addressing the research question posed 
in this thesis, exploring the extent to and ways in which South African business engage in 
South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy.  
 
2.6  Conclusion 
The preceding theoretical overview has highlighted the need to look beyond the orthodox or 
traditional approaches to diplomacy studies and IPE scholarship. Both of these disciplines 
have far more to contribute than remaining locked into the straightjacket of realist IR 
theories. The study of diplomacy is strengthened by exploring different questions than just 
the ‘high’ politics of security. Although it is far more widely accepted than before, that 
economic diplomacy has a justifiable place in the lexicon of diplomatic research, there is still 
a tendency to downplay its significance. Further, the predisposition to reify the state as a 
rational utility maximising actor in both the study of negotiation theory within economic 
diplomacy and IPE has also resulted in the neglect of a range of other, often more useful, 
explanations of what we observe in international economic relations. 
 
Expanding the possible framework of what may properly constitute the unit(s) of analysis and 
framing an ontological position that includes both states and key NSAs in the analysis of 
diplomacy will enable us to better account for the influences and outcomes within economic 
diplomacy. This provides a useful starting point for exploring economic diplomacy more 
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generally as well as a conceptual framework for understanding the role of South African 
business as NSAs in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy. Addressing the 
imbalance of the traditional approach to diplomacy requires a post-rationalist framework that 
releases diplomacy from the state-centric anarchy-problematic, reframing diplomacy in the 
context of connecting various social entities such as cultures, economies and states (Lee and 
Hudson 2004: 358). Diplomacy needs to be understood in the context of an aggregate of 
public and private views and needs within and beyond the state. A MSD framework enables a 
polycentric or multi-dimensional analysis of a wider spectrum of actors across a broader 
range of issues including economics.  
 
This chapter set out to explore the theoretical frameworks for explaining the role of NSAs, in 
particular private-sector actors, in economic diplomacy. The argument presented is that, far 
from being the preserve of unitary state actors, economic diplomacy is a process in which 
NSAs are actively engaging, both formally and informally and at a level well beyond Robert 
Putnam’s two-level game or double-edged diplomacy (Putnam 1988; Evans et al 1993). 
These actors are not confined to the domestic interest group status usually accorded them. 
They function as de facto economic diplomats in various fora internationally - both in terms 
of firm-firm and state-firm diplomacy (Strange 1992). Economic diplomacy requires an 
analysis that considers a triangle of diplomatic interactions: traditional state-state diplomacy 
as well as emergent forms of NSA-state and NSA-NSA diplomacy (Stopford and Strange 
1991: 209). Saner and Yiu (2008: 101) maintain that an unanticipated consequence of 
globalisation has been the increasing importance of NSA participation in economic 
diplomacy. A post-modern diplomacy has emerged that enables multiple stakeholders to 
participate in international economic relations.  
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The chapters following explore the extent to and ways in which South African business 
engages in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy, using MSD as an analytical 
framework. The study identifies three modes of engagement or roles that business play in 
South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy: a consultative role; a supplementary role; 
and an entrepreneurial role. The empirical chapters describe how and where business engages 
in these roles and, the impact of South Africa’s political economy. In order to do this, 
Chapter Three describes the political economy of South Africa’s historical and post-apartheid 
economic diplomacy in order to give context to the agency described in the subsequent 
empirical study. By engaging in empirically-rich research the thesis makes a valuable 
contribution to the reviewed literature and on-going debates in diplomacy studies. 
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CHAPTER THREE: SOUTH AFRICA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY  
3.1  Introduction  
The story of South Africa’s rise to economic prominence, political notoriety and then fame is 
worthy of a Hollywood blockbuster. The first miracle in South Africa was the discovery of 
gold and diamonds in the 19th Century.42 This was also to result in the political system that 
became the oppressive apartheid regime. The second miracle was the peaceful transition to a 
fully fledge constitutional democracy in 1994, which gave birth to the ‘rainbow nation’ of 
Nelson Mandela. The story continues as post-apartheid South Africa grapples with the 
enormous challenges of resolving the extreme differences of inequalities of income and 
wealth in the country. Between 1995 and 2008 the Gini coefficient measuring inequality rose 
from 0.64 to 0.67 ranking South Africa as one the world’s most unequal countries with 31.3 
percent of the population living in poverty in 2009 (World Bank 2011; World Bank 2012).43 
In addition South Africans have a low life expectancy of around 50 years (World Health 
Organization 2012). This misery is exacerbated by high official unemployment levels of 24.9 
percent in 2010 and a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS (Statistics South Africa 2011; CIA 
2012). 44 It is no small challenge to address the development needs of more than 50 percent of 
the population, whilst securing economic growth and fostering a thriving economy, although 
of course, the two are bound together.  
                                                      
42
 Diamonds were discovered in the 1860s and Gold in the 1880s. 
43
 The poverty headcount ratio is calculated as the population in a country living on less than $.00 per day at 
2005 international prices. 
44
 The unofficial unemployment figure is estimated to be far higher at around 40 percent, due to the fact that 
discouraged job-seekers who have stopped looking for work are not counted among official unemployment 
figures. In 2010, an estimated 377,000 children under the age of 15 were reported living with HIV and with a 
reported number of 5.38m people infected with HIV in 2011, South Africa’s epidemic is the largest in the world 
(UNAIDS 2010: 28; Statistics South Africa 2011) . In 2011, the estimated number of children living and 
orphaned as a result of aids totalled 2.01m rising from 1.9m the previous year (UNICEF 2010; Statistics South 
Africa 2011). Due to reporting anomalies, social stigma as well as the fact that people with HIV/AIDS usually 
contract a secondary illness which is the ultimate cause of death and this is officially recorded as the proximate 
cause of death, rather than the original HIV infection, mortality statistics are unreliable. However, South 
African official statistics reflect that AIDS claimed the lives of 257,910 in South Africa in just one year in 2011 
and accounted for 43.6 percent of deaths in the country (Statistics South Africa 2011) . 
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This chapter provides the historical context and background to South Africa’s political 
economy and the crucial role of business from the establishment of capital interests through 
to the present ANC government’s economic diplomacy. It presents a brief economic history 
elucidating the role of business in the earliest political economy of the country and during 
apartheid-era sanctions. Understanding South Africa’s economic history is fundamental to 
understanding the present economic drivers and the historical and present power and 
influence of business NSAs in South Africa. This leads into an analysis of South Africa’s 
economic diplomacy during the apartheid era and the role of business during apartheid 
leading up to the political transition of 1994. The chapter then explores the various debates on 
South Africa’s post-apartheid liberalisation highlighting the fundamental role of business in 
influencing the African National Congress (ANC) government’s economic policy. The 
chapter then turns to briefly outline the key economic drivers relevant to South Africa’s 
contemporary economic diplomacy, as background to the subsequent empirical chapters.  
 
3.2  South Africa’s historical political economy 
Without the discovery of gold and diamonds and subsequently a number of other mineral 
deposits in South Africa, the economy of South Africa would have remained largely agrarian 
and it is doubtful whether South Africa would be the important regional and indeed global 
player in the international economy that it is today (Feinstein 2005). The mining sector has 
been cited as crucial, not just to the economic process, but also to the important role it played 
in the development of the apartheid South African state (Yudelman 1984; Crush et al 1991; 
Fine and Rustomjee 1996). This symbiosis between mining and the state remains a feature of 
the present political economy (Yudelman 1984). The historical development of mining as the 
corner-stone of South Africa’s economic rise to prominence is essentially the story of the 
emergence of no more than six powerful privately owned mining companies and their 
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significant role in the architecture and implementation of apartheid subsequently (Handley 
2008). These are Anglo American (including De Beers), Anglovaal, Gencor (formed through 
the merger of General Mining and Union Corporation), Goldfields, Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investments (JCI) and Rand Mines (Flynn 1992: 312; Segal 2000).  These 
mining houses were more than just operators of mines – they were co-ordinators of the 
acquisition of mining rights, mine operations managers and, critically, facilitators of 
international capital vital for the capital intensive processes of deep-mining (Hamann and 
Bezuidenhout 2007: 97). Pre-capitalist societies in South Africa were largely agricultural and 
even this was limited in scope by the climate and geographical difficulties of many parts of 
the country (Feinstein 2005:2-3). It was the discovery of diamonds and gold that drove the 
country’s first wave of rapid economic growth; within twenty years the mineral revolution 
accounted for two-thirds of the country’s export totals (Wilson 2001: 101). 45  
 
Massive capital flows from Britain followed, enabling the rapid development of the nascent 
mining industry (Bundy 1992: 28; Clark 1994: 19). High levels of capital and technological 
assistance, however, were not matched by a similar abundance of workers (Greenberg 1980). 
This heralded the beginning of a process of state-driven proletarianisation (Moodie with 
Ndatashe 1994: 44; Soko 2004: 85). Semi-skilled and skilled labour was imported from 
Europe and unskilled labour sourced through coercive migrant labour entrenched by 
successive governments during the apartheid era, aided and abetted by the large mining 
conglomerates through the Chamber of Mines (Jones 1995: 16-17). 46 This racially segmented 
work force, that privileged the role of white semi-skilled and skilled labour whilst exploiting 
the African labour force and suppressing black miners’ wages, became a corner-stone of the 
                                                      
45
 For a full account of the transformation of the languishing South African economy to the economic power-
house it became, see Feinstein (2005: 90-112). 
46
 One mechanism for ensuring a steady supply of low-income workers was the taxation of rural blacks thus 
forcing them into wage labour (Jones 1995) 
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successive apartheid governments segregation policies (Wilson 2001: 103).  Exploitative 
working conditions, poor health and safety records, suppressed wages and the migrant 
labour/hostel system were entrenched features of a century of labour abuses later politically 
entrenched by the white apartheid regime (Trapido 1971: 312; Turrel 1987; Crush et al 1991; 
Moodie with Ndatashe 1994).  According to Feinstein (2005: 112), “this fundamental 
inequality must be seen, therefore, as an indispensable element in the process by which gold 
made possible the growth and transformation of the South African economy” (see also 
Marais 1998). 
 
The mineral boom (commencing with the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and the subsequent 
discovery of the gold reefs in the Witwatersrand in 1884) provided the impetus for South 
Africa to embark on the expansion and development of manufacturing and commercial 
agricultural ventures (Yudelman 1984; Crush et al 1991). Where the mining sector had more 
or less taken off on its own steam with private capital infusions from Britain in the main, 
manufacturing and commercial agricultural development was a different matter (Morris 1982: 
44).  What emerged in South Africa was a dichotomy of power with English-speakers 
dominating economic power and Afrikaners with the political power, via state dominance 
(Adam 1971: 73-74; Sparks 1990:46; Sadie 2001: 77).  
 
The development of manufacturing and commercial agriculture in South Africa was a slow 
process. Until the First World War manufacturing was limited to basic consumer goods – 
small-scale and labour intensive (Morris 1982). The election of the Pact Government in 1924 
changed the face of industrialisation in South Africa, adopting a protectionist stance to 
promote industrialisation and diversification in the South African economy (Kaplan 1982: 
305). In the mid twentieth century commercial agricultural operations began to supplant 
small-scale producers, many of whom were African (Murray 1982: 238). Government 
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intervention in the form of import substitution instituted to protect new industries from 
foreign competition through tariffs and agricultural initiatives received large support through 
subsidies (Feinstein 2005: 113-142).47  The chemical industry is one example of where 
import substitution was employed. Chemical manufacturing emerged from the need to service 
the agricultural and mining industry (Miller 2007: 141).  Furthermore, such infant industry 
protection was also intended to create and protect employment for white or European 
workers, whilst at the same time continuing to ensure a steady supply of cheap unskilled 
labour from the black population (Bleany et al 1999: 397). Such protectionism was bolstered 
by the stable gold price, the result of the fixed international gold price, first under the gold 
standard and then through the gold-exchange standard at Bretton Woods in 1944 (Gelb 1991). 
This stability remained a factor until 1971.  
 
Protections and massive capital supply saw industry grow as a contribution to GDP from 23 
percent in 1948 to 31 percent in 1970. At the time pundits were speculating that 
manufacturing would take over from gold as the primary driver of the economy (Hobart 
Houghton 1976: 137).48  However, the South African model of Fordism (extending 
industrialization through mass consumption) was flawed from the outset by the racial bias it 
entrenched (Hirsch 2005). Black mass consumption was never a factor since wage 
suppression meant that the burgeoning black population, for the most part trapped in poverty, 
could not participate in the consumption part of the equation. In addition, manufacturing was 
driven by capital-intensive technology, rather than designed to absorb surplus labour (Marais 
                                                      
47
 The Pact Government was a coalition of the National and Labour parties. Import Substitution was aimed at 
protecting nascent industry from import competition through high tariffs raising the price domestically to such 
levels that domestic firms could compete with international manufactures. South Africa followed a similar 
strategy to other newly industrialising economies at the time such as Germany, Canada, Australia and 
Argentina; with one difference: they attempted to link the policy with creating employment for a privileged 
minority group – whites (Feinstein 2005:119). 
48
 Gross Domestic Product refers to the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product tax. 
Essentially GDP refers to the total domestic product or domestic output by a country in a given year.   
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1998: 21). 49 The industrial sector was thus hamstrung by low wages linked to low 
productivity (exacerbated by the absence of training and skills development), the small home 
market and dependence on gold income to fund imports necessary for production processes 
(Handley 2008: 45-47). 
 
The high dependence on imports of capital goods and technology also made the economy 
susceptible to balance of payment difficulties (Marais 1998: 120-121). Manufactured exports 
were initially strong in the period 1948 to 1972 at an average rate of growth of 7.3 percent 
per annum but this had declined to an unimpressive 1.7 percent from 1972-1984 (Feinstein 
2005: 220). The early 80’s saw poor export growth, which had calamitous effects on South 
Africa’s balance of payments (forcing the government to restrict imports on which these 
industries depended) and dampening investor confidence (Feinstein 2005: 221). External 
shocks such as the early 1970’s oil crisis also impacted on the South African economy. As 
Figure 3.1 below shows, GDP growth rates declined significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. In 
the 1960’s GDP growth had averaged 5.5 percent, dropping to 3.3 percent in the 1970s and 
1.2 percent in the 1980s (Gelb and Black 2004: 4). 
 
The mid 80’s and early 90’s also saw international sanctions limiting the supply of 
investment; combined with slow growth and structural weaknesses in the economy, due to 
prolonged and misdirected import substitution policies, the South African economic crisis 
deepened. With it, political sentiment against apartheid domestically and, particularly, among 
business grew as it became apparent that access to capital investment (and growth) was 
reliant on democratisation (Gelb and Black 2004: 8). The impact of the shrinking economy 
was starkly felt by mainly white South Africans who experienced a decline in real average 
per capita income terms of around 15 percent from 1984 to 1993 (Hirsch 2005).  
                                                      
49
 For a more detailed discussion of manufacturing and commercial agriculture in the early industrial 
development of South Africa see Feinstein  (2005)  and Trapido (1971).  
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Figure 3.1  GDP Growth Rates 1950-1990 
 
 
Source: (Statistics South Africa 2002) 
 
Political transformation commenced in 1990, with the unbanning of various political 
groupings, the release of Nelson Mandela and the elections which followed in 1994. The 
demise of apartheid is attributable to various factors and there remains some debate as to the 
key drivers for transition as evident from the discussion of the radical-liberal debate that 
follows.  Scholars are not agreed on the extent of the role played by business. Some argue 
that business was more complicit in apartheid than part of the solution (Nattrass 1991; Bond 
2000). Others acknowledge the responsibility capitalists share in apartheid, but they contend 
that a number of sectors of business also lobbied against the system and actively worked for 
the dismantling of apartheid  (Waldmeir 1997; Lipton 2007; Handley 2008). Business 
pressures for transformation pre-date the transition period of the mid 80s onwards. Such 
pressures were related, not only to the need for investment and access to capital, but also to 
the imperative of broadening the domestic market and in response to the implications of the 
severe skills shortages resulting from apartheid education policies and segregation (Lipton 
1986). 
 
The economic history above demonstrates that South African firms and business interests 
have been an integral part of the political landscape from the earliest beginnings of South 
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Africa’s economic story. As the political drivers have changed through apartheid and the 
1994 political transition, business has been critically present and active at every stage. For the 
purposes of this thesis it is important to get a sense of the extent of business involvement in 
the domestic/regional/international political arena more generally as this provides vital 
context to the examination of the role of business agency in South Africa’s post-apartheid 
economic diplomacy.  
 
3.3  South Africa’s apartheid-era economic diplomacy  
During the pre-apartheid and apartheid eras, South Africa’s trade policy was largely one of 
protectionism and import substitution. Various authors argue that the economic policies 
advocated by the state during the apartheid era were specifically geared to promoting the 
explicit interests of Afrikaner capital (Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Van der Westhuizen 2002). 
In this regard Lipton and Simkins (1993: 6) boldly state that “ it was clearly an essential 
feature of the National Party’s (NP) strategy that economic development should not be 
shaped by market forces but by deliberate state intervention to ensure that it conformed to the 
requirements of apartheid”.  Feinstein (2005: 119) concurs noting that “what was unique to 
South Africa was the attempt to link this [infant industry protection measures] to policies 
designed to create employment specifically for one group in the labour force, those of 
European descent.” The primary objective of these policies was entrenching the system of 
white domination. Although South Africa was one of the original 23 signatories of the GATT 
in 1947, and thus accepted the theoretical idea of trade liberalisation, the government did not 
undertake anything close to full-scale trade liberalisation. Rather the government focused on 
export promotion whilst applying domestic protections against import competition (Soko 
2004: 113). The apartheid government restricted imports directly through quotas and tariff 
controls as well as through tight fiscal and monetary policy (GATT 1993b: 4).  
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South Africa was present at the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions having been 
part of the Western allied forces in World War Two. Despite the long historical association 
with multilateral trade, initially through the GATT, South Africa maintained an ambivalence 
to trade liberalisation throughout the apartheid period. This is evident in the on-going 
commitment to import substitution as a policy mechanism, despite the deleterious impact of 
this on South Africa’s economic performance during the 1980s and early 1990s, combined 
with the broader social context in South Africa (Feinstein 2005: 189).  
 
South Africa questioned whether the fulfilment of its GATT undertakings was appropriate to 
the country’s level of development and commensurate with other industrialised countries. 
This is evident from the recommendations made in the Reynders Commission Report, which 
was tasked with evaluating Export Trade in South Africa. The Report raised concerns 
regarding whether South Africa was gaining sufficient benefit for the concessions being made 
in the GATT by liberalising access to its markets while other countries imposed a range of 
restrictions on South African agricultural exports (The Reynders Commission 1972).  
 
Despite the concerns raised by the Reynders Commission regarding the potential negative 
impacts for South Africa of the GATT system, the Report also highlighted that South Africa 
still had an interest in the expansion of world trade and that South Africa should therefore 
remain associated with the GATT in order to avoid further attempts to isolate the country 
(The Reynders Commission 1972: 78). Instead over the decades, South Africa was able to 
circumvent most of its GATT obligations by virtue of its increasing international economic 
isolation as a result of anti-apartheid sentiment (Soko, 2004:122). In keeping with its 
nationalistic rationale initially of achieving independence from its former colonial mistress, 
Great Britain, South Africa sought to achieve a manufacturing economy not dependent on 
primary product exports. As the decades unfolded and international pressures opposed to 
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apartheid increased, South Africa became increasingly focused on a self-sufficiency agenda 
based on protectionism (Terreblanche and Nattrass 1990:16-17). The country developed an 
armaments industry, with chemical, metal and engineering spin-offs. Public expenditure was 
focused on perceived strategic industries, such as the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) 
and the Mossgas refinery project (McCarthy 1998: 68). Protection from import competition 
to secure national strategic industries took the form of subsidies, import surcharges, complex 
tariff structures and high excise duties (GATT 1993b: 4-5).  
 
The early ambivalence towards trade liberalisation represented tensions between fears that 
trade liberalisation would constrain South Africa’s domestic objectives of self-reliance and 
export interests in expanding world trade. The Reynders Commission (1972: 78) 
recommended that rather than withdrawing from the GATT, South Africa should “endeavour 
to bring about a change in these rules and in their actual application”.  This sentiment has 
echoes in post-apartheid South Africa’s subsequent participation in the WTO during the Doha 
Round, where the country has repeatedly called for developing countries to work within the 
institution to change it from within making trade practices fairer, rather than replacing the 
system altogether (Lee 2006: 52). 
 
The debt crisis of the mid 1980s, following massive disinvestment in South Africa due to 
political instability and the intensification of international sanctions, was the trigger for a shift 
in economic policy orientation by the apartheid government. Export-led growth began to 
assume greater importance (DTI 1989: 1). This process was further entrenched by evidence 
emerging from the Asian Tiger economies (particularly South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam) 
that the road to economic growth for developing economies was through export-led strategies 
and a concomitant commitment to market liberalisation (Birdsall and Jasperson 1994). 
Haggard (1995) points to this phenomenon as indicative that international discourses can be 
82 
 
significant factors in determining economic strategies adopted by developing countries.50 
This focus on export-led growth was underpinned by the government’s appointment of Kent 
Durr as Minister of Trade and Industry, a firm economic liberal taken from the private sector 
(Kentridge 1993). 51 This shift towards an export orientation and reducing trade-distorting 
import tariffs corresponded with the start of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in 1986, in which South Africa participated. These factors indicate that the shift 
in South Africa’s trade policy can be attributed to a combination of domestic factors, 
international pressures, economic imperatives and the influence of business interests (GATT 
1993a). The consultation process around the negotiations at the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT, occurred within the NEF, which comprised representatives of Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) and business (Fine 1997: 135). In the period following 
these undertakings, the then Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Irwin, asserted that South 
Africa had liberalised its tariffs faster than the terms of its WTO undertakings (Cassim 2006).  
 
3.4  Business during apartheid and at political transition 
It is very difficult to conduct an analysis of business involvement in any aspect of South 
Africa’s political system, domestic or international, without taking account of the historical 
relationship between business and apartheid. One perspective, espoused by radicals or 
Marxists, holds that business was both a beneficiary of the apartheid system and a co-
architect in the discriminatory regime (SACP 1997; Terreblanche 1997). 52 The South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) conducted an analysis of business culpability in 
                                                      
50
 For further analysis of the so-called Asian Miracle see Amsden (1989); Johnson (1985); Krueger (1993); 
Krugman (1994); Lall (1981); Williamson (1993); World Bank (1993a). 
51
 Economic liberalism here refers to a commitment to an approach that favours minimal government 
intervention and leaves market and competitive forces to their own devices. The role of government is 
minimalised to the provision of public goods which private enterprise cannot provide. 
52
 The South African Communist Party (SACP 1997) posits in their submission to the TRC that it “was precisely 
the captains of industry, particularly those associated with the diamond and gold-mining industry, who 
pioneered many of the core features of what later came to be known as apartheid.” 
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designing, supporting and perpetuating apartheid, at which various people were invited to 
submit testimony (Asmal et al1997).53 Contrasting perspectives that argue business had a role 
in dismantling apartheid, contend that the TRC hearings were overly influenced by the 
testimony of  neo-Marxist interpretations, particularly the evidence of Terreblanche (Krogh 
1998; Lipton 2007). Certainly, the conclusions reached by the TRC on business, that any 
profitable activity under apartheid was linked to the system and therefore had a shared moral 
responsibility for its abuses, reflects the views testified to by Terreblanche (1997).54 The TRC 
(2003: 140) stated that “business was central to the economy that sustained the South African 
state during the apartheid years” and that “the blueprint for ‘grand apartheid’ was provided by 
the mines and was not an Afrikaner state innovation”. The TRC recommended that restitutive 
measures including a wealth tax, a one-off levy on corporate and private income, a 1 percent 
donation by listed companies and/or retrospective surcharges on corporate profit be 
considered (TRC 2003: 331). A subsequent (and the most recent) TRC document available, 
Vol. 6 indicated disappointment with the Business Trust, established for reparations 
payments from the private sector as well as a fund established in Switzerland for 
contributions by Swiss banks and investors in South Africa.55   
 
  
                                                      
53
 The TRC was established to attempt to deal with gross human rights violations under apartheid between 
1960 and 1994. Although the mandate of the TRC was narrowly defined (too narrow for some) to include 
killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any person for political motivation and thus excluded 
broader human rights violations such as discrimination and dispossession the TRC  still held several 
institutional hearings into business and various other sectors such as churches, youth and health organisations 
(Nattrass, 1999: 373-374) 
54
 The TRC process involved representations by several groups of organised business as well as large 
corporations and individual corporate executives. For a broader picture of these submissions see Nattrass 
(1999). 
55
 At time of publication in 2003 of Vol. 6 of the TRC Report the Business Trust had received a mere R800 m 
from the private sector and the Swiss fund less than 0.02 percent of profits made by Swiss banks and investors 
in South Africa each year during the 1980s. A significant section of this Chapter is devoted to the role of Swiss 
banks and investors in supporting apartheid and thus sharing moral responsibility for human rights violations. 
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The radical-liberal debate 
 
The debate around the culpability of business coalesced around  two extremes: the radical-
liberal or race-class debate (Nattrass 1991; Lipton 2007).56 Radical critics of business 
maintained that apartheid was a system of exploitation that benefited capital and was racially 
entrenched by the effect that apartheid promoted white wealth and corporate profitability at 
the expense of black workers.57  Marxist analysis held that apartheid’s primary purpose 
through a broad range of policies from influx controls, labour bureaux and broader political 
suppression was to ensure the steady supply of cheap labour for industry and mining 
(Legassick 1974: 9).58 What this argument fails to take into account, however, is the negative 
impact that the labour colour-bar had on access to skilled and semi-skilled labour with a 
deleterious effect on economic performance from as early as the 1960’s. As Lipton (1986: 7) 
puts it “apartheid raised costs of production and made exports uncompetitive”. 
 
Radicals argued that “apartheid was designed to serve the interests of the dominant class and 
was the means by which capitalism could thrive…” (Feinstein 2005: 162).  Liberals 
countered this on the basis that business was in fact harmed by apartheid and that the 
economic policies of the apartheid government restricted economic growth and development 
(Samuels 1955: 16; Horwitz 1967: 12; O'Dowd 1974). They argued that “migrant workers, 
high labour turnover, inferior education, job reservation and other apartheid policies all had 
powerful adverse effects on the productive efficiency of black workers and thus severely 
retarded growth” (Feinstein 2005: 162). The economic crises faced by South Africa in the 
1970s and 1980s, they postulated, can be attributed to import substitution and a dependency 
on cheap labour entrenched as part of the apartheid system (Vigne 1997). 
                                                      
56
 For an extensive review of the debate on ideological impetus behind South Africa’s political transformation 
and the key role players see Merle Lipton (2007). 
57
 Some of the strongest critics of business at the TRC hearings included the Black Management Forum and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (Nattrass, 1999: 380-381). 
58
 Influx control refers to the policy of preventing the migration of families into urban areas. Only people with a 
legitimate ‘Pass’ entitling them to work in a given urban area were permitted to stay there. 
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In the radical explanation, Nattrass (1999: 378) maintains that business regarded themselves 
as victims of the political system and purported to lack the power to change it. This 
perspective fails to take into account the evidence of leading capitalists in campaigning 
against an increasingly wide range of apartheid policies on black labour, education, mobility, 
trade union rights and from the early 80s political rights (Adam et al 1997). Liberals argue 
that business had become part of the anti-apartheid initiative some time before the release of 
Nelson Mandela which signalled the beginning of the political transition leading to the 
elections of 1994 (Lipton 2007).   There is substantial evidence of South African business 
engaging in various forms and levels of activity to dismantle apartheid, both domestically and 
abroad (Bernstein 1998).  
 
While industrialists were more likely to adhere to the conservative status quo and bankers 
were more liberal, it was in fact a mining conglomerate in the form of Anglo-American that 
stood at the forefront of business opposition to apartheid (Handley 2008: 52). Harry 
Oppenheimer, the CEO of Anglo-American opined that apartheid and economic growth were 
mutually exclusive and that growth would lead to the rise of a strong black middle-class, a 
thesis that came to be called the “Oppenheimer Thesis” (Sampson 1987: 95). Additional 
pressures were brought to bear on the apartheid government by a few business groupings 
such as the Federated Chamber of Industries and the Urban Foundation. In January 1985, the 
South Africa Foundation (SAF), representing the major corporations in South Africa, met 
with two ANC representatives in London foreshadowing a subsequent meeting with the ANC 
in Lusaka in 1987 (Chapman and Hofmeyr 1994). This was followed by business meetings 
with the United Democratic Front (UDF) and further sessions with the ANC leadership, 
culminating in 1988 with the formation of a formal business grouping called the Consultative 
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Business Movement (CBM) (Eloff 1998).59 There were overt initiatives too, such as the 
furore created in 1987 by the managing director of First National Bank (FNB), Chris Ball, for 
authorising the funding of an advertisement calling for the unbanning of the ANC (Callinicos 
1988: 159). In addition business orientated think tanks, such as the Urban Foundation, were 
also producing policy recommendations for transformation in the South African political 
economy (Smit 1992: 39-42).  
 
Radical critics of business rejected the notion of business being opposed to apartheid out of 
hand – even though recognition was granted that different categories of business were 
differentially involved and/or affected by apartheid (Greenberg 1987). For radical scholars 
apartheid was structured around the needs of capital and was supported enthusiastically by 
business because of the massive profits business made from apartheid (Trapido 1971; Wolpe 
1972; Legassick 1974; Terreblanche 1997). The SACP submission to the TRC has a 
subheading: “Past Oppression goes on earning compound interest” and continues that 
“corporations…were deeply complicit in institutionalised racial oppression and the 
systematic undermining of the fundamental human rights of the majority” (SACP 1997) . 60 
 
This introduction to some of the “controversies about capitalism and apartheid in South 
Africa” is relevant to this thesis because it places in context the often complex and 
controversial role of business in the political arena, particularly during apartheid. 61 The 
difficulty in reconciling business and anti-apartheid credentials has stemmed, in part at least, 
from the radical-liberal debate around whether capitalism could be regarded as a supporter of 
the anti-apartheid movement. According to Nattrass (1991) for radicals the “fight against 
                                                      
59
 The UDF was a civil society organisation allied with the ANC (which was banned and exiled at the time). 
60
 The SACP is one of the ANC’s electoral alliance partners, along with COSATU. The submission was viewed 
online and so no page number can be given for the direct quotation. 
61
 Borrowed from the title of an article on this theme by Nicoli Nattrass: ‘Controversies About Capitalism and 
Apartheid in South Africa: an Economic Perspective’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 
December, 1991 
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apartheid was the fight for socialism”, whilst liberals viewed socialism with extreme distaste. 
Lipton (Lipton 1986: 4) takes issue with such a value-laden distinction of what constitutes a 
liberal, arguing that liberals in the South African context could hold views anywhere from 
social democracy to free market conservatives.  
 
The historical misinterpretation conveyed by a radical Marxist perspective, that ignores any 
evidence of business’s anti-apartheid stance (however diluted) suits the line not only or even 
primarily of the left-leaning anti-capitalists, but of post 1994 Africanists who find in this  
misinterpretation a justification for policies that discriminate against white business. A strong 
case can be made for taking measures against capitalists and capitalism itself but this does not 
need to rest on distortions of their historical role. This has further political consequences, in 
poisoning the difficult relationship between ANC and business. The support for many racist 
policies by sectors of business but not all sectors, should never be ignored or downplayed, but 
nor should significant shifts in their policies from around the 1970s which had roots in earlier 
conflicts between business and the apartheid government during the 1940s and particularly 
with Associated Chamber of Commerce (ASSOCOM) thereafter. The recognition of this 
growing pressure from business was not just that of liberal analysts, but was by the mid-80s 
increasingly accepted by Marxists such as O’Meara. In contradiction to what he had written 
earlier, faced both by the evidence and the course of events, O’Meara (1997) acknowledged 
that there had for some time been mounting pressures from capital against an increasing 
range of apartheid policies. These elements of white capital were calling for reform both in 
the form of de-racialising the country as well as for economic liberalisation (Lipton 1986: 
228).   
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ASSOCOM and the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) supported the liberal views 
espoused in the Buthelezi Commission and Lombard Report.62 Oppenheimer, a leading 
business figure in the liberal camp, regarded “racial discrimination and free enterprise are 
basically incompatible” (Anglo American 1980). Furthermore, balance of payment crises in 
that decade forced a more outward driven policy in an attempt to increase exports to mitigate 
the effects of the balance of payments deficit. Increasing international isolation, accompanied 
by the cessation of inward capital flows and sanctions meant that South Africa began to count 
the cost of apartheid (Welsh and Spence 2011: 101). Skills shortages were coming home to 
roost even as growth slowed (Bernstein 1998). This resulted in increasing domestic pressure 
from many sections of industry, commerce and commercial agriculture, although some 
sectors had been raising concerns about the economic impact of skills shortages as early as 
the 1960’s  (Feinstein 2005: 240; Lipton 2007: 44).63 
 
The culminating point of the economic crisis was the withdrawal from apartheid and it was 
into this era of virtual economic collapse and pariahdom that the ANC launched the first 
democratic government of South Africa, in 1994 (Bond 2002; Hirsch 2005). This is crucial, 
because much of the debate around what informed ANC economic policy in the post-
apartheid period hinges on understanding the economic context within which policy choices 
were and continue to be negotiated and decided.  
 
It is evident that South African business has played a key role in many aspects of South 
Africa’s economic diplomacy, both during apartheid and in the democracy. Business was an 
important catalyst for political transformation, from as early as the 1960s but particularly 
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 The Buthelezi Commission was initiated by Mangosuthu Buthelezi to investigate changes to bring about 
social, economic and political justice in the then province of Natal (South Africa Ministry of Home Affairs 
2007). The Lombard Report was commissioned by the Natal sugar industry (Smith 1992: 31). 
63
 Most notably these include employers’ associations such as Assocom, the Federated Chamber of Industries 
(FCI), the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation (SEIFSA) and the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI). 
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towards the end of apartheid rule (O'Dowd 1974; O'Meara 1997; Renwick 1997). Michael 
Spicer, Chief Executive of Business Leadership SA (BLSA), formerly the South Africa 
Foundation, points out that business was highly critical of and well left of the apartheid 
government in the decade leading up to the 1994 elections (Int: Spicer, 2006). As part of the 
National Economic Forum (NEF) during the transition government’s negotiations business 
made a significant impact on the ensuing economic policy.   
 
The primary purpose of business in international engagement during the apartheid era was, 
according to Spicer, to perform the role of international economic diplomacy forfeited by the 
government as a pariah state. In this instance business NSAs were performing a substitution 
role in diplomacy and this has resonance with multi-actor diplomacy approaches that outline 
the lack of legitimacy of state actors on occasion (as South Africa did during apartheid).64 
The goal was to keep open linkages between South African business and the outside world 
independently of government, and included sanctions-busting initiatives.65 This linking role 
was expressed through recognisable diplomatic tools such as communication, building 
relationships, information gathering and sharing and lobbying. Essentially, business 
performed a bridging role akin to that of mediating between the outside world, foreign 
business actors, sovereign actors, the exiled ANC and the incumbent government of the 
National party.  
 
The South African government’s on-going commitment to neoliberal economic orthodoxy, 
the rationale for which has been explored above, is further supported by the role of “liberal 
social forces” in the form of international capital and business groups (Lee 2006: 15). South 
Africa’s major corporations remain largely white owned (despite BEE initiatives) and 
                                                      
64
 See Chapter 2, sub-section 2.5, reference to Rosenau (1990) and Hocking’s  (1999b) catalytic diplomacy. 
65
 Such initiatives included using neighbouring countries like Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland as 
intermediaries to route exports to broader markets as well as using false documents to send South African 
goods abroad (Khadiagala 1999: 257-258) 
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together with the business press have been highly effective at countering socialist elements 
within the ANC (Fig 2007a).66 Eager to disassociate itself from apartheid, business was 
actively involved in facilitating and funding the negotiations around transition, with the view 
to protecting its entrenched interests and power (Handley 2008: 66).  It was certainly in 
business’s interests to seek a peaceful resolution to the political transition. This is not to 
suggest that business was the sole undermining force for transition or that all business entities 
shared this propensity. Other factors were equally significant to the end of apartheid, 
including the role of mass action and trade union activism supported by international 
pressures in the form of sanctions and isolation. Context also had a role to play: economic 
growth leading to an emerging black middle-class, lack of access to capital to generate higher 
growth, massive skills shortages, and global integration pressures promoting norms of justice, 
reform and anti-racism (Lipton 2007: 104). 
 
Following transition, the imperative for business was how to ensure that the ANC was guided 
towards a liberal economic approach and away from its stated goals of redistribution and the 
concomitant disruptions this would have entailed for capitalist interests (ANC 1992). It is to 
this issue that the chapter now turns, exploring the drivers and processes that have resulted in 
the ANC’s largely neo-liberal economic policies and on-going commitment to multilateral 
undertakings such as the WTO.  
 
3.5  Post-apartheid ‘liberalisation’ 
For much of its exiled time, the ANC (influenced in large part by the SACP) upheld a 
socialist reform policy, including nationalisation of mines, banks and monopoly industry. 
Formal economic policies had not been articulated but the rhetoric of socialism was 
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 Although, some commentators such as Moeletsi Mbeki would argue that BEE is simply replacing a white 
corporate elite with a small black elite, concentrating corporate transformation in the hands of a few 
influential black business men such as Cyril Ramaphosa and Tokyo Sexwale (Mbeki 2009).  
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predominant. The Freedom Charter of 1955 (ANC 1955) held redistribution as an important 
theme:  
“The People Shall Share in the Country’s Wealth! The national wealth of our country, 
the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people; The mineral wealth 
beneath the soil, the Banks and the monopoly industry shall be transferred to the 
ownership of the people as a whole; All other industry and trade shall be controlled to 
assist the wellbeing of the people.” 
 
 The lack of specific mechanisms for achieving broadly stated ideals was useful for rallying 
support from a wide range of supporters, including working classes, professionals, business 
people and African nationalists (Nattrass 1994: 344). One of the first statements Mandela 
made on his release was to affirm a commitment to nationalisation as a means of 
redistribution (Handley 2008: 73). 
 
The debate about the connection between apartheid and capitalism was fierce, with Marxist 
theorists arguing that replacing apartheid meant replacing capitalism, thus according to 
Nattrass (1991: 656) “the fight against apartheid [was] the fight for socialism”.  Initial 
economic policy documents emanating from the ANC leading up to the election framed their 
economic premise as “growth through redistribution”, with strong socialist influences, 
including a pivotal role for labour in the “planning and execution of industrial policy” (Lodge 
1999: 8). This resulted in an inevitable backlash from pro-business elements in the media and 
policy think-tanks. This massive onslaught was in part responsible for the watering down of 
economic policy (Kentridge 1993: 7).  
 
Various explanations have been proposed regarding why South Africa should embark on a 
liberalisation path. Indeed, it is remarkable that it should, given that the new government of 
South Africa following the 1994 elections was comprised of a coalition of the ANC, the 
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SACP and COSATU.  The Gramscian approach holds that South Africa is a victim of 
neoliberal hegemony by which South Africa is part of a global neo-liberal convergence 
process (Bond 2004). Left-thinking scholars such as Bond (2000: 54) contend that business 
applied a highly effective strategy to devastating effect on the “decades-old redistributive 
economic ambitions” of the ANC.  
 
A contrasting perspective of middlepowermanship posits that South Africa has adopted a 
middle power role in the international system and as such plays a strategy of accommodation 
and challenge, seeking to transform the imbalances of the international system from within as 
a means of ensuring its role as a significant player in the system (Nel et al 2001; Taylor 
2001). Middle powers are middle ranking countries in economic and military terms and seek 
to strengthen their international influence through multilateral engagement (Cox 1996b: 243). 
Cooper et al (1993: 16) argue that opportunities are created for middle powers by the “hiatus 
in structural leadership in the international order”. A middle-power strategy refers to how 
smaller powers can make influential contributions in a context in which great powers seem to 
have the monopoly. In this regard Cooper et al (1993: 17) suggest that a middle-power 
typology can provide a better explanation for the role and behaviour of smaller powers in 
international politics. A key feature of middlepowermanship is the conciliation role that these 
actors adopt in mediating in the international arena. This role is often associated with peace-
keeping initiatives because middlepowermanship is so closely related to the notion of middle-
powers as trust-worthy or occupying a higher moral ground as “good international citizens” 
(Cooper 1997: 7). However, this is not the sole purpose for adopting a middle power role; 
middlepowermanship also fulfils an important function in helping the middle power achieve 
its own societal interests within the existing global system (Black 1997: 141; Pfister 2005: 
12). 
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Katzenstein (1985) suggests that middle-power interests extend beyond strategic political 
objectives to economic interests associated with underpinning the liberal international order 
via institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and the WTO. Lee (2006: 56) argues that in 
positioning itself as a middle power facilitator, South Africa is entrenching itself within the 
neoliberal orthodoxy. Part of South Africa’s strategy for re-engagement was integrating with 
the world through multilateralism, a feature of middlepowermanship (Taylor 2001: 11; Lee 
2006). For example South Africa prefers multilateral fora to bilateral diplomacy as a means 
of exerting influence (Schoeman 2000). Multilateralism creates the opportunity for smaller 
states to “participate on an equal footing on the world stage” (Nzo 1999). Through 
multilateral engagement South Africa has the stated intention of “playing a leading role 
internationally”(Department of Foreign Affairs 1998). A Coxian-based critical theory 
perspective concludes that transformation in the world order combined with domestic-societal 
asymmetries of power, exerted significant pressure on South Africa to emerge as a middle-
power (Solomon 1997; Van der Westhuizen 1998). This, in conjunction with a high level of 
dependence on international support to achieve its goals of reconstruction and development, 
forced the ANC to adopt a more liberal foreign and economic policy position.  
 
Another explanation is that South African policy elites were hijacked by business influence 
early on in the policy making stages of the ANC’s accession to power. This argument follows 
on from the radical Marxist perspective and emphasises the role of domestic social forces as 
influential agents in South Africa’s transformation and subsequent policy direction. This is 
supported by the fact that at the time of its unbanning the ANC had no clearly defined 
economic policies (Ward 1998: 38). A lack of policy direction in the ANC created an 
opportunity for South African business elites and capital to launch a ‘charm offensive’ 
dedicated to correcting the ANC’s perceived economic flaws, through think tanks, studies 
and direct representation.  One account recalls the role of the Finance Minister Derek Keys in 
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influencing ANC economic head Trevor Manuel and via him Nelson Mandela (Waldmeir 
1997: 213). The pro-business media also ran a series of devastating articles highlighting the 
pitfalls of a mixed economy (Taylor 2001: 61). This resulted in a situation where “business 
came to play a part in national affairs that is surely without parallel in the world” (Friedman 
and Atkinson 1994).  As Taylor (2001: 61) reports from an interview with Terreblanche “the 
leadership core of the ANC were wined and dined from morning to night by the “captains of 
industry”. This explanation is not to refute the relevance of a middle-power approach or a 
Gramscian take that emphasizes the hegemony of liberalisation as an ideology. In fact the 
role of business interests in shaping and changing policy can be seen as part of either or both 
of these processes.  
 
The trend towards liberalisation had thus started very gradually in the decade preceding the 
ANC’s election to power and has been significantly intensified in the ensuing period both 
bilaterally and multilaterally (Cassim and Zarenda 2004: 105). South Africa was negotiating 
multilaterally (in the Uruguay Round that established the WTO) and shortly after becoming a 
founder signatory through the single-undertaking of the WTO, was negotiating a common 
market arrangement within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well 
as engaging in protracted negotiations with the South African Customs Union (SACU). 67  In 
addition South Africa signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the European Union (EU), 
which came into effect in January 2000 (Cassim and Zarenda 2004: 113). In May 2000, the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) with the US came into effect and included 
South Africa in the 34 Sub-Saharan countries eligible for trade benefits.  Whilst there has 
been a heavy focus on bilateral and regional trade agreements, and this has been a significant 
location for much of South Africa’s post-apartheid liberalisation, it does not minimise South 
                                                      
67
 SADC comprises 14 members including South Africa: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
(DFA 2008b). SACU comprises South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (DFA 2008c). 
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Africa’s role in multilateral fora (Cassim and Zarenda 2004: 116). Increasing liberalisation 
through multilateralism is thus a feature of the South African economic diplomacy landscape 
and points to various points of linkage with firms and business interests.  
 
South Africa’s economic and trade policy, while certainly being informed by the imperatives 
of macroeconomic policy, is not the only explanation for the reformist agenda consistently 
pursued by the post-apartheid government.  While exploring the question of economic and 
trade policy it is valuable to query why the ANC converted so singly to orthodox (neoliberal) 
economic ideas in the period of transition from Government of National Unity (GNU) to 
democratically elected party. ANC activists began preaching the benefits of free-market 
economics very early on in the economic policy making process (Nattrass 1994: 355). The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of command style economies at the time of 
transition was a crucial factor, along with the failure of socialism in a number of African 
countries at the time, such as Mozambique and Ethiopia.68 Certainly pressures from intense 
lobbying by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) contributed, although there were also 
less neo-liberal recommendations  from institutions like the World Bank, which called for 
land redistribution of 30 percent of white-owned land (World Bank 1993b).69 A series of 
corporate-led scenario planning initiatives undoubtedly had a significant effect on the ANC 
leadership (Hamill 1998: 66; Bond 2000: 54-55; Handley 2008: 74).70 Williams and Taylor 
(2000: 26) cite a similar list of explanatory factors, expanding on the fact that with limited 
resources the ANC was highly dependent on input from other well-funded and pro-liberal 
civil society groups: “Representatives of big business continued the educational ‘charm 
                                                      
68
 According to Michael Sachs, head of the ANC’s policy and research unit, there was no alternative to 
capitalism without the Soviet Union (Bond 2004) and (Taylor 2001). 
69
 The neoliberal message was promoted by a plethora of studies and high profile conferences aimed at 
lobbying the government in waiting (Williams and Taylor 2000: 27). 
70
 Notable among these was the Nedcor/ Old Mutual’s “Prospects for Successful Transition”; Sanlam’s 
“Platform for Investment”; the Mont Fleur “Scenarios”; the South African Chamber of Commerce (SACOB) 
“Economic Options for South Africa”(Handley 2008). 
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offensive’ on the ANC elite in general and Mandela in particular” (Williams and Taylor 
2000: 26). Mandela’s passionate desire to interact with elite groupings made him vulnerable 
to the ideas and views of both influential international business leaders and the South African 
corporate elite.71  The express purpose of Corporate Scenario Planning exercises was to 
“significantly alter the mindsets or paradigms through which decision makers see the world” 
(Lee 1993: 72).  
 
Left wing elements such as COSATU did make attempts at limiting the influence of the 
barrage of neoliberal ideology on economic policy, with little success. By retaining Derek 
Keys as Finance Minister (an ex-Gencor executive) in the new government, the ANC sent a 
clear message that reassured established capital interests that the new government was going 
to be a safe pair of hands (Williams and Taylor 2000: 29; Handley 2008: 75). In short, the 
ANC, resource strapped and caught off-guard by their sudden unbanning in 1990, had little 
by way of ideas or strategies to offer as a counter to the neoliberal consensus foisted on them 
by a broad array of local business, Washington institutions and foreign capital (Cassim 2006). 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), essentially a compromise 
document between neoliberal and socialist doctrine, was short-lived. According to Williams 
and Taylor (2000: 33; Cassim 2006) the rolling out of the Growth Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) in its place was the embodiment of the triumph of neoliberal 
ideology (Department of Finance 1996). These developments all indicate that there was a 
significant role for business in influencing economic policy from the earliest point of the new 
ANC-led government’s rule. This assessment of the primacy of the role of business in South 
Africa’s early economic policy, demonstrates that capital was not inextricably linked to 
apartheid, although capitalists were certainly complicit in and benefitted from apartheid at 
                                                      
71
 Williams and Taylor (2000: 26) point specifically to the influence of the Brenthurst group, an association of 
monopoly capitalists formed at the instigation of Anglo-American tycoon, Harry Oppenheimer. 
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various times prior to 1994 (Lipton 2007: 108). Capital interests were also highly influential 
in the dismantling of apartheid and the concomitant development of a post-apartheid 
economic policy.  
 
Discussions  over the future economic policy of South Africa at transition reflected a 
consensus on 3 key points: i) maintaining macroeconomic stability; ii) re-integrating South 
Africa into international trade and financial markets; iii) redressing the racial skewing of 
capital ownership and management in both the public and private sector. Some regarded these 
negotiations as being “significantly influenced by the prevailing international conventional 
wisdom” of the time (Gelb 2006: 4). Gelb (2006) notes that trade and capital account  
liberalisation were a prerequisite for international capital inflows in the early 1990’s, when 
South Africa was undergoing political and economic transformation and re-engaging with the 
international system at large. 
 
This theory holds that neo-liberal convergence has carried through to South Africa’s 
increasingly active role in the Multilateral Trading System (MTS). An enthusiastic supporter 
of multilateralism generally, South Africa has embraced neo-liberal orthodoxy in its trade 
policy more enthusiastically than most other developing countries (Lee 2006: 63). This is 
reflected in South Africa’s support for launching the Doha Round (DR), co-option to Green-
man status and ‘friend–of-the-chair’ at the 4th Ministerial in Doha. It was also mirrored in 
central neo-liberal focus of the GEAR programme implemented in 1996. “Pretoria’s 
international positioning and role has reflected an accommodation to neo-liberal economic 
globalisation…” (Keet 2002, May: 4). Again, this is evidence of an important role being 
played by business in economic policy-making processes. The GEAR strategy was replaced 
in 2006 by the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), which 
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has received little attention from the Zuma administration and has published no annual report 
since early 2009 (ASGISA 2008). 
 
Much of the literature explaining the ANC government’s neoliberal capitalist commitment 
points to various themes along the lines of a ‘neoliberal convergence theory’. Williams and 
Taylor (2000: 21) argue that the ascendancy of neoliberalism as an ideology has been the 
result of a process of “active dissemination” by a broad range of “social forces, institutions 
and intellectual agents”. In this way the ideology of neoliberalism has been elevated to the 
status of an accepted reality, rather than one of a number of ideas. Further supporting the 
importance of the role played by business actors in the process of disseminating ideas in 
order to inform and influence policy decisions.   
 
3.6  The present economic milieu  
In order to understand and explain the role of business in South Africa’s post-apartheid 
economic diplomacy it is useful to know more about South Africa’s key trading partners as 
export and import markets. Table 3.1 below provides a summary of South Africa’s 15 top 
export destinations by country.  The table reflects the total volume of exports for 2006, 2009 
and 2010, the ranking of each country, the proportion of total exports going to each of these 
and the annual growth between 2009 and 2010 in export volumes to this country. Data is 
included from 2006 to see where South Africa’s export focus has shifted, in order to better 
understand how the emphasis in diplomatic relationships may also be shifting. From the last 
column it is apparent that 70 percent of South Africa’s total exports go to the top 15 export 
destinations. The remaining 30 percent of total exports is divided between some 231 other 
countries. 
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Table 3.1  South African Trade by Country: Exports (2007-2010) 
 South African Trade by COUNTRY (Rand ‘000) 
COUNTRY EXPORT (R ‘000) RANK Proportion 2010 Projected 
Annual Growth 
Name 2010 2009 2007 2010 2007 % Total Cum. 2011-2010 
China (Chinas) 58,552,687 48,686,325 24,501,423 1 5 13.2% 13.2% 35.1% 
United States NAFTA 52,415,349 41,317,574 52,071,869 2 1 9.8% 23% 11.4% 
Japan (N/E Asia) 46,330,557 33,974,651 50,109,199 3 2 9.2% 32.2% 19.0% 
Germany (EU) 42,740,052 32,456,864 34,064,713 4 4 7.5% 39.7% 4.5% 
United Kingdom (EU) 26,610,710 25,350,209 34,362,668 5 3 4.8% 44.5% 7.8% 
India (SAARC) 22,610,710 18,127,454 9,232,017 6 10 4% 48.5% 8.8% 
Netherlands (EU) 17,163,722 18,455,683 19,634,216 7 6 3.6% 52.2% 26.8% 
Switzerland (EFTA & OTHER) 16,849,011 21,348,936 8,680,635 8 11 3.4% 55.6% 22.5% 
Zimbabwe (SADC) 15,116,802 13,295,370 7,968,601 9 14 2.8% 58.4% 21.5% 
Mozambique (SADC) 13,855,206 12,994,223 8,680,635 10 12 2.8% 61.2% 27.6% 
Korea Republic South (NE ASIA) 13,007,863 7,721,932 8,090,732 11 13 2.7% 63.9% 5.6% 
Belgium (EU) 12,449,005 10,560,175 12,146,484 12 7 2.5% 66.4% 21.3% 
Zambia  (SADC) 11,447,459 11,244,835 9,290,414 13 9 2.5% 68.9% 29.8% 
Italy (EU) 10,519,997 9,078,973 10,274,544 14 8 2.2% 71% 22.9% 
Taiwan (CHINAs) 7,800,578 6,918,220 6,332,538 15 >15 
 
1.5% 72.5% 13.8% 
TOTAL EXPORTS 
ALL COUNTRIES 
 
583,965,528 
 
512,802,515 
 
477,024,769 
     
15.1% 
 
(Source: DTI 2011a).  
The data shows that South Africa’s top export markets are now China, the United States, 
Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. Export growth to China in 2009-10 was 8.2%, but 
this does not reflect that between 2006 and 2007, exports to China grew by 102.7% (which 
was then South Africa’s fifth largest export market). It is significant to note also, that China 
was not even among the top 10 destination countries for South African exports in 2002 (DTI 
2003; Ligthelm 2004). Also noteworthy is the increasing importance of India (ranked 14th in 
2007), which is now South Africa’s sixth largest export market with export growth in the 
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2010/11 period of 22.0%. What is significant about these developments is that South Africa is 
definitely shifting away from a heavy dependence on OECD trading partners towards a 
growing relationship with other large developing country economies. This is reflected in a 
shift in South Africa’s economic diplomacy towards a South-South focus. This is further 
evidenced by the alignment of the South African government with other large emerging 
economies of China, India and Brazil (and their recent inclusion as a member of the BRICS 
grouping).  
Table 3.2  South Africa Trade by Country: Imports (2007-2010) 
 South African Trade by COUNTRY (Rand ‘000) 
COUNTRY IMPORT (R ‘000) RANK Proportion 2010 Projected  
Annual Growth 
Name 2010 2009 2007 2010 2007 % Total Cum. 2010-2009 
CHINA (CHINAS) 84,101,670 70,809,455 60,298,345 1 2 13.7% 13.7% 12.8% 
GERMANY (EU) 66,784,256 63,256,336 65,620,967 2 1 10.9% 24.6% 12.6% 
UNITED STATES 
(NAFTA) 
42,155,143 41,583,951 43,155,143 3 3 8.4% 33% 37.7% 
JAPAN (N.E ASIA) 30,996,256 26,321,616 36,978,079 4 4 4.7% 37.6% 4.6% 
SAUDI ARABIA (MIDDLE 
EAST) 
23,717,740 26,650,919 25,383,070 5 6 4.5% 42.1% 31.1% 
IRAN (MIDDLE EAST) 23,003,027 22,109,679 20,082,502 6 7 4.2% 46.3% 24.9% 
UNITED KINGDOM(EU) 22,151,626 21,596,728 27,287,819 7 5 4% 50.3% 24.2% 
INDIA (SAARC) 20,749,304 15,416,904 12,510,077 8 11 3.7% 53.9% 22.2% 
FRANCE (EU) 17,281,178 17,022,037 18,963,589 9 8 3.1% 57% 7.8% 
NIGERIA (WEST AFRICA) 16,082,954 15,599,807 12,480,199 10 12 2.7% 59.7% 31.5% 
ITALY (EU) 14,603,025 13,674,888 15,653,589 11 9 2.6% 62.3% 22.5% 
ANGOLA (SADC) 14,684,730 11,659,324 15,653,589 12 13 2.2% 64.5% -17.9% 
THAILAND (ASEAN) 13,372,096 12,131,342 10,319,231 13 14 2.1% 66.7% 15.9% 
KOREA REP. SOUTH (N.E. 
ASIA) 
12,760,666 9,659,353 12,618,332 14 10 1.8% 68.4% 16% 
SWEDEN (EU) 10,237,723 9,395,687 8,112,992 15 >15 1.7% 70.2% 19.9% 
Total Imports all Countries 585,385,374 539,966,849 559,649,392     18.4% 
 
(Source: DTI 2011a) 
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South Africa’s main importing sources by country are reflected in Table 3.2, with China, 
Germany, and the United States the top three sources of imports.  The data from the tables 
reflecting imports and exports also indicates that South Africa still has a trade deficit, with 
imports exceeding exports by some R17.3billion in 2010, but significantly less than the trade 
deficit of 2006 of R65.6 billion. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of South Africa’s exports by region, demonstrating the 
heavy reliance on Europe as a trading partner, attracting just over a third of South Africa’s 
exports. Asia is the second most important region for exports.  
 
In 2010 South Africa’s largest trade deficit was with Asia, followed by Europe. This on-
going dependence on Europe as a trading partner may be significant as an explanatory factor 
in the negotiating positions South Africa has adopted in various economic diplomacy 
processes thus far, particularly in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU. It 
also explains South Africa’s present engagement with India and China in economic 
diplomacy initiatives such as the IBSA dialogue and BRICS forum respectively. China 
presents a significant opportunity for South Africa going forward (Davies 2005).  South 
Africa has a negative trading balance with all its trading partners bar Africa which places 
South Africa at something of a disadvantage in economic negotiations. The trade surplus 
South Africa enjoys with the rest of Africa must also be viewed in the context of South 
Africa’s status as a perceived economic hegemon on the continent more broadly, but 
specifically in the sub-region as a member of SADC. 
 
The pie chart in Figure 3.2 below clearly shows that the EU as a whole remains a dominant 
regional export destination for South Africa. However, taken together, other markets in 
economies of the South are gaining significant influence. The Chinas and NE Asia together 
comprise 25% of South Africa’s exports. SADC and the rest of Africa account for a further 
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17% of exports. This trend is obvious evidence of the rising influence of emerging market 
economies in South Africa’s trading relationships. 
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of South Africa’s Exports by World Region (2010) 
 
Source: (DTI 2011a) 
 
Minerals and mining remain a key sector in the economy and South Africa was ranked 9th in 
terms of World exports of mining products in 2008 (WTO 2010:215). Merchandise trade is 
the largest element of South African exports with manufacturing an important component 
(DTI 2011a). The services sector is the least competitive in global terms, contributing very 
little of South Africa’s total export volume, despite being highly developed domestically and 
the existence of a robust financial services sector which is increasingly attracting foreign 
investment interest (WTO 2011a). 
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of South Africa’s historical political economy, 
apartheid-era economic diplomacy and the role of business during apartheid, as catalyst for 
the demise of apartheid and finally as agency in the economic policy-making of the post-
apartheid ANC government.  A clear role for business agency has been established 
throughout the various stages of South Africa’s economic history. A review of the economic 
history of the country reveals early on the power of capital interests in transforming South 
Africa from a small agrarian economy, to a fully- fledged participant in the global economy. 
The impetus for this transformation was the mining revolution, which enabled South Africa 
to overtake many colonial and semi-colonial economies at the time. This is remarkable in the 
context of the change in South Africa’s fortunes in the eight decades that followed, from 
being one of the best performing economies to one of the worst in the early 1990s. Apartheid 
policies of the job colour bar, restricted workers rights and racist education had cost the 
economy dearly. Along-side this, the shift through import substitution to an industrial policy 
focused on developing agricultural and manufacturing capabilities had a calamitous effect. 
The political impetus for change was driven by a variety of factors including international 
pressure and domestic resistance, along-side a severe economic crisis, and culminated in the 
political transformation of South Africa in 1994. 
 
The economic legacy of apartheid combined with a complex economic policy-making 
process for the ANC led to a highly charged process that highlighted the contentious nature 
of transformation in a country ravaged by apartheid division and racially biased privilege. 
South Africa’s trade diplomacy from the establishment of the WTO at the UR to the present 
DR negotiations, tracks a similar path to the unfolding polemic of broader neo-liberal 
economic policy within the ANC. It is here that the role of business is most clearly evident, 
both as catalyst for change and importantly as a force for continuity. 
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Business has had a highly influential role in the politics of South Africa from the earliest 
stirrings of economic development. Taking this into account is critical to understanding the 
shifting, yet on-going, role of business through the democratic transition of the early 1990s to 
the present.  The contribution of this thesis to the debates about the role of NSAs in economic 
diplomacy outlined in Chapter Two is furthered in this chapter by understanding the extent to 
which South African business has been intimately engaged in various economic policy-
making and diplomatic processes throughout South Africa’s history. How and why business 
engages in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy constitutes the analysis that 
follows in the forthcoming four chapters.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: SOUTH AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY 
STAKEHOLDERS  
4.1 Introduction 
A MSD approach is premised on the notion of diplomatic actors representing a wide array of 
stakeholders, including the state as well as NSAs. A multistakeholder approach emphasises 
the synergy between state and NSAs in seeking co-operative solutions to various problems 
(Frendo 2006: vii). MSD points to a diffusion of the functions and roles of diplomatic 
processes opening up the diplomatic space for NSAs to participate in policy-making through 
giving advice and offering expertise (Kurbalija and Katrandjiev 2006: 5).   Contemporary 
politics is characterised by complexity and a broad diversity of state and non-state actors and 
this is equally true for diplomatic processes that enable people to engage within this polity 
(Hocking 2006: 15).  Furthermore there is increasing recognition that the participation of 
NSAs in diplomatic processes is both useful and desirable and that these actors can make a 
valuable contribution (Valencia 2006: 85). Including multiple stakeholders in economic 
diplomacy gives expression to a broader range of social interests and changes the role of 
government officials from gate-keepers to facilitators or coordinators (Katrandjiev 2006: 
134). 
 
4.2 Government Institutions  
These state actors describe the institutional capacity of South Africa relating to trade-policy 
making and the execution of economic diplomacy initiatives including negotiating 
international trade agreements. These include the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Department of Agriculture, 
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Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), National Treasury, the Presidency and Parliament. The 
discussion below outlines the chief responsibilities and functions of these departments.  
 
The Department of Trade and Industry 
 
The DTI is the primary department responsible for formulating and executing trade policy. 
The department has a number of institutional resources at its disposal such as the 
International Trade and Economic Development Division (ITED), the International Trade 
Administration Commission (ITAC) and Trade and Investment South Africa (TISA). It is 
within ITED that trade policy is determined and under which bilateral and multilateral trade 
negotiations are conducted (trade diplomacy). ITED comprises two sub divisions: 
International Trade Development and African Economic Development. The aim of ITED is 
to seek “to develop global trade and investment links with key economies, promote economic 
development, negotiate preferential trade agreements and support a strong, equitable multi-
trading system” (DTI 2011c). ITAC is responsible for trade administration with a stated 
objective of creating “an enabling environment for fair trade, through the efficient and 
effective administration of trade instruments” (DTI 2011b). Specialist units are responsible 
for international trade instruments and technical advice, trade remedies and import/export 
controls. TISA manages the promotion of exports and inward investment (commercial 
diplomacy) (DTI 2011d). ITED performs the primary co-ordination function for all three.  
 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) 
 
 DIRCO, formerly the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), remains an important 
departmental resource and partner with the DTI in providing foreign mission facilities. 
DIRCO further ensures consistency between South Africa’s trade negotiations and broader 
foreign policy objectives and international obligations (DIRCO 2010a). In the Strategic Plan 
for 2010-2013, under priority number five, DIRCO identify the need for strengthening 
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political and economic relations through enhanced economic diplomacy. This entails the need 
to improve and develop capacity in economic diplomacy at missions and Head Office 
(DIRCO 2010a: 14). The Plan further identifies trends in international relations to “broaden 
the playing fields by facilitating the involvement and participation of non-state actors and 
private business, national and multinational” in the country’s diplomatic processes in order to 
enhance expertise in globally competitive markets (DIRCO 2010a: 24). Furthermore, DIRCO 
prioritises the importance of participating in consultative processes such as government 
clusters (DIRCO 2010a: 25). 
 
National Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) 
 
Agriculture is the key element of concern to trade diplomacy within this department, 
particularly regionally given the importance of agricultural issues to most SADC states.72 
There is historical competence brought into the DAFF from the apartheid-era Department of 
Agriculture with particular strength in consultative mechanisms in the Agricultural Trade 
Forum (ATF).73 This forum facilitates consultation processes between multiple stakeholders 
in agriculture, including industry and departmental officials to formulate positions on 
agricultural trade (DAFF 2007: 28). In addition the department maintains links with 
agricultural economists in university-based research organisations. The DAFF also promotes 
multilateral engagement with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the WTO 
and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR); and bilateral 
relationships with the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the European Commission. 
The department has specified international trade functions including ensuring South Africa’s 
agricultural interests are represented, analysing international trade and marketing policies and 
the impact of these on the agricultural sector in South Africa and advising on agricultural 
                                                      
72
 See Chapter Six for an example of the role played by the DAFF, supported by the South African Liquor Brands 
Association (SALBA) in the EU Wine and Spirits negotiations. 
73
 See Chapter Five for reference to the consultative role of business NSAs in economic diplomacy.  
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trade policy. The International Trade Directorate within the DAFF represents the department 
at international fora and negotiations as well as providing administrative support in granting 
permits, monitoring quotas and other elements of trade facilitation pertinent to trade 
agreements and international commitments (DAFF 2011).  
 
National Treasury 
 
The National treasury is tangentially involved in South Africa’s trade policy and economic 
diplomacy in its capacity as the manager of South Africa’s public finances (National 
Treasury 2011). The Treasury has an interest in trade matters by virtue of the links between 
trade and debt in the country as well as international currency implications for trade policy 
and negotiations.  Trade policy is of significance to the treasury in debates around industrial 
policy and protectionist demands and how these may be connected to the country’s current 
account deficit (Draper et al 2010: 264).  
 
The Presidency 
 
The Presidency performs a coordinating function, drawing various departments together in 
clusters of key related ministries. Where trade policy and diplomacy is concerned there are 
two relevant clusters. The first is the Economic Sector cluster, which  focuses on providing 
“research, analytical, advisory, policy and strategic support to The Presidency”(The 
Presidency 2011).  The Economic Sector is also the coordination point for the Presidential 
Working Groups of Trade Unions, Big Business, Black Business and Commercial 
Agriculture. The second, the International Relations and Trade cluster comprises the 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Department of Defence, the South 
African Secret Service, the DTI, the National Treasury, Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism, Department of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and the Department of 
Science and Technology. The wide range of departments included in the International 
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Relations and Trade cluster reflects the inclusion of strategic policy issues in this group. The 
recent establishment of the National Planning Commission (NPC) headed by Trevor Manuel 
(former Minister of Finance) promises to bolster the role of the Economic Sector cluster’s 
longer-term planning, although he faces opposition from the left leaning members of 
government in COSATU and the SACP (Hartley 2009, November 16).  The NPC includes 
Commissioners from business such as Bobby Godsell (retired businessman and former CEO 
of AngloGold Ashanti)  Cyril Ramaphosa (Deputy Chairperson of the NPC, former trade 
unionist turned businessman) and Vincent Maphai (Executive Director Corporate Affairs and 
Transformation at SABMiller, former chairperson of BHP Billiton) among a panel of 
Commissioners with wide ranging expertise covering finance, industry, telecommunications, 
biotechnology, climate change, education, health, food security and water engineering (Zuma 
2010; NPC 2011). Intra-government coordination is to be the responsibility of the 
Department of Economic Development, newly established in May 2009 (Manuel 2009). 
 
Economic Development 
 
This new ministry was established in May 2009, after political pressure from COSATU and 
the SACP, under the auspices of Minister Ebrahim Patel, a former trade unionist in response 
to the appointment of Trevor Manuel to the NPC in The Presidency. Mr Patel was the long-
standing Secretary General of the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union 
(SACTWU).  He was responsible for successfully lobbying for the imposition of import 
quotas on Chinese textiles at the beginning of 2007 (van Eeden 2009).The ministry outlines 
its key responsibility as coordinating the country’s New Growth Plan and overseeing other 
related government entities’ work on economic development (Economic Development 
Department 2012). A vital component of the department is to facilitate transformation of the 
economy and address structural constraints exacerbating unemployment. Early indications are 
that the Economic development Ministry is competing with the National Treasury for policy 
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space in coordinating economic policy (Draper et al 2010: 265). The department has already 
engaged in policy interventions through NEDLAC where it was instrumental in the 
negotiation of a distinctly protectionist framework response to the global economic crisis 
(Government of South Africa 2009). The New Growth Path is focused specifically on a job 
creation strategy for South Africa and includes reference to the role of the developmental 
state as an institutional driver of employment as well as emphasising the importance of joint 
commitments from business, investors, workers and civil society along-side the government-
led initiative (Economic Development Department 2011). 
Parliament 
 
South Africa’s trade negotiations are conducted by trade diplomats such as Xavier Carim 
(Deputy Director General (DDG) ITED) and Faizel Ismail (Head of South Africa’s 
Permanent Mission to the WTO, Geneva) supported by other members of the delegation and, 
in the broader context, business, trade unions and civil society representatives. Once a trade 
agreement has been negotiated and concluded however, it still has to be ratified by 
Parliament. The Cabinet makes a final decision and the Minister signs off on this before 
submitting it to Parliament for final ratification (Cronje 2011). The negotiators may have to 
make representation on the terms agreed via a memorandum to Parliament explaining what 
concessions were traded and advising to the best of their ability what Parliament should do; 
but at the end of the day agreements are ratified in Parliament (Draper et al 2010: 265).  
Groupings outside of government departments also make representation to Parliament urging 
them not to ratify various undertakings, such as for example a call by the TAC and Section27 
(a civil society group for social justice) urging Parliament not to ratify WTO decision on 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health as requested by Cabinet on 
March 16, 2011 (TAC and Section27 2011). There are occasions that Parliament has not 
ratified agreements, such as the EU Wine and Spirits Agreements adopted by the EU in 2002, 
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but not as yet ratified by South Africa’s Parliament and a Fisheries Agreement with the EU 
remains unratified as a result of “irreconcilable mandates between South Africa and the EU” 
(DIRCO 2012).  
 
4.3 Non-State Actors (NSAs) 
There are several key groups that constitute NSAs relevant to South Africa’s economic 
diplomacy, including political organisations, NGOs, research institutes, think tanks and 
business groups. This section identifies multiple stakeholders in South Africa’s economic 
policy and diplomacy but focuses primarily on business NSAs.  
 
ANC 
 
As the ruling political party in South Africa by a significant majority the ANC has a 
dominant role in establishing economic policy, via the Economic Transformation Committee 
(ETC) (Lodge 1999). 74 The ETC coordinates the economic policy responses of the tripartite 
alliance in government (ANC, COSATU and SACP) and has several sub-committees 
including a trade committee chaired by the Minister of Trade and Industry (ANC 2011). An 
example of its deliberations is the recent instruction by the ANC General Council to conduct 
an investigation into nationalisation of mines and more broadly to include banking and 
manufacturing (Africa Confidential 2011). In 2006 the ANC established a forum for business 
engagement called the Progressive Business Forum (PBF) to facilitate vital communication 
and on-going dialogue between government and all sizes of business (PBF 2010). 
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 Although, the discussion in Chapter Three demonstrates that other stakeholders also play a significant part 
in influencing and shaping that position. 
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COSATU 
 
COSATU, one of the tripartite alliance governing South Africa and the foremost trade union 
alliance in South Africa, was established in 1985 to unite various trade unions opposed to 
apartheid (COSATU 2011). The organisation has international alliances to the International 
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Organisation of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) 
and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). By virtue of their constituency, COSATU 
have been key drivers of industrial policy and opponents of trade liberalisation initiatives 
(Draper et al Vavi 2008, November 4; 2008, October 31). 
 
Business Associations  
 
The first business association in South Africa was the Chamber of Mines established in 1887 
(South African Chamber of Mines 2010). Other industry associations followed and in 1892, 
the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCOM) was formed followed 
in 1917 by the Federated Chambers of Industry (FCI) (Hill 1983: 66). These three early 
associations merged in 1990 to become the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) 
which later became the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SACCI)  
(Handley 2008: 64).  The SAF was formed to represent the top 50 biggest companies in 
South Africa with goal of representing private sector interests at national level.75 In the 1980s 
business associations were still organised along racial and ethnic lines and SACOB and SAF 
represented English-speaking white business interests. Afrikaans business was represented by 
the AHI. Black business as described above was a relative late-comer, with the Foundation 
for African Business and Consumer Services (FABCOS) founded in 1988 representing the 
informal sector, mainly the taxi industry (FABCOS 2010). The National African Federated 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NAFCOC) dating back to 1964, was an association of 
small and medium sized businesses and retailers (NAFCOC 2011). The Black Management 
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 SAF later became BLSA and their role is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven. 
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Forum (BMF) was founded in 1976 to represent professionals and business leaders (BMF 
2010a). As is clear from the discussion above these groups coalesced into two main voices:  
Business South Africa (BSA) representing white business and the Black Business Council 
(BBC) for black business. Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) emerged in 2003 as the 
merger of these 2 groupings. Many of the constituent members of BUSA retain their 
institutional identity and offer independent views and statements from time to time. For 
example in July 2011, Business Leadership South Africa (an institutional member of BUSA) 
issued a separate press release on the issue of calls for nationalisation of the mines by the 
ANC Youth League (BLSA 2011). In another instance the Chamber of Mines (also a BUSA 
member) issued its own press release in 2011 offering a formal response to Minister Pravin 
Gordhan’s medium term budget policy statement following a press statement by BUSA on 
the same topic (Chamber of Mines 2011; BUSA 2011b) 
 
Black Business  
 
Given the historical context outlined in Chapter Three it is necessary to give some 
background to the racial politics of business organisation in South Africa. The section that 
follows provides a brief overview of the often confusing and convoluted landscape of various 
initiatives at establishing business representation through business associations during the 
apartheid era and afterwards. Some scholars point out that black business leaders are “still 
usually too busy negotiating deals and growing their businesses to have the time and 
resources for systematic engagement in wider macro debates over the long-term prospects of 
the economy” (Dlamini 2004: 177). This is belied by the fact that one of the new highly 
successful black businessmen in South Africa, Tokyo Sexwale, is now a member of the 
government, having been appointed by Zuma as the Minister of Human Settlements. 
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Early attempts to develop greater black participation in South Africa’s economy were 
spearheaded by the NAFCOC - a black business association (Chabane et al 2003: 22). The 
ANC has repeatedly referred to the importance of affirmative action in advancing access to 
the economy for persons previously denied access (ANC 1992). This was reinforced in the 
RDP, but no mention is made as to how this is to be achieved  (Southall and Sanchez 2007: 
208). Developing black business was crucial to Mbeki’s thinking, so much so, that similar to 
his Big Business Working Group (BBWG) he also established a black business working 
group with which he regularly met. It was at one of these meetings that the concept of BEE 
was born. The idea emerged out of a consensus that if black business was to become more 
influential it would need to be more organised (Gumede 2007: 286).  
 
Many BEE executives have an extensive network of roles on the boards of a number of South 
African corporations as well as world-wide. Cyril Ramaphosa, founder of Shanduka Group, 
an empowerment company with investments in resources, energy, real estate, banking, 
insurance and telecommunications, is a case in point. Apart from board memberships of the 
Bidvest Group and MTN and non-executive positions on Mondi (unbundled from Anglo 
American), Macsteel Holdings, Alexander Forbes, Standard Bank and SABMiller, 
Ramaphosa also sits on the Coca Cola Company International Advisory Board, Unilever 
Africa Advisory Council and was the first deputy chairman of the Commonwealth Business 
Council. He is also honorary Consul General for Iceland (Butler 2007).  
 
Tokyo Sexwale too has extensive roles through directorships on, among others, Absa Group 
Limited, Altech and Goldfields Limited.  He is the honorary consul general of Finland in 
South Africa.  Leslie Maasdorp, vice-chairman of Absa Capital and Barclays Capital is also 
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chairman of black empowerment investment company Yard Capital.76 Between 2002 and 
2006, Maasdorp was the first African to serve on the International Advisory Board of 
Goldman Sachs International. He has held government positions as DDG of the Department 
of Public Enterprises where he led the privatisation programme and previously as a policy 
advisor in the ANC’s department of Economic Planning. He was also nominated as a Young 
Global Leader by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and is Vice-President of BLSA (BLSA 
2010b).77 
 
Peter Moyo, one of three founding partners of the BEE group, Amabubesi, has at various 
times held positions as the Deputy Managing Director of Old Mutual, Chief Executive 
Officer of Alexander Forbes Preference Share Investments Limited and is currently Chairman 
of the Audit Committee of Telkom, Chairman of the Audit Committee of the Auditor 
General’s Office, Chairman of the board of Vodacom and Chairman of Willis South Africa, 
in whom Amabubesi has also taken a sizeable share (Amabubesi 2011).   
This sort of broad involvement across very powerful vested business interests indicates a 
growing diversification of power in the South African corporate landscape.  Interestingly the 
lines between private sector and government are blurred not just at domestic level but also in 
the diplomatic recognition offered through the roles of honorary Consul General to both 
Ramaphosa (Iceland) and Sexwale (Finland) (Global Business Leaders 2011; Who's Who 
Southern Africa 2011a). 
 
There is a historical bias in South Africa to ethnicity and race in private sector power; under 
apartheid that was the Afrikaner via the National Party; under the ANC it is black economic 
empowerment that is emphasised (Handley 2008: 99) . However, “comrade capitalism” as 
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 Barclays acquired a majority share in Absa, South Africa’s largest retail bank, in 2005 for £2.9bn (BBC News 
2005, May 9). 
77
 See Chapter Seven  for more on the role of BLSA in SA’s economic diplomacy and the role of big business.  
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depicted by Iheduru (2002: 73) does not necessarily mean a descent into neo-patrimonialism 
where state and business interests are virtually inseparable.78 Despite the concerns being 
voiced about crony capitalism emerging in South Africa’s political elite the state is not yet 
all-powerful  and the private sector remains able to exert influence both directly and 
indirectly on the government.   
 
National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NAFCOC)  
 
NAFCOC was one of the earliest proponents of transformation and this remains a central 
tenet in their policy. According to NAFCOC National President Lawrence Mavundla 
“ownership of enterprises must be transferred into the hands of the majority sooner rather 
than later” (Khwebo 2010: 7). The by-line of NAFCOC is “To be the leading voice of 
business in South Africa” and NAFCOC has set out, in its “Vision 2014” planning document, 
to establish partnerships with government and parastatals and to focus on international 
relations among other goals (NAFCOC 2010). NAFCOC engages in lobbying and advocacy 
initiatives for job creation and economic development while promoting responsible 
citizenship. Their primary constituency is small, micro and medium enterprises (SMMEs). 
This harks back to the early role NAFCOC played at its establishment in 1964 representing 
the needs of informal black traders and developing management skills and business 
opportunities for their members.   
 
At inception NAFCOC was focused on empowering black entrepreneurs and thus associates 
strongly with the imperatives of the BEE agenda (NAFCOC 2010).  At its 45th annual 
conference in Johannesburg early in 2010, under Resolution 1: Programme of Action, 
NAFCOC broke with past tradition and aimed to begin interacting with foreign business 
delegations visiting South Africa, commencing the first initiative to expose their SMME 
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 Neo-patrimonialism refers to corrupt patronage by the state of private actors to garner support and loyalty 
(Eisenstadt 1973). 
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membership to international opportunities (Khwebo 2010: 5). Part of this vision is to 
strengthen relations with international partners, especially international trade institutions.  
One of the first initiatives under this goal was to undertake two overseas visits, one to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the other to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The 
DRC visit was as part of a gaming and lotteries consortium, in which NAFCOC holds a 30% 
stake, which had been granted a license in DRC. At the signing ceremony, Mavundla claimed 
in an interview that the consortium’s investment was a response to the call from government 
to assist in the DRC’s reconstruction efforts of the war-ravaged country (Khwebo 2010, May 
26).  The trip to the UAE was intended to form linkages with various business chambers in 
that country and NAFCOC attended as part of a bigger South African business delegation of 
some 72 business representatives, which was organised by the ANC’s Progressive Business 
Forum (PBF 2010).79 NAFCOC is also in discussions with several African embassies about 
establishing NAFCOC-led trade missions to those countries (NAFCOC 2010).  
 
The Black Management Forum (BMF) 
 
The BMF was founded in 1976 to deal with issues of equality and socio-economic 
transformation. The association represents the development and empowerment of managerial 
leadership for black people which reflects the demographics of wider society. The BMF 
regards itself as non-partisan and pro transformation. As part of the Black Management 
Council the BMF was responsible for the resolution that resulted in the Black Economic 
Empowerment Commission (BEEC) chaired by Cyril Ramaphosa (BMF 2010b).  Until July 
2011, the BMF was a member of BUSA, when it withdrew from the broader association 
citing frustrations with the lack of institutional transformation within BUSA. The criticism 
was triggered by the resignation of Jerry Vilakazi (CEO for five years) and the failure of the 
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 The ANC’s Progressive Business Forum offers members the opportunity to attend international visits as part 
of the official delegation (PBF 2010).  
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organisation to appoint a BMF approved candidate as his replacement (Polity 2011). This 
event triggered the resurrection of the BBC under the chair of Patrice Motsepe, to act as an 
umbrella body for all black business. Announcing the launch of the BBC at a Black Business 
Summit on the 7th of September 2011, the summit confirmed that black business would 
temporarily suspend all participation in BUSA (Hannah 2011, September 8). Three weeks 
later, Motsepe spoke about a rapprochement with BUSA on the grounds that unity between 
all business people was absolutely fundamental but could not simply sweep away alienation 
and ostracism felt by black business (Creamer 2011, 21 September). A team was appointed to 
negotiate unity with BUSA around key institutional issues such as the organisation’s 
constitution and governance before the 2012 ANC policy conference.  
 
South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SACCI) 
 
SACCI is by far the largest of the business associations in South Africa with a membership of 
20,000 businesses (mostly small and medium-sized),but also including 80 large corporations 
and 20 national sectoral associations as well as 50 regional chambers of commerce (SACCI 
2010). Large regional chambers such as the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce (JCCI) and 
Durban Chamber of Commerce and industry (DCCI) and Cape Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (CCCI) have split away from SACCI. The large numbers of SMMEs which 
constitute SACCIs membership explain the focus of the Chamber on issues of concern to 
smaller enterprises, such as bureaucratic red-tape and reducing the cost of doing business in 
South Africa (SACCI 2011). The Chamber is represented on a number of government bodies 
as well as regional bodies such as the SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry. SACCI 
appears to be primarily focused on domestic issues and in fact does not have the resources to 
address broader international trade diplomacy issues on behalf of its membership (Int: Droski 
2009). A review of the SACCI website reveals that no press release related to trade 
agreements whatsoever after 2008, when a single press release merely lamented the break 
119 
 
down in the Doha talks but offers no views on the key issues or suggestions on a way out of 
the impasse.  
 
Under its policy areas trade policy/ diplomacy is not listed as an aspect of focus.  Trade is 
given as a heading on the website, but refers to a bulletin which advertises various business 
opportunities in different countries, such as Turkey seeking buyers and contacts in SA for 
surgical instruments or an Indian packaging company advertising for new markets in South 
Africa. There is also a links tab that provides access to the DTI and other government 
services, the WTO, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and various other information 
sites such as trade networks and trade journals - but does not provide details on any of South 
Africa’s existing trade agreements or those under negotiation or any views on issues of 
pertinence to ongoing WTO negotiations in the DDR (SACCI 2010).  
 
Business Unity South Africa (BUSA): Interlocutor of choice 
 
BUSA’s by-line on their web homepage is “One Voice for Business”. BUSA was born out of 
the merger between the BBC and BUSA in 2003 (BUSA 2010a). BUSA is gaining an 
increasingly influential profile with the Zuma administration and the dominant position 
occupied by big business may be waning with the elimination of Mbeki’s BBWG, in favour 
of renewed emphasis on NEDLAC (Business Day 2010, July 29). As far as South Africa’s 
economic diplomacy goes, BUSA is emerging as a very influential partner to government in 
terms of inviting representatives to participate in various activities.80  
 
Common concerns about BUSA from the interviews conducted related mainly to the under-
resourcing of the institution.  Until relatively recently BUSA had little trade capacity (true for 
most business associations and companies in South Africa). It was only recently in 2009, that 
                                                      
80
 See Chapter Five for further discussion on BUSA’s role in facilitating business participation in formal State 
visits as part of the discussion on the supplementary role played by business NSAs in South Africa’s economic 
diplomacy.  
120 
 
BUSA issued a formal statement at the WTO, along-side other business associations on the 
Non-Agricultural Market Access  (NAMA) negotiations (BUSA 2009).  A further challenge 
for BUSA is getting its members to agree to common positions on different issues, given the 
broad diversity of business interests represented doing so is no small achievement – but it 
does limit the scope for lobbying (Int: Parsons 2009).  
 
BUSA is  increasingly becoming government’s “interlocutor of choice” and the DTI formally 
recognises BUSA as the co-ordinating body for arranging business attendance at various 
functions including formal state visit delegations (BUSA 2010b: 20).81  While BUSA has 
little economic power, compared with the large conglomerates, its political clout is significant 
since the association has no apartheid history (Int: van Vuuren 2009). BUSA is also the 
recognised business representative at NEDLAC which is consolidating BUSA’s standing and 
enhancing business interest in the association (Majokweni 2011).  
 
BUSA is based on a committee structure: subcommittees are formed around specific tasks or 
interest areas such as electricity supply and pricing. These then develop various positions and 
a member of the committee or BUSA staff member will prepare drafts which are circulated to 
the broader membership for input or approval. Sometimes BUSA will submit divergent 
opinions on things (not a preferred option) but did do so recently on preferential procurement 
where some members had a different view from the consensus and they made their own 
submissions to argue their view points. Such submissions are often presented to Parliament.  
BUSA has a business parliamentary office in Cape Town staffed by three people, responsible 
for Parliamentary lobbying, a function previously fulfilled by SACCI.  
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 During 2010, BUSA coordinated business participation as delegates on 7 official State visits to Turkey, India, 
Russia, Lesotho, China, Syria and Kenya. 
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Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA) – representing big business 
 
“Business Leadership South Africa is an association of South Africa’s largest corporations 
and major multinational companies with a significant presence in South Africa. They are 
represented on Business Leadership’s Council and Board at the level of Chief Executive 
Officer or Chairman” (BLSA 2010b).  Formerly the South Africa Foundation, the association 
was formed in 1959 and had a significant history of engagement with government during 
apartheid, around the political transition and in the post-apartheid political economy of South 
Africa (Taylor 2007: 171). BLSA is also a constituent member of BUSA. Although much is 
made of the political leverage of big business, as discussion above has noted, the Zuma 
administration is presenting a new landscape for business engagement and this is reflected in 
the mission statement of BLSA which states that “a core mission of Business Leadership 
South Africa is to facilitate an effective business dialogue with government. This, as with 
other activities requires working closely with Business Unity South Africa (BUSA), the 
mandated national representative body of business, and with other business bodies” (BLSA 
2010a).   
 
Even this recognition is a significant shift in perspective from the big business contingent in 
South Africa.  The association confines its role to dealing with issues of collective interest to 
business as whole, leaving industry concerns to industry and sectoral associations and does 
not purport to represent the interests of any individual company. As an association BLSA is 
largely silent on matters of trade diplomacy at multilateral and regional or bilateral level. Its 
focus appears to be more on domestic economic policy-making and this would seem to 
support the assertion of this research that big business finds little value in attempting to 
participate in broader trade diplomacy, partly due to perceived limitations of NEDLAC as a 
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consultative mechanism, and a tendency to pursue economic goals through go-it-alone 
diplomacy as and when necessary.82  
 
Industry Associations 
 
This section does not attempt to provide an overview of all the industry associations active in 
South Africa, they number in the hundreds. It is not pertinent to an understanding of the 
extent to which and ways in which business engage with South Africa’s economic diplomacy. 
What is covered in this section is reference to specific industry associations with relevant 
examples of engagement in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy. In the main, 
industry associations tend to focus on the domestic policy agenda and the regulatory 
environment. They find it more difficult to engage on issues of trade diplomacy by virtue of 
being seen to represent a small section of the broader economy with sectoral interests (Int: 
Lotter 2010). Many industry associations are members of BUSA in any event (BUSA 2011).  
 
Think Tanks and Research Institutes  
 
There are a number of research institutions and think tanks that make an important 
contribution to developing the trade capacity of South Africa’s negotiations, such as the 
Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), South African Institute for International Affairs 
(SAIIA), Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC) and Trade and Industrial Policy 
Strategies (TIPS). These can be seen as forming part of a policy network along-side other 
stakeholders. Stone (1997) defines a policy network as a set of relationships which link 
different actors around common or shared interests and which results in the sharing of 
resources in pursuit of these common goals. Such policy networks encourage cooperation and 
learning and result in more efficient use of knowledge (Reinicke 1998). The increasingly 
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 See Chapter Seven for a discussion of the entrepreneurial role played largely by big business in South Africa’s 
economic diplomacy.  
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complex world of international cooperation creates a space in which networks of knowledge-
based experts - epistemic communities - play a significant role in helping actors understand 
the key issues (Haas 1992: 3).   
 
In the South African context the TIPS focuses specifically on the quantitative elements of 
trade policy, such as measuring trade flows and tariff structures with the view to providing 
material technical input to negotiation processes.  The organisation was established by the 
DTI in 1996 and is a registered non-profit economic research institute. TIPS has an extensive 
academic network through which it accesses and disseminates valuable policy-related 
research to inform wider debates on trade policy within the country (TIPS 2011a). Recent 
research has included policy briefings on SACU service negotiations (TIPS and TRALAC 
2011b), Industrial Policy development in SACU (Mbuta 2011)  and trade and climate change 
policy implications for South Africa (du Plooy and Jooste 2011). TIPS works collaboratively 
with other research-based organisations such as TRALAC and services a client base of 
primarily government departments, both national such as the DTI, DAFF and Department of 
Minerals and Energy and regional such as provincial governments of Mpumalanga or the 
Western Cape. Other work has been done for COSATU, SADC, SACU as well as business 
associations such as FABCOS (TIPS 2011c).  
 
TRALAC, a non-profit organisation is focused on capacity building initiatives and through 
this work has developed an extensive network of regional government entities and other 
regional institutions. The organisation was established in 2002 with seed funding from the 
Swiss Department of Economic Development and is staffed by trade lawyers and economists. 
TRALAC’s main expertise is on trade law along-side other trade-related issues and focuses 
on trade law capacity in the Southern African region. As part of this mandate TRALAC 
monitors trade negotiations, assesses agreements and participates in dialogue with various 
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stakeholders around the implications of trade agreements. Part of this activity involves 
preparing research disseminated through newsletters, briefing documents and news articles. 
Its capacity building initiatives encompass training on trade law topics, negotiation skills, 
dispute settlement, providing learning materials for other institutions including academics 
and collaboration with other international bodies conducting similar processes. In addition, 
TRALAC facilitates dialogue, workshops, seminars, conferences, electronic discussion fora 
and debates drawing in various stakeholders from government and business. Recent 
publications include edited books such an evaluation of the tripartite free trade agreement 
between the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African 
Community (EAC) and the SADC (Hartzenberg 2011) and an assessment of regional 
integration in Southern Africa (Bosl et al 2010). Trade Briefs are also disseminated by the 
organisation and include coverage of topical issues such as South Africa in the BRICS 
(Sandrey 2011), the Anti-dumping Agreement in the WTO (Brink 2009) and an update on 
South Africa’s trading relationship with China (Fundira 2011). Clients include the DTI, 
SADC and SACU Secretariats, the Commonwealth Secretariat and Namibia’s Department of 
Agriculture (TRALAC 2011).  
 
SAIIA offers independent research on a variety of trade related and economic diplomacy 
topics through its Economic Diplomacy Programme. The programme focuses on the domestic 
political economy and trade policy-making as well as the international negotiating 
environment. The premise on which SAIIA’s research is based is that international economic 
negotiations and agreements have a significant impact on domestic and regional economic 
policy. The research programme conducts and distributes high-level analysis and research to 
inform diplomatic and policy processes so that negotiators are better able to articulate 
interests and positions within the international context. As such the programme has four key 
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areas of focus: South Africa’s trade, industrial and exchange rate policies; regional 
integration; regulatory reform and multilateral economic governance (G20 and WTO) (SAIIA 
2011). Outputs of the programme include policy briefings, research reports, occasional 
papers, opinion pieces and books. A selection of the research institute’s work includes a book 
on South Africa’s African trade diplomacy (Draper 2005b); a collaboration with the IGD on a 
FTA between China and SACU (Draper and le Pere  2005). Occasional papers cover topics 
including SACU, the WTO, FTA of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
(MERCOSUR), Indian trade policy and the US (Soko 2006; Alves et al 2008; Khumalo 
2009; Draper 2010; Hichert et al 2010).  
 
Finally, the IGD was established at the request of Nelson Mandela by the ANC in 1995 and 
subsequently purports to operate as an independent foreign policy think tank focusing on 
political and economic issues of relevance to Africa and South Africa. The organisation 
offers policy-based analysis, debate and written outputs pertinent to these topics (IGD 2011). 
The institute has three broad agendas: South Africa’s foreign policy and diplomacy including 
economic issues and multistakeholder interactions; African studies covering regional 
integration, peace diplomacy and trade; and multilateral governance analysing 
multilateralism, non-state actors and international finance diplomacy. IGD has a formalised 
strategic partnership with the University of South Africa (UNISA) to pursue joint research 
initiatives. Like the previous research-based organisations IGD has a prolific and varied 
range of publications from books and monographs to quarterly reviews, occasional papers 
and various research reports. Research topics pertaining to economic diplomacy include 
BRICS (Kornegay and Masters 2011), China-Africa cooperation (IGD and CCR 2009), and 
Southern Africa and US trade (Vickers 2008b). Close links with the ANC and COSATU 
explain a tendency to promote industrial policy (Draper 2010).  
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NGOs - The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 
 
The TAC is an advocacy group in the health-sector with a mandate to lobby and campaign for 
equal access to prevention and treatment for HIV sufferers.  This has particular relevance to 
trade and economic diplomacy through the activist group’s particular interest in intellectual 
property rights provisions in bilateral negotiations and particularly the United States. The 
TAC was established in 1998, and has tackled global pharmaceutical companies on 
affordable HIV/Aids drugs (Thom 2002, January 29; Sulston 2003, February 18). The TAC 
provides scientific research and policy input on matters pertaining to TB and HIV&AIDS. 
Until fairly recently TAC’s relationship with the government was tenuous owing to the 
strident advocacy work of the TAC in challenging the government’s AIDS treatment strategy 
(Nullis 2008, September 30). The TAC remains focused on tackling issues of access to 
medicines through lobbying the pharmaceutical sector as well as through multilateral 
processes governing intellectual property rights and related trade processes (TAC 2011).  
 
4.4 Analysing agency in South Africa’s economic diplomacy 
This section of the chapter analyses the role of agency in South Africa’s post-apartheid 
economic diplomacy. The preceding section identified the key actors or stakeholders in South 
Africa’s economic diplomacy. Now we turn to analysing the extent of the role that each plays 
in diplomatic processes and unpack the weaknesses, strengths and opportunities for 
engagement of these stakeholders.  This section is based on the interviews conducted during 
the research as well as other primary resources including websites, newspaper articles, press 
releases and annual reports. 
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Government Stakeholders – capacity constraints and opportunities for consultation 
 
In an article reviewing the DTI’s capacity in South Africa’s trade negotiations Bisseker  
(2007, October 12) says “there has long been a concern, not just among business, that the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) lacks sufficient capacity to conduct the range of 
trade negotiations it is involved in”.  South Africa is especially over-stretched in bilateral 
negotiations where it cannot rely on international coalitions for assistance. According to 
interviewees government should be relying on business inputs through consultative processes 
which are not functioning as they should. “(South Africa’s) weakness is connected to a lack 
of numbers of seasoned trade negotiators and, because we're in lots of negotiations, the 
numbers are stretched. For example, we have only one person responsible for services, and he 
also has to cover the environment. The US has 20 people in services, Australia 10, so if we 
were going to negotiate a bilateral with them, we'd be dead in the water " (Draper quoted in 
Bisseker  2007, October 12).  
The lack of resources also means that South Africa lacks the capacity to negotiate very 
broadly on wide agendas. An example of this was accusations by the EU trade commissioner 
Peter Mandelson in 2007 that South Africa was stalling the EPAs negotiations between 
SADC and the EU (Mandelson 2007; Cronin 2007, November 20). Bisseker (2007, October 
12) argues that South Africa was trying to restrict the agreement simply to trade in goods, 
because in reality  the country simply did not have the capacity to negotiate on the wider 
agenda which included competition, investment protection and services. It is unlikely that the 
DTI would admit this position, but it certainly true that the major sticking point of the 
conclusion of an EPA was around new-generation trade related issues (TRIs) such as 
environment and social requirements in the agreement (Julian 2007). Xavier Carim (2007), 
South Africa’s chief trade negotiator at the negotiation, defended South Africa’s position that 
“forcing TRIs is not the right way to go”.  
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Business interviews highlighted concerns that the DTI is more experienced at negotiating 
tariffs but does not have the same expertise in negotiating the sorts of issues important to 
services, such as market access, and how to negotiate a service-type agreement. There is 
recognition that this requires further capacity building and the DTI has been trying to 
understand from the services sector what type of regulatory barriers they are facing (Int: 
Carim 2009). South Africa does not have adequate mechanisms for consulting the services 
sector and needs to establish a structure similar to the ones being used by other countries such 
as the US, which has a coalition of services industries.   The over-riding perception of 
interviewees across sectors is that South Africa lack trade capacity both within government 
and in business. Carim (Int: 2009) notes that until the late 1990s the number of people who 
understood trade policy in South Africa could fit into a minivan. 
 
Interviewees from all stakeholder groups agreed the need for a greater focus on economic 
goals in South Africa’s foreign missions. Business interviews revealed that DIRCO is 
perceived to be mainly politically orientated: “South Africa has a lot to say economically but 
we’re not telling the world about this effectively” (Int: Tshiqi 2009).  This has a lot to do with 
the historical perspective which was more politically focused. Business would like to see 
South African embassies playing a more facilitative role; introducing South African 
businesses operating in foreign markets to one another to learn from others’ experiences 
especially in places where the language barrier makes it difficult like Angola, Mozambique or 
the DRC and providing better market intelligence. There is also evidence of this lacuna in 
recent trends to hire former diplomats with protocol knowledge and networks or contacts in 
relevant places for business. For example MTN’s appointment of Nozipho January-Bardill as 
Executive Director, Corporate Affairs for MTN – a major communications company with 
extensive reach in Africa (MTN 2011). January-Bardill was the Deputy Director General, 
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Human Capital Management, and Head of the Foreign Service Institute of the DFA (now 
DIRCO) between 2005and 2007. She was also Ambassador to Switzerland for South Africa 
between 2000 and 2005 (Who's Who Southern Africa 2011b). Haiko Alfeld is a former Head 
of the WEF, Africa Summit and also previously a South African diplomat at the United 
Nations (UN) (Bloomberg Businessweek 2011). He was appointed General Manager of 
International Government Relations at Sasol, an international integrated energy and 
chemicals company, listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) (SASOL 2011a). 
 
This is shifting; whilst DIRCO’s objectives relate primarily to political issues and good 
relations with other countries, in South Africa’s embassies there is an increasing focus on 
economic issues. “In our embassies the top priority is economic diplomacy – so even on 
DIRCO’s side economic policy has been elevated and is in many cases the number one issue 
for ambassadors” (Int: Carim 2009). Evidence of this shift is apparent in the 2010-2013 
Strategic Plan for DIRCO, where a key priority area is identified “to strengthen capacity in 
economic diplomacy at missions and Head Office” (DIRCO 2010a: 38). To this end DIRCO 
has set a target for 2010/11 to implement capacity and skills development programmes in 
economic diplomacy. This indicates an increasing alignment between departments such that 
economic issues are taking centre stage for embassies.  
 
Whilst Parliament retains an oversight function on trade agreements there was consensus 
among interviewees that the capacity difficulties on trade knowledge faced by most 
organisations in South Africa are mirrored in Parliament (Int: Carim 2009; Davies 2009; 
Draper 2009; Grant 2010). Interviewees from both business and government concurred that 
there is a need for capacity building of parliamentarians on trade and economic diplomacy as 
well as putting in place better mechanisms for coordination (Int: Alfeld 2009; Carim 2009; 
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Chance 2009; Davies 2009; de Villiers 2009; Draper 2009; Grant 2010; Ismail 2009; January 
Bardill 2009; Maasdorp 2009; Mapai 2010; Worrall 2009; Zalk 2009).  
 
Interdepartmental Coordination 
 
Interviewees confirmed that South Africa’s economic diplomacy agenda is geared primarily 
around regional trade, because of the ‘African Agenda’ around which South Africa’s foreign 
policy is structured (Int: Carim 2009; Davies 2009; Draper 2009; de Villiers 2009; Grant 
2010; Parsons 2009; Soko 2009). This is balanced to a certain extent by the concomitant 
commitment to multilateralism in the WTO, which is regarded as an important platform for 
levelling the playing-field in international trade (Draper 2010: 275).83 Apart from the African 
focus of South Africa’s agenda, there is also the fact that WTO negotiations are resource 
intensive and time consuming. Interviewees indicated that this creates a preference for 
negotiating regional and bilateral agreements. There was also consensus among the 
interviewees around the limitations of consultation mechanisms, with tremendous 
inconsistency between these (Int: Bateman 2009; Cassim 2006; Carim 2009; Grant 2010; 
Lawrence 2009; Rhomberg 2009, Walters 2001; Zalk 2009). For example the DAFF appears 
to be better organised and far more transparent and inclusive in its consultation processes 
(Int: Kruger 2009). The DTI relies mostly on NEDLAC as the forum for consultation, 
whereas the DAFF uses the ATF as a consultation mechanism (DAFF 2007; Agricultural 
Business Chamber 2011).84 Interviewees felt that the DTI provides greater opportunities for 
consultation through NEDLAC on regional trade agreements than on WTO negotiations (Int: 
Lotter 2009; Grant 2010; Cassim 2006; Nikolaou 2009). The extent to which NSAs are 
considered to have been influential in shaping trade policy differs also depending on location. 
                                                      
83
 See Chapter Three for how this platform is used by middle powers to enhance their standing on the 
international stage. 
84
 See Chapter Five for a detailed analysis of the consultative role played by business in South Africa’s post-
apartheid economic diplomacy. 
131 
 
The DTI, for example regard NSA influence as mediocre whilst the DAFF view NSA 
engagement as having been significant (Int: Kruger 2009; Zalk 2009). This may be 
attributable to the motivation on the part of the department engaging in consultation 
processes. Government interviewees cite the DTI, DIRCO and the Presidency as driven by 
motives of public policy requirements, whereas the DAFF, ITAC and Treasury seek technical 
input and transparency in their engagements (Int: Carim 2009; de Villiers 2009; Zalk 2009). 
 
Some government departments are particularly successful at coordinating with international 
organisations as well. For example the DAFF’s engagement with the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the WTO and the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR); and bilateral relationships with the US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and the European Commission. The government clusters within the 
Presidency make institutional provision for greater coordination interdepartmentally and 
opportunities for broader stakeholder consultation. For example the DTI also consults 
intensively through the International Relations-ITCS cluster, which is co-convened by 
DIRCO and the Department of Defence (The Presidency 2011) .  There has been a move to 
be more strategic about trade issues between  departments in work that the DTI is trying to do 
in specific regions or countries, such as China, IBSA, the US and EU (DTI 2011c). The EPA 
negotiations in SADC have been broadly discussed with a broad range of stakeholders and 
this represents a marked improvement in co-ordination (Int: Carim 2009). The recent 
establishment of the Planning Commission headed by Trevor Manuel may also begin to play 
a more influential role in coordination of economic diplomacy issues, but it remains to be 
seen. Business interviewees find co-ordination to be lacking in large part. An example cited 
by BUSA is that 15 different delegations visited Cuba in an eight month period during 2009, 
seeing the same people at different times (Int: Grant 2009). This obvious duplication and 
confusion could be obviated by better inter-departmental co-ordination.   
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Multistakeholder interaction and business NSAs 
 
Both business and government interviewees regard business and other social partner 
involvement in South Africa’s trade policy making as extensive. Furthermore government 
departments value the input of NSAs stakeholders. Business engagement is variable and 
sometimes subject to sectoral interests with defensive and offensive positions depending on 
the fora for negotiation, be it the WTO, South-South or North-South negotiations. Issues of 
concern to business NSAs interviewed varied from market access into developed economies 
to competition from developing economies and consequent job losses. Business NSAs have 
engaged in consultation processes around a broad range of fora including the SADC FTA, the 
EU EPAs, SACU-MERCOSUR FTA, SACU-EFTA and the SACU-US FTA. Business is 
present at all main WTO minsterials. BUSA representatives have attended most meetings 
since the Hong Kong Ministerial. The negotiations proper on aspects such as tariffs, is a 
process limited to government representatives.  No government wants to be seen as captive of 
specific business interests or any other social interests and this is a difficult balancing act 
along-side the need for technical assistance and consultation.  
 
As regards business input at a strategic level, on forum choice, this is far more limited. Which 
free or preferential trade agreements are going to be negotiated is taken at a higher political 
level; once a decision to undertake such an agreement has been reached it is then opened to 
consultation processes at NEDLAC (Draper et al 2010: 281).  It has happened that the social 
partners have called for a moratorium on further negotiations. For example the call by the 
coalition between the textile manufacturers and SACTWU to suspend negotiations with 
China, due to threats to jobs as a result of cheap Chinese imports of textiles and clothing. A 
temporary quota was instituted to respond to these demands, but clearly the strategic decision 
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to pursue formal economic and political links with China as part of the South-South focus of 
South Africa’s foreign and economic policy has continued apace.85  
 
Overall, business interviewees regard the institutional structures for consultation to be 
sufficient, although the organisation of these and communication across departments linked 
to these is highly variable.86 At times the period allotted for consultation on different matters 
is too brief and the planning of meetings disorganised leaving little time for adequate 
preparation. Business interviewees were frustrated that low level officials attend many of the 
meetings and that real influence was only achieved through contact at ministerial level (Int 
Lotter 2009; Spicer 2009; Tshiqi 2009; van Vuuren 2010). This has resulted in a tailing off of 
attendance at NEDLAC meetings by influential representatives of business NSAs (Int: Lotter 
2009; Grant 2010).   
 
An example of successful coordination between stakeholders was the establishment of a 
special government-led task team in the mining sector in response to the global recession, 
which resulted in saving tens of thousands of jobs in the sector. The Mining Industry Growth 
and Development and Employment Task Team include representatives of labour, business 
and government. According to the Mineral Resources Minister, Susan Shabangu, at the 
Mining Indaba 2010 the initiative has mitigated job losses which could have been as high as 
100,000 between December 2008, when it was established and February 2010 (Mpofu 2010, 
February 3) . 
 
                                                      
85
 See Chapter Six for an analysis of the South-South strategic focus of South Africa’s foreign and economic 
diplomacy. 
86
 No business interviewee faulted the structures available for consultation. They did however, reference 
significant variation in accessibility and organisation. Chapter Five provides a detailed analysis of the 
consultation process in South Africa and the consultative role played by business NSAs. 
134 
 
Business interviewees also raised concerns about the economic diplomacy capacity of foreign 
embassies. Many have operations throughout Africa; and they do approach the South African 
embassy in these locations when necessary. This assistance is usually focused on issues to do 
with visas but sometimes yields contacts and information about investment incentive schemes 
which the company would not have known about otherwise. For example Nampak in Nigeria 
built a green-field manufacturing plant for cigarette-box packaging as they received access to 
‘Pioneer Status’ benefits which were financial incentives to set up a facility in Ibadan, 
Nigeria (Int: Tshiqi 2009). This sort of commercial diplomacy support from the South 
African embassies abroad is rare but not unheard of. Some of the more active embassies share 
this information with organisations such as BUSA (the Nigerian one for example) and there is 
also information sharing around contacts and commercial diplomacy between companies at 
BUSA events (Grant 2010; January-Bardill 2009; Mapai 2020; Nikolaou 2009). Business 
interviewees were ad idem that this level of commercial diplomacy support from South 
African embassies is “hit and miss” and Carim (Int: 2009) ruefully concurred that there 
remained gaps in South Africa’s foreign missions as far as commercial diplomacy was 
concerned.87  Embassy diplomatic and support staff are generally regarded by South African 
business as not being well trained and under-resourced. Although as the discussion above on 
the capacity-building initiatives within DIRCO shows, developing better economic 
diplomacy capacity is a key objective for the department going forward.  
 
NSAs participate in economic diplomacy directly at negotiations as well as indirectly through 
a variety of methods, including capacity-building, research, technical analysis and lobbying. 
After self-initiated lobbying, meetings are by far the most useful means of influencing or 
                                                      
87
 All business interviewees were asked about their perception of commercial diplomacy support in South 
African Embassies abroad and without exception identified that there was a lack of adequate commercial 
diplomacy support from most embassies.  
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engaging with government stakeholders on economic diplomacy. Other forms of public 
campaigns are less utilised (Draper et al 2010: 279).  
 
Both government and business stakeholders affirmed a mutual willingness to attend meetings 
and dialogue organised by either sector. BUSA has been extremely successful at putting 
forward a unified message to government on the NAMA negotiations in the WTO. The 
organisation presented a cohesive position to NEDLAC that outlined a defensive position on 
the negotiations, and successfully influenced South Africa’s negotiating position on NAMA 
(BUSA 2009). This was no doubt made possible also by the support of other influential NSAs 
in the forum such as COSATU (Vavi 2008, July 26).  Research-based NSAs such as TIPS 
have also been successful in lobbying through their research on tariffs in the SACU-
MERCOSUR Preferential Trade  Agreement (PTA)  negotiations (SACU 2008a). Business 
interviewees generally regard the DTI as having shifted the focus of negotiations and 
economic diplomacy to preferential agreements and away from the WTO (Int: Grant 2010; 
Kruger 2009; Lawrence 2009; Leopold 2009; Maasdorp 2009; Mapai 2010; Mthintso 2010; 
Parons 2009). In contrast DTI officials insisted that the two venues remain of equal 
importance (Int: Carim 2009; Zalk 2009). The present deadlock in the Doha Round of the 
WTO may reinforce a perception of neglect for NSAs.   
 
Politics of Race and Representation 
 
The earlier discussion on black business and the difficulties of coordinating business unity 
pointed to the on-going impact of racial politics in South Africa’s political economy, which 
remains a crucial sticking point in the business-government relationship. This has played out 
in the convoluted formation, dissolution and competition between business associations 
representing corporate interests in the South African political economy.  BEE has become a 
central issue on the agenda between government and business (BEE Act No.53 2003).  
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The struggle between business associations has revolved around which of the associations has 
the right to be the ‘voice’ of business and thus heard by government.  Historical inequalities 
wrought by apartheid have carried forward into South Africa’s contemporary political 
economy.  Capital remains in the control of white owned businesses and efforts at 
transformation have not resulted in broad-based transfer of capital (as ostensibly intended) 
(Brown 2002; Mbeki 2009; BMF 2011). Rather what transformation has taken place appears 
to have enriched a small number of blacks with connections to the ruling ANC in the 
construction of a new elite with vested interests in maintaining the status quo (Murray 2000; 
Verhoef 2003; South African Institute of Race Relations 2012). Of 295 companies listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) only four percent have a black CEO, two percent 
have a black financial director and less than 15 percent have any black representation in their 
senior management (The Economist 2010).  
 
According to Mbeki (2009: 61), a critic of BEE as a meaningful tool for transformation, 
“BEE...strikes a fatal blow against the emergence of black entrepreneurship by creating a 
small class of unproductive but wealthy black crony capitalists made up of ANC politicians”.  
In this sense the policy of BEE, which has been touted as a concession by big business to 
prevent wide-spread nationalisation and promote privatisation has achieved its desired 
objective (Chabane et al 2003). Big business has remained squarely in the hands of white 
capitalists and the new fortunes of so-called ‘black diamonds’ ensure that influential black 
businessmen continue to support a system which has benefited them so well (Radebe 2010). 
Critics of the pace and extent of transformation point to the overlap between political 
personalities and business elites (Handley 2008: 94).  
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There is increasing evidence that individuals in government are using these as opportunities 
for self-enrichment, blurring the line between co-operation and corruption (Friedman 2005, 
November 9; Gumede 2007: 106).  This trend has led at least one opposition MP from The 
Congress of the People (COPE), Philip Dexter, to challenge the President about what he 
called ZEE (as he dubbed Zuma Economic Empowerment), during questions about the 
contentious mineral rights issues in 2010 that favoured direct family members of the 
President (Mail and Guardian 2010, September 9). For example the investigation into the 
alleged fraud in granting of mineral rights by the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs. 
The matter came to the fore because of the row between Anglo American’s iron-ore division 
Kumba Iron Ore and the South African arm of Arcelor-Mitttal over access to ore at the 
Sishen Iron Ore Company. The investigation has highlighted contentious BEE deals 
involving Arcelor-Mitttal and Zuma’s son and other businessmen close to the President (Leon 
2011, June 8). Kumba lodged a criminal complaint over the granting of prospecting rights 
over the Sishen property to ICT, a BEE grouping with no mining experience, described as 
little more than a “bribe of the political class” (Borain 2010, August 17).  Cynical observers 
are even suggesting that recent calls for nationalisation by ANC Youth League (ANCYL) 
leader Julius Malema are ill-disguised attempts to bail-out failing empowerment deals in the 
wake of losses as a result of the global financial crisis and falling mining shares (Reuters 
2011, July 29).  
 
The extent of government corruption is such “that the murky relationship between money and 
politics has been at the heart of almost every major scandal faced by political parties and the 
government since 1994” (Robinson and Brummer 2006: 2). Of course not everyone who has 
political connections either in present government or through their struggle credentials is 
“greedy and grubby” but it is not always easy to differentiate (Friedman quoted in Handley 
2008: 98). Terence Nombembe, South Africa’s auditor-general, reported that 49 public 
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servants who were directors of companies had failed to disclose their business interests or 
their public role when submitting for government tenders (The Economist 2010, June 5). 
 
A polarisation of business interests around size and racial divisions continues. Big business 
remains represented by its original association (under a different name), BLSA. The change 
in administrations from Mbeki to Zuma has seen the emphasis shift away from Mbeki’s 
BBWGs and could be a reason why BLSA has finally joined the government-approved 
business association, BUSA. This has enormous advantages for BUSA which has limited 
financial resources and so benefits from the money available through BLSA representing the 
top corporations in South Africa. The slow pace of transformation and anti-white sentiment 
still prevalent among many small and medium sized black-owned businesses means that 
associations such as NAFCOC and the BMF continue to exist, but with little clout (in terms 
of economic power) and plenty of political capital.   
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter has outlined the wide number of stakeholders participating in various aspects of 
South Africa’s economic diplomacy. Government stakeholders extend across a range of 
departments and institutions to varying degrees of effectivity. NSAs represent a variety of 
stakeholders, including business. In analysing the role of these stakeholders in South Africa’s 
post-apartheid economic diplomacy the chapter concludes that there are several key issues 
determining the extent to and ways in which business engages in economic diplomacy. 
Within government departments there are capacity constraints and between departments there 
are concerns around coordination and general organisation as well as weaknesses in the 
consultation mechanisms and how these are utilised. Research institutes and think tanks are a 
vibrant part of the policy network and produce a plethora of reports and research papers 
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which are widely available. In addition they perform a useful role in engaging other 
stakeholders in dialogue.  
 
Business NSAs are also constrained for different reasons. The politics of race and 
representation have made it difficult for business to organise meaningfully and construct a 
unified position of key issues of trade policy and negotiations. There have also been problems 
for business in gaining access to government arising out of this context. Furthermore, the 
historical relationship between business and the ANC has contributed to the nature of the 
sometimes dysfunctional relationship between certain sectors of the business community and 
government. Addressing the issues of historical disadvantage has been central to the ANC’s 
policies around affirmative action and black economic empowerment. It would not be 
possible to give a full account of business engagement in economic diplomacy without taking 
cognisance of the problems of representation and access posed by racial politics and capital 
ownership along racial lines. Business representation is crucial to explaining the extent to 
which and ways in which business engages in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic 
diplomacy, in terms of who is regarded as the legitimate voice of business in South Africa. 
By legitimate voice of business this research refers to which business representatives are 
consulted by government and the sensitivities surrounding white capital interests versus black 
economic empowerment and transformation in the business sector. This does not mean that 
white capital is mute or that big business is passive in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. 
Far from it, as the next three chapters prove. All sectors of business are engaged in different 
levels of economic diplomacy and through three possible modes: consultative, supplementary 
and entrepreneurial.  
 
Despite the difficulties and obstacles to consultation and participation there is a remarkable 
degree of activity taking place around business engagement in economic diplomacy both on 
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trade policy and on negotiations at multilateral as well as bilateral and regional levels. The 
chapters that follow describe and analyse the modes of engagement that emerged during the 
empirical research and writing of this thesis. The first of these is a consultative role and is the 
topic of Chapter Five. The consultative role of business is better understood in the context of 
the institutional structures both of business NSAs as well as government departments and 
policy-making processes, analysed in detail in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: MODES OF DIPLOMACY, THE CONSULTATIVE 
ROLE OF BUSINESS 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter set out the various stakeholders in South Africa’s economic diplomacy 
and analysed the opportunities and constraints for these stakeholders in engaging with South 
Africa’s economic diplomacy. This research is focused on the role of business NSAs and the 
remainder of the thesis will explore this stakeholder specifically and others only in relation to 
the engagement of business in South Africa’s economic diplomacy.  
 
One of the fundamental features of MSD is inclusivity or partnership in policy processes. 
Multistakeholder processes “aim to bring together all major stakeholders in a new form of 
common decision finding (and possibly decision-making) on a particular issue” (Hemmati 
2000: 19). This process is premised on the right to be heard and the exercising of influence on 
a negotiation or dialogue. Consultation is therefore one of the foundations of a functioning 
MSD. In the research conducted, consultation was identified by the interviewees as a critical 
aspect of business engagement in economic diplomacy. Whilst the effectiveness of different 
consultative mechanisms was perceived to be variable, all stakeholders agreed that it was a 
crucial part of and starting point for engagement.   
 
This chapter draws on the insights of domestic societal (Milner 1997) and domestic 
institutional theories (Cowhey 1993) discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.  Societal 
theories provide a way of analysing how societal interests are translated into policy. Social 
groups in a country are deemed to demand policy which is supplied by government. They are 
also considered to have views on what this policy ought to look like; often competing views. 
Consultation at a domestic level is one means for governments to access the input of different 
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stakeholders into policy-making. Such consultation is not always even-handed and certain 
groups may have more privileged access than others (Alt et al 1996). Institutional approaches 
focus on the domestic institutions or formal structures of policy-making and procedures and 
how these interface with social actors and policy-makers in different ways (March and Olsen 
1984). This chapter will explore the main consultative mechanisms available in the South 
African context and analyse how effectively these are accessed by business NSAs and to 
what purpose. In effect, the chapter is analysing the interaction of stakeholders and 
institutional mechanisms or structures of consultation. In so doing the research develops an 
argument for viewing business NSAs as engaging in a consultative role in South Africa’s 
post-apartheid economic diplomacy.  
 
The discussion that follows is structured to commence with a contextual setting for 
consultation in South Africa, drawing on the insights of earlier chapters on the historical 
relationship between business and government and politics of race and representation in the 
post-apartheid period. The relationship between business and government in South Africa is 
characterised as one of constructive contestation. The chapter then identifies the main 
locations or sites of consultation, including consultation mechanisms as well as providing an 
overview of South Africa’s trade agreements and negotiations. Finally, the chapter identifies 
a consultative role for business NSA in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy 
that is informed by various factors, including the historical relationship between business and 
the ANC as well as domestic institutional or structural factors that both create opportunities 
for and constrain consultation. This section analyses the strategies and tools deployed by 
business NSAs in engaging in a consultative role.  
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5.2 Constructive Contestation 
The history of business culpability during the apartheid era, despite well documented 
evidence of anti-apartheid activities, has resulted in an on-going mistrust between the ANC 
and business (Lipton 1986; Lipton 2007). Notwithstanding the rainbow nation of the Mandela 
era, racial politics remains a significant factor in business-government interaction (Gumede 
2007; Gevisser 2009). Although the economic policies later embraced by the ANC appear, to 
many, to be a capitulation to the neo-liberal consensus, this was not always a foregone 
conclusion.  Handley  (2008: 3) argues that South Africa displayed a “process of constructive 
contestation” between business and government on economic policy issues, such that “policy 
processes are strengthened when the state is forced to engage in considered, inclusive 
consultation with important social actors – such as business”.  The nature of ‘constructive 
contestation’ implies that there needs to be some sort of process or forum for engagement. 
NEDLAC was the institution designed for that purpose and followed on from the NEF.88  
 
Whatever power business had by virtue of its market strength was based on its historical 
advantage due to racial oppression during the apartheid and pre-apartheid era when business 
was establishing itself in South Africa. At the time of transition business was a powerful 
force, well organised, diversified and independent of government. This helps to explain why 
business seemed to achieve much of what it wanted in economic policy at the time of 
transition.  Some scholars argue that business occupied a separate space, which was 
disciplined by the currency and stock markets, and independent monetary policy, thus 
affording business, autonomy from political power (Shubane and Mackay 1999). However, 
over time this power has been eroded and the historical distrust is aspect of an uneasy 
relationship between government and business at the inception has festered into something 
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 See discussion below in the section on Nedlac for an overview of the institution as a site for diplomatic 
engagement/forum for consultation. 
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far less constructive. The racial exclusivity of business has hampered its legitimacy in the 
new South Africa and despite its role in influencing the economic policy debates early on, 
poisoned its relationship with the newly elected ANC government (Landman 2001). One can 
no longer say that “big business feels comfortable and relieved” or “that organised business 
is...carefully listened to formally and informally” as Adam et al (1997: 213) optimistically 
maintain in their early work within the first five of the 1994 elections. It is impossible 
therefore to assess the consultative role of business NSA without also taking cognisance of 
the racial politics that underpins business in South Africa.  
 
 “Mbeki and his advisors appeared to distrust and dislike the private sector, reacting 
defensively and with charges of racism to any criticism of government from business” 
(Handley 2008: 89). This is mirrored by a tendency among business leaders to have low 
expectations of the ANC government, despite the early track record within the ANC 
government of prudent management of the economy during 15 years of post-apartheid 
government.  The cooling relationship between government and business reached its zenith 
during the Mbeki era, and business found it increasingly difficult to access political 
leadership within the ANC; instead Mbeki appointed a council of international business 
people, called the Presidential International Advisory Council, to advise the government on 
attracting foreign investment (BuaNews 2004, September 6). This may have a lot to do with 
the fact that business has continued to be white and that real transformation has been slow in 
manifesting itself. Even international business was regarded as racist when Mbeki perceived 
markets to be punishing the Rand after a run on the currency (weakening the Rand to around 
ZAR6 to the US$). Mbeki saw this as an attack on the currency,  linked to the resignation of 
Chris Stals in 1999, then Governor of the South African Reserve Bank (widely admired in 
international markets for his commitment to anti-inflationary policies) and further when he 
was replaced by Tito Mboweni who was then known more for his labour sympathies and lack 
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of qualifications for such a technical job (Sidiqi 1996, October 1; Hogg 2002, March 7; 
Hirsch 2005). Mboweni subsequently proved the markets wrong, but the ANC was already 
offended by what they perceived to be racist misgivings about their management of South 
Africa's economy (Gumede 2007). In response to the deterioration of the business-
government relationship, business launched a new initiative called the Business Trust under 
the auspices of the purposely established National Business Initiative (NBI). The Business 
Trust established in 1995, was based on the model of the Urban Foundation and the CBM as 
a response to “the need for a constructive dialogue between government and business” and to 
“correct the impression that it was not committed to transformation” (Business Trust 2011).    
 
The Business Trust entailed a financial pledge from business of R1billion for social 
investment projects around job creation and education projects (Grawitsky 1998; Collins 
2000). Initially the Business Trust aimed to raise and spend the R1billion between 1999 and 
2004. At the end of that period their mandate was extended to a total spend of R1.8billion to 
be used by the end of 2011 (Business Trust 2010: 2). The quid pro quo was access to the 
President and this was rewarded by Mbeki, when he created a working group giving business 
direct access to the government and the President via monthly meetings (Bezuidenhout et al 
2007: 31). To further highlight the differentiation of business along racial lines (and to 
obviate criticism from other social groups) Mbeki also created working groups for black 
business, commercial agriculture and the trade unions (The Presidency 2001).  In the post-
Mbeki period, however, these working groups have been dumped by the Zuma administration 
in favour of a more representative organisation: BUSA (Business Day 2010, July 29). 
BUSA’s then president, Jerry Vilakazi stated that having separate working groups was 
divisive and often resulted in duplication, which is why Zuma’s restoration of NEDLAC as a 
forum for social dialogue was to be desired (Ngwala 2010, April 25). After the World Cup 
2010 event, Zuma planned a lekgotla (gathering) of various business groups, including 
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representatives of BUSA, BLSA and the BBWG. At the announcement of the planned 
lekgotla Zuma confirmed that “the old form of engagement (through Mbeki’s working 
groups) had negatives and positives... The weakness was it was divisive” (Business Day 
2010, July 29). This heralded a return to NEDLAC as the primary consultation mechanism 
for the DTI and government more generally. Douwes (1994) refers to the role of NEDLAC as  
generating creative tensions to avoid tendencies to authoritarianism, which resonates with the 
constructive contestation thesis put forward by Handley above. The next sections of this 
chapter look at the locations of consultation and explore the structure and efficiency of 
formalised consultation mechanisms, primarily NEDLAC.  
 
5.3 South Africa’s Trade Agreements 
South Africa’s existing trade agreements are largely focused around and conducted through 
the two primary regional bodies to which it belongs: SACU and SADC. It is a key objective 
of South Africa’s economic diplomacy to pursue regional integration strategies (DTI 2011c).  
This has not always proved easy to accomplish when balanced against South Africa’s other 
objectives to secure economic relations with the EU, which remains a key export market for 
South Africa.89  
 
Table 5.1 below outlines the key trade agreements to which South Africa is a party and 
provides useful data on the importance of regional cooperation in South Africa’s trade 
negotiations. 
  
                                                      
89
 See Chapter Three for data on South Africa’s trade flows and the strategic relevance of key trading 
relationships for the country.  
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Table 5.1  Selected list of South Africa’s Trade Agreements November 2011  
(Excluding WTO commitments) 
 
Source: (TIPS 2010a; SARS 2011) 
  
                                                      
90
 MERCOSUR refers to the free trade area of South America, roughly translated as the Common Southern 
Market (Ariete 2006). 
91
 Source African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA 2011). 
92
 Source General System of Preferences (GSP 2011). 
Agreement Agreement type Issues/ Status 
 
Regional 
 
  
 
SACU 
 
 
Customs Union/ FTA 
 
Revenue sharing obligations 
 
SACU-EFTA 
 
 
FTA 
 
Tariffs and market access 
 
SACU-MERCOSUR90 
 
PTA (signed 2009, still to be 
ratified) 
 
Tariffs 
 
SACU-USA 
 
 
TIDCA  
 
Market access and trade links 
 
SACU – EU 
 
 
EPA 
 
Signed by Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, South 
Africa has yet to conclude the EPA negotiations 
 
SADC 
 
 
FTA 
 
Economic integration 
 
Bilateral 
 
  
 
SACU-India 
 
 
PTA pending  
 
Proposed 
 
SA- EU 
 
 
TDCA concluded 
EPA Proposed 
 
 
Tariffs  
Services, Competition policy proposed 
 
SACU – China 
 
 
FTA /PGD 
 
Proposed 
 
SACU Nigeria 
 
 
FTA 
 
Proposed 
 
Trilateral 
 
  
 
SADC-EAC-COMESA 
 
 
FTA – in progress 
 
Proposed 
 
Non-reciprocal trade arrangements 
 
  
 
AGOA 
 
 
Non-reciprocal 
 
Preferential access for imports.91 
 
Generalised System of Preferences 
 
Non-reciprocal 
 
Lower duties on exports for improved market access.92 
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Table 5.1 Cont. 
SACU: South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland;93 SADC: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe; EFTA: European Free Trade Area; 
MERCOSUR: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; PTA: Preferential Trade Agreement; FTA: Free Trade Agreement; EPA: 
European Partnership Agreement;94 TDCA: Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement;95 TIDCA: Trade Investment, Development 
and Cooperation Agreement;96 AGOA: African Growth and Opportunity Act (USA); EPA: Economic Partnership Agreement;97 PGD: 
Partnership for Growth and Development;98 EAC:  East African Community - Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi;99 COMESA: 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa - Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
DRC, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius Comoros.100 
 
 South Africa negotiated a comprehensive trade, aid and political cooperation agreement with 
the EU that resulted in the TDCA signed in October 1999 and which came into effect in 2004 
(EUR-Lex 2004). This was divisive because the EU decided not to include the other SACU 
members in the negotiation. As the EPA negotiations followed soon after under the Cotonou 
Convention these SACU partners, the Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) 
states, have been caught in the middle.101 South Africa is determined not to conclude the EPA 
negotiations while new era issues remain on the table, and there was tremendous pressure on 
the BLNS states from the EU to conclude the EPA or lose their preferential market access. As 
they were excluded from the TDCA this left them adrift. In the end an EPA was signed with 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 2009 (ACP-EU-Trade 2009). 
 
SACU is the oldest customs union in the world and was established by agreement in 1910. 
The agreement was updated in 1969 and in 2002 the most comprehensive update was signed, 
                                                      
93
 Source South African Customs Union (SACU 2011). 
94
 Source ACP-EU Trade (2009). 
95
 Source EU Legislation (Europa 2011). 
96
 Source Ambassador Schwab (SACU 2008). 
97
 Source (European Commission 2011). 
98
 Source (DTI 2011b). 
99
 Source East African Community (EAC 2011). 
100
 Source Community Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA 2011). 
101
 The Cotonou Convention replaced the Lome Conventions under which African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries were recipients of a favourable trade and development assistance from the EU. WTO undertakings 
meant that the EU had to revisit the favourable terms offered to ACP countries as these contravened MFN 
principles. 
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which effectively removed decision-making powers on trade policy from the sovereign 
members (SACU 2011). In terms of Article 7  of the 2002 SACU Agreement all tariff and 
trade remedy decisions are undertaken by  a council of ministers advised by a tariff body and 
commission of senior officials (SACU 2002). This reduces South Africa’s input to an 
advisory role performed by the ITAC division of the DTI. The agreement is thus a source of 
further tension for South Africa in terms of its industrial policy strategy (see discussion 
below) which requires the DTI to retain as much policy space as possible and the SACU 
undertaking could significantly curtail South Africa’s use of tariffs as a trade policy 
instrument. These dynamics could result in SACU splitting up, with significant consequences 
for the regional group and particularly South Africa’s economic diplomacy (Bertelsmann-
Scott 2010). 
 
SADC constitutes a third of South Africa’s export market, and is therefore an important 
regional relationship. In selecting SADC rather than COMESA as a preferred forum for 
integration, South Africa fuelled tensions in the region. A number of SADC members have 
overlapping membership in COMESA and there was wide-spread resentment at South 
Africa’s forum choice, as it was perceived by other SADC members to have chosen a forum 
it could dominate (Marais 1998).102 Mistrust with its regional partners was further 
exacerbated when South Africa supported the launch of the Doha Round at the WTO against 
the position of the Africa Group (Mutume 2001). 
 
In addition to its regional aspirations South Africa has also identified a strategy for pursuing 
bilateral and regional PTAs with key trading partners under the auspices of the DTI’s Global 
Economic Strategy (Ismail et al 2000). The first stage of this strategy was to secure 
agreements with the US, the EFTA and MERCOSUR. The EFTA with SACU was concluded 
                                                      
102
 See Chapter Six for more discussion on South Africa’s regional aspirations and concerns of hegemonic 
dominance. 
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and implemented in May 2008 and removes all industrial tariffs (van der Merwe 2008, 
August 1). Negotiations with MERCOSUR resulted in agreement on a PTA, less 
comprehensive than the envisioned FTA and is quite limited in scope (SACU 2008a). The 
agreement has been concluded but has yet to be ratified. Negotiations on a FTA with the US 
have collapsed as a result of the US ‘WTO-plus’ approach to the negotiations (TIPS 
2010b).103 
 
The second stage is to establish agreements with important bilateral relationships, namely, 
India, China and Nigeria. The SACU-India negotiations were launched in 2007 and are still 
ongoing. At the time of writing there remained several outstanding issues in the negotiations, 
such as around which sectors/ product lines should be included in a PTA, the application of 
rules of origin and the extent of liberalisation in the services sector (especially financial 
services) (Agritrade 2010; Ntisana 2011). India is competitive in services, mainly the IT 
sector, as well as clothing, textiles, footwear and pharmaceutical products. China is 
manufacturing dominant and reliant on commodity imports of coal, oil, gas and base metals. 
Although the DTI has identified an intention to engage in negotiations with China on a PTA 
or FTA this has not yet materialised and experts agree that there would be a number of 
crucial issues to be overcome for such an agreement to be made (Alden 2005; Davies 2005; 
Draper et al 2010). Chief among these would be concerns around threats to labour-intensive 
industries in a country beleaguered by extreme poverty levels and very high unemployment. 
Commentators such as Davies (2005) and Draper et al (2010) above also cite South Africa’s 
new Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP2) as a barrier to the conclusion of any further 
significant liberalising initiatives in South Africa’s economic diplomacy (Davies 2010; DTI 
2010d). 
 
                                                      
103
 ‘WTO-Plus’ refers to obligations that exceed existing requirements of WTO agreements (Qin 2003). 
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This pattern of retreat from liberalisation is evident too in South Africa’s multilateral 
engagement at the WTO. This is evident in the leading role being played by South Africa in 
the NAMA 11 group and, which was delivered with consensus of all the major social 
partners, after intense negotiations within NEDLAC (BUSA 2009). The adoption of a more 
defensive position in the WTO does not signify a withdrawal from multilateralism, merely a 
shift in South Africa’s engagement position (Ismail 2011). This would signify an increasing 
attempt by South Africa to resolve the tensions between its position in Africa and its 
commitment to multilateralism. As a new member of the BRICS grouping South Africa is 
playing a role as a member of the major emerging developing economies while still acting as 
a bridge to smaller developing countries that make up most of Africa (Wagner and Jackman 
2011, April 2; Hervieu 2011, April 19). According to the DTI a key focus of South Africa’s 
negotiating position in the WTO is to strengthen the G20 group of developing countries (DTI 
2011c). It is this shift in South Africa’s gaze towards increased South-South engagement that 
informs the discussion in Chapter Six and through which business is playing a supplementary 
role in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. 
 
5.4 Consultation Mechanisms 
In the language of MSD, consultation mechanisms would be one of the key sites or locations 
where diplomatic activity occurs. Domestic consultation, whilst not taking place in the 
international arena, is influencing and being influenced by these processes. MSD approaches 
argue that the involvement of NSA stakeholders blurs the artificial distinction that old 
diplomacy held between the domestic and international arena (Evans et al 1993).  A feature 
of contemporary diplomacy is the linkage between domestic and international negotiating 
platforms and this entails the simultaneous evaluation of both levels.  Not to mention that 
152 
 
NSAs are increasingly engaging directly on the international stage in their own right, thus 
further complicating the domestic/international distinction. 
 
Many trade experts agree that governments are pursuing greater transparency and 
participation in trade policy-making in order to promote legitimacy and ultimately social 
consensus on trade policy and negotiations (Ostry 2002; Hocking 2004c; Wolfe and Helmer 
2007). Such consultation processes have had varied outcomes. Capling and Low  (2010: 8) 
identify several key features of consultation with NSAs that may provide a useful comparison 
for evaluating the consultative role of South African business NSAs in South Africa’s 
economic diplomacy later in the chapter.   
• Consultation can vary between formal institutionalised and informal mechanisms. 
• In developing countries only business NSAs have the resources and capability to 
engage meaningfully in consultation 
• Consultative mechanisms tend to privilege business actors above NGOs and other 
social actors. 
• Public information on trade flows, progress in negotiations, and research or analysis 
of trade-related issues in developing countries is not as advanced as in developed 
economies. 
• NSAs are increasingly engaging directly with relevant ministries (such as industry or 
agriculture) relying on these to better represent their positions in inter-governmental 
consultation and discussions. 
• Consultative processes in respect of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are better 
functioning and precede consultation processes on WTO negotiations. 
• The trade agenda is becoming highly complex as a result of the inclusion in 
consultation of broader numbers of stakeholders. Protectionist interests (often 
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representing social interests) are competing with export-led industries and broader 
government departmental engagement.  
 
There are a limited number of formal consultation mechanisms involving business NSAs in 
South Africa’s economic policy-making processes. These are NEDLAC, the ATF, the 
Presidency’s clusters and the Industry Forum. Consultation on trade issues is primarily done 
under the auspices of NEDLAC  (DTI 2011c).  The DTI also maintains strong relationships 
with various industry associations and business interests through a number of export councils. 
 
The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) 
 
NEDLAC was the formalisation of existing negotiating structures which coalesced around 
business, government and labour (Bezuidenhout et al 2007: 22). NEDLAC is also described 
as the institutional expression or manifestation of the social contract between stakeholders 
(Grobbelaar and Besada 2008: 106). Some scholars argue that institutions such as NEDLAC 
were “important not just for the opportunity they provide South Africa to create a stable 
industrial relations system, but for the clear rules of the game they set for regulating 
economic conflict” (Sisk 1995: 281).  
 
NEDLAC was established in 1995 as a successor to the forerunner organisation, the NEF, 
which was set up in 1992 during the transition government in South Africa. The Council 
convenes the key stakeholders of organised government, business, labour, and community 
groupings. Representing government are the departments of Labour, Trade and Industry, and 
Finance and Public Works. Business is represented by BUSA (including the BBC and BSA). 
Labour has representation through the three key union federations: COSATU, the Federation 
of South African Labour Union (FEDUSA), and National Council of Trade Unions 
(NACTU). Community organisations comprise the South African Youth Council, the 
National Women’s coalition, the South African National Civics Organisation, Disabled 
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People South Africa, the Financial Sector Coalition and the National Cooperatives 
Association of South Africa. NEDLAC operates to reach consensus between the stakeholders 
on issues of economic and social policy (NEDLAC 2011).  
 
NEDLAC is structured around four chambers: Public Finance and Monetary Policy, 
Development, Labour Market and Trade and Industry. Trade policy and economic diplomacy 
issues are negotiated by the government and social partners through the fourth chamber – 
Trade and Industry. NEDLAC is solely a consultation forum and does not engage in 
negotiations per se. It is the institutional mechanism through which domestic stakeholders are 
engaged in consultation and negotiation with one another around aspects of economic 
diplomacy and negotiations.  
 
The process for consultation commences with government bringing draft legislation to the 
relevant chambers in the form of green papers, which outline ministerial positions or 
proposals. These are then discussed by the stakeholders and a second draft known as a white 
paper is prepared, which includes any dissenting views. If consensus is reached the matter is 
regarded as closed and sent for ratification to Parliament. If no consensus is reached then 
constituencies are still able to represent their case or concerns to the Portfolio Committee or 
the National Chamber. Labour convenor, Ebrahim Patel cites NEDLAC as a case study in 
functioning consultation and global best practice (NEDLAC 2006: 5). Outside opinion would 
appear to concur. A Wikileaks document prepared by the American Embassy in June 2006 
and leaked in that same year, concludes that NEDLAC “functions as a forum where 
stakeholders can make their points and where business and labour can unite to pressure 
government if need be, without the involvement of pricy lobbyists”(Wikileaks 2006). 
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Government-led Task Teams 
 
Task Teams are government-led initiatives established on an ad hoc basis in response to 
particular issues or crises. For example, the Economic Recovery Task Team includes 
President Zuma, ministers of Finance, Trade and Industry, Labour and Economic 
Development as well as BLSA (The Presidency 2009). Another consultative task team 
established in the wake of the global economic crisis is the Mining Industry Growth, 
Development and Employment Task Team, which includes labour, business and government, 
and was set up in December 2008. “The task team was aimed at helping the industry manage 
the negative effects of the global economic crisis and to save jobs as well as position the 
industry for growth and transformation in the medium to long-term” according to Mineral 
resources Minister Susan Shabangu at the Mining Indaba 2010 (Mpofu 2010, February 3).  
 
The Agricultural Trade Forum (ATF) 
 
This is the site at which consultation occurs between the Department of Agriculture and the 
agricultural industry as well as other stakeholders such as labour, The Land Bank, civil 
society in the form of land reform groups and provincial agricultural departments.  Farmers 
from both commercial sectors as well as small or emerging farmers are included. The ATF 
provides input to trade negotiations on any aspect relating to agricultural interests (DAFF 
2011). 
 
The Industry Forum 
 
This is a consultation forum convened by the director general of the DTI. It is a formal 
consultative mechanism that meets quarterly and comprises all South Africa’s industrial 
sectors, provincial governments and commerce bodies. The IF covers a broad agenda of 
issues relating to economic development and industrial and trade policy, extending to matters 
of regional integration and the WTO (DTI 2011b). 
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5.5 Diplomatic process, tools and methods 
MSD argues that “consultation enables multiple stakeholders to compensate for government 
deficiencies in diplomatic processes by exchanging resources through policy networks” 
(Hocking 2006: 7). This entails processes of information exchange, monitoring of diplomatic 
engagements and negotiations as well as defining and promoting common interests. 
 
 South African business NSAs engage in a variety of strategies for influencing trade policy 
and negotiations. These include first and foremost consultation and self-initiated lobbying, 
and to a lesser degree preparing research reports and technical information or advice. A 
variety of formal and informal consultation mechanisms create opportunity for business to 
monitor diplomatic engagements as well as give input towards defining the common interest 
along-side other stakeholders. Several business interviewees referred to the notion of ‘SA 
Incorporated’ and the need to create a better common branding abroad (Int: Davies 2009; 
Kruger 2009; Maasdorp 2009; Mapai 2010; Nikolaou 2009; Parsons 2009; Spicer 2009). 
However, there is little evidence that business uses public campaigns to be heard or gather 
support for its positions. The primary targets of business NSA advocacy are ministers and 
government officials, and less frequently, legislators and public opinion (Draper et al 2010).  
 
5.6 Analysing the consultative role of business NSA 
Draper et al (2010) have conducted research into consultation processes and mechanisms in 
South Africa’s trade policy-making and Draper (2004) has specifically explored the role of 
business NSAs in economic diplomacy.104 Draper presented five main findings: i) that 
                                                      
104
 Draper’s survey was conducted with South African corporations using open-ended questions. 13 companies 
responded and included MNCs with foreign control. According to Draper the respondents represented a wide 
variety of economic activities and as such constituted a “significant spectrum” of the economy and was a 
“broadly representative sample” (Draper 2004: 2). 
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business had neglected trade issues as a priority concern; ii) that there was a need for business 
to develop a central coordination point for preparing positions on trade negotiations; iii) that 
business should attempt to have a dedicated forum for business-government consultation 
away from other stakeholders; iv) that business should develop its research capacity on trade 
diplomacy in order to better support government in this activity and also to disseminate its 
research to inform public debates; v) that business should lobby government to improve the 
economic diplomacy initiatives of foreign embassies. In their 2010 survey Draper et al (2010: 
280) concluded that NSAs were of the opinion that South Africa had “adequate structures for 
trade policy consultation”. Furthermore the study found that business regards the DTI as a 
primary point of intervention for consultation alongside the ATF for agricultural commerce 
issues. They contend that business NSAs also find value in developing closer personal 
relationships with key personalities among government negotiators as personal relationships 
are more approachable and such key people are more knowledgeable about the key issues. In 
addition they find that business NSAs are more influential in influencing the details of 
selected negotiations but have little sway or input at a strategic level in forum selection. 
Finally, they conclude that the executive branch of government remains the dominant player 
in South Africa’s trade policy-making and negotiations. 
 
Many interviewees agreed that in its earliest conception the NEDLAC process was highly 
effective and constructive (Int: Alfeld 2009; Bateman 2009; Chance 2009; Draper 2009; 
Grobbelaar 2009). Initially business representatives were optimistic that consultation 
mechanisms and processes offered an opportunity for trust-building and genuine dialogue on 
economic policy (Adam et al 1997: 213-214; Nattrass 1997: 107). Now however, NEDLAC 
is regarded by many business representatives as a defunct institution (Draper 2004). In 
contrast government representatives tended to disagree on this point. Even in its earliest 
construction NEDLAC was perceived to be a forum that privileged some actors over others. 
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Initially it was Big Business and Big Labour; now it is perceived as labour and government 
versus the rest.  
 
The early promise of NEDLAC appears to have dissipated and business at a senior level does 
not attend (Int: van Vuuren 2009 and Maasdorp 2009). NEDLAC’s mandate was to “seek to 
reach consensus and conclude agreements pertaining to social and economic policy” 
(NEDLAC 1998: 2). NEDLAC was intended to be the embodiment of societal corporatism 
(Nattrass 1997), but in fact appeared to be an uneven corporatism in which business felt that 
much of the legislation that emanated  from NEDLAC was biased towards labour interests 
(Taylor 2007: 169). From another perspective the labour legislation that was negotiated (The 
Labour Relations Act, 1995, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 1997 and the 
Employment Equity Act, 1998) could be seen as a “triumph of hard bargaining” by the 
unions (Business Day 2005, May 16).  
 
Despite this victory for labour, critics of South Africa’s neoliberal economic policies argue 
that GEAR followed quickly on the heels of labour-friendly legislation and that GEAR was 
most distinctly labour-unfriendly (Bond 2000). In reality GEAR was never negotiated in 
NEDLAC, because by then NEDLAC was already a waning influence in government policy-
making  (Taylor 2007: 170). This period marked the beginning of the decline in NEDLAC’s 
importance and according to van Vuuren the former head of BUSA the institution is 
chronically under-resourced (Int: van Vuuren 2009).105 As discussed earlier, NEDLAC is 
seeing a shift in its fortunes under the Zuma administration,  with increasing numbers of 
cabinet ministers turning to it for policy input (Business Day 2010, July 29). NEDLAC also 
recently appointed a new executive director in form of Graham Smith. He is a veteran of 
social dialogue and was previously head of the Metal and Engineering Industry Bargaining 
                                                      
105
 This perception is difficult to verify and no secondary resources reflecting this position were identified.  
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Council, where he participated in numerous consultative processes with the DTI, Department 
of Labour, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, and NEDLAC  
(SAPA 2011, October 4). How this will play out with business remains untested.  
 
The politics of race and how organised business engages in the consultation process and 
economic diplomacy more broadly is an important factor in explaining variations in 
consultation processes. In particular issues of transformation (or BEE) and representation - 
who has a ‘voice’ or access - are significant elements in this process. This research finds that 
the contested issues of transformation and redistribution concerns have complicated the 
access that business has to government (both formally and informally). As a result, a number 
of the business actors interviewed (particularly from big business and white capital) indicate 
that business access to government is limited on formal economic diplomacy initiatives such 
as multilateral negotiations at the WTO or regional agreements such as SACU or SADC (Int: 
Chance 2009; Draper 2009; January-Bardill 2009; Maasdorp 2009; Mapai 2010; Spicer 2009; 
Tshiqi 2009). Some business groups, such as BUSA, as a result of being regarded as more 
representative of the transformation agenda, are becoming government’s ‘interlocutor of 
choice’ and are increasingly becoming more influential in representing business interests 
across a range of issues including trade and economic diplomacy (Int: Grant 2010). As a 
result of the particular racial politics that has characterised the political economy of South 
Africa, responding to the challenges of transformation is an integral part of the corporate 
landscape. The issue is fundamental to all aspects of the relationship between business and 
government in post-apartheid South Africa and so also central to the problematic of 
consultation and the role of business associations.   
 
All the business interviewees revealed an on-going lack of trust between business and 
government along with other aspects of institutional weakness due to poor co-ordination, lack 
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of capacity and disorganisation within consultation mechanisms. As a consequence, business 
is less engaged, though not unengaged, in domestic consultation on economic diplomacy than 
might be expected in a country such as South Africa with the long-standing relationship 
between business and government. What the research also reveals is that business NSAs 
engage in consultative modes of engagement to varying degrees and depending on the 
location of such diplomatic processes. The consultative role of business NSAs is fluid, 
diffuse and manifests in multiple spheres in a constantly evolving and shifting form.  
 
In the section above on consultation mechanisms reference was made to Capling and Low’s 
(2010) observations of NSA engagement in trade policy-making. When this study is 
compared to their findings, there is significant resonance but also divergence with some of 
their conclusions. South African consultation does indeed vary between formal 
institutionalised and informal mechanisms. It is not true of South Africa that only business 
NSAs have the resources and capacity to engage meaningfully in consultation. Research 
institutes and think tanks are highly engaged and active in producing both technical and 
policy related research. Social actors from labour are well-resourced and highly active as well 
as influential in South Africa’s consultative landscape. In addition, given the complex 
relationship between business and government, it cannot be said of South Africa that business 
has a privileged position over other stakeholders in consultation processes.  
 
It has been true of South Africa, as for other developing countries, that public information on 
trade flows and negotiations had not, until relatively recently (2012), been well 
communicated.106  A comparison of the 2008 and 2011 annual reports reveals that in the 
                                                      
106
 A review of Nedlac’s website was done in December 2011 at which stage annual reports were only available 
up to 2008. In April 2012 a further review of the Nedlac website revealed that the information had been made 
current and all annual reports up to 2011 were available for download. The recent annual reports (2009 
onwards) also showed far greater detail of the trade negotiations being discussed under the auspices of 
Nedlac. 
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2007/2008 reporting period, the Trade and Industry Chamber met just 11 times and only two 
of these meetings related to trade negotiations (NEDLAC 2008: 45) . In contrast during 
2010/2011 reporting period, the Chamber met on 91 occasions and 38 of these pertained to 
trade negotiations (NEDLAC 2011: 45).  In terms of forms of engagement, it is certainly true 
for South Africa that business NSAs have a preference for engaging directly with ministries 
and relevant government departments. A number of business interviewees found that there 
was far greater scope for input to regional and bilateral trade negotiations than multilateral 
processes in the WTO (Int: Alfeld 2009; Bateman 2009; Bone 2008; Lawrence 2009; Mason 
2009; Plaatjie 2010; Tshiqi 2009; Vapi 2009; Walters 2009). The increasingly complex 
agenda being faced as a result of consultation and competing social interests certainly was 
felt by government interviewees. This study reveals that business NSAs are actively engaged 
in a consultative role. However, business is responding to limitations in the consultative 
environment by finding alternative ways to participate in South Africa’s economic 
diplomacy.  
 
Coordination and unity 
 
The interviews reflected a call for greater strategic coherence to South Africa’s foreign policy 
and the business community’s interests. Dlamini (2004: 171) expresses this as the need for  
“a co-ordinated and focused approach that nurtures and promotes a symbiotic relationship 
between foreign policy and business”. This has led to calls for a so-called ‘SA Inc.’ approach, 
where foreign policy goals are linked to economic objects driven by business imperatives, be 
they export orientated or investment driven.  
 
Consultation and Inter departmental co-ordination 
 
Tensions between the DTI and the DFA (now DIRCO) were apparent from the early years of 
political transition. As the department responsible for negotiating South Africa’s multilateral 
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and bilateral trade agreements the DTI has enjoyed considerable success and a high profile in 
the WTO. According to January-Bardill (Int: 2009), a former South African Ambassador, this 
has fuelled envy within DIRCO, partly driven by personality differences in the two 
departments.107  The relationship between the two government departments is characterised 
by business interviewees as lacking in communication (Int: Chance 2009; Grant 2010; Spicer 
2009). De Villiers (Int: 2009) also indicated that DIRCO is in competition with the 
Department of Defence (DoD), which has taken the lead in matters of peace and security as 
well as matters of arms sales, placing the DoD in direct competition with DIRCO, which is 
partly responsible for managing the National Arms Control Convention, particularly with 
reference to issues of human rights records and existing geopolitical tensions. The DoD is 
driven by profit motives in the internationally competitive arms market (le Pere and van 
Nieuwkerk 2004: 124). Denel (Pty) Limited is the largest manufacturer of arms and defence 
equipment in South Africa and is owned by the government. 
 
In the present global political economy, there is an increasing need for ministries such as 
agriculture, energy, education or defence to interact at an international level, with counterpart 
ministries from other governments as well as MNCs from other countries or civil society 
representatives on a range of issues. This is driving these departments to adopt diplomatic 
functions for themselves, a role no longer the preserve of the Departments of Foreign Affairs 
(Pigman and Vickers 2010: 10).  In this regard greater co-ordination becomes more vital as 
the Department of Foreign Affairs (or its national equivalent) must play the part of the 
facilitator of consistency between departments (Hocking 2003).  
 
Most companies have relationships with different government departments (Department of 
Agriculture, Labour, Education, Safety and Security) and all speak of the silo-effect – where 
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 Given the obvious sensitivities relating to this observation January-Bardill would not specify the names of 
people within the DTI and DIRCO or give specific examples.   
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departments do not interact with one another. A good example of how this greater symbiosis 
between government and business is possible and effectual is the Kimberley Process, through 
which Anglo-DeBeers and the South African government embarked on a joint diplomacy 
initiative to reach international agreement at the UN on conflict diamonds, which also 
included the support of Angola and Sierra Leone as well as the British and Canadian 
governments (Lipton 2009). 108  
 
Criticisms levelled at NEDLAC by the business sector tend to ignore the deep schisms that 
exist within the business community itself. Although the call for business to speak with one 
voice so often associated with Mbeki, is somewhat utopian, the conflicts and divisions 
between different sections of business associations in South Africa has been catastrophic to 
business’s ability to engage meaningfully in NEDLAC processes as well (Taylor 2007: 176). 
Whilst the divisions between business associations has been in a large part about racial 
representation or language preferences (between English and Afrikaans speaking businesses) 
and size of business represented, there appears to have been little advantage to business 
associations representing black businesses. Attempts at merging black business associations 
with white mainstream associations have not always worked out. An example of this is the 
failed alliance in 2002 between the BBC and BSA (now called BUSA), which could not even 
begin as a merger due to the BBC’s concerns about being an acquisition until they could both 
play an equitable role. Hasmuk Gajaar, then President of the BBC, felt that achieving a de-
racialised body within two years would be optimistic (BBC News 2002, April 8).  A further 
example is the recent spat between the BMF and BUSA.109 
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 The Kimberley Process is an initiative introduced under the UN General Assembly Resolution 55/56, aimed 
at certifying the origin of diamonds to prevent diamond sales from being used to finance rebel movements in 
conflict countries, which are often called ‘blood diamonds’ (UN 2001).  
109
 See Chapter Four for more detail on this. 
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A previous attempt to merge NAFCOC and SACOB (now SACCI) was rejected by members 
of the black business community. Subsequent attempts to merge NAFCOC into BUSA came 
to nought as NAFCOC feared that their membership of small black business would be 
swamped by big business (Wadula 2004, September 4). The BBC did eventually successfully 
merge with BSA to form BUSA in October 2003, forming an umbrella body for other 
chambers and business associations, which gave a greater prominence to black business 
(BUSA 2010a). However, the merger did not succeed in shifting the emphasis away from big 
business interests, and BLSA the association representing the large conglomerations that 
dominate the South African economy remains the largest source of funding for BUSA today. 
This has meant that sectoral associations and regional chambers have the incentive to 
maintain their individual identities in order to still lobby for and promote sectoral interests 
with the government such as the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers (Taylor 
2007: 178).  
 
Functioning Consultation: the South African Liquor Brands Association (SALBA) and the 
EU-Wines and Spirits Agreement 
 
Agricultural associations have generally been more active participants than other business 
groups within the WTO. They attend ministerials as part of the civil society participants. Out 
of 11 civil society groups at the Hong Kong ministerial three were agricultural interest 
groups, and the remainder were think tanks or COSATU. The three associations were the  
South African Agricultural Processors Association (SAAPA),  Agri South Africa (ASA) and 
South African Sugar Association (SASA) (WTO 2009). De Villiers (Int: 2009) and Kruger 
(Int: 2009) identified the ATF as an example of well-functioning domestic consultation, 
which holds monthly meetings. The way in which the ATF engages with various stakeholders 
and the extent of participation by groups such as SALBA makes this a very good example of 
functioning consultation. Regular meetings are chaired by the DAFF and attended by SALBA 
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and a wide range of agricultural associations such as the Wheat, Maize, Meat and Sugar 
associations, as well as trade union representatives from the Food and Allied Workers Union 
(FAWU). There is regular feedback at these meetings about developments in SACU, SADC, 
WTO, and bilateral talks with China or India.   
 
A review of the agenda items at a meeting held in September 2009 reveals that the ATF 
provides a meaningful opportunity to discuss various aspects of South Africa’s trade policy 
and diplomacy, such as South Africa’s industrial policy with reference to agro-processing, 
South Africa’s agricultural trade strategy, trade a policy objectives with respect to Africa and 
further African integration; the WTO Doha Round, broad objectives and where the round is 
going and agricultural market access into China (ATF 2009). This is in marked contrast to 
interview responses on NEDLAC which identified that NEDLAC processes were frequently 
unhelpful and for which no minutes or agenda items are available for researcher review. 
Interviewees who have attended NEDLAC meetings confirm that minute taking in NEDLAC 
was particularly poorly done.  
 
As a result of the ongoing consultation process an industry association, SALBA, has been 
intimately involved in the negotiation of the South Africa- EU Wines and Spirits Agreement 
and participated as part of the negotiating team until this was no longer possible due to 
pressures from the EU delegation (Int: Kruger 2009).110 SALBA has a broad membership 
including manufacturers as well as distributors. Members include KWV, and all the big wine 
and spirit producers, as well as Distell a brand house which is a subsidiary of Diageo and 
other international brands such as Pernod Ricard. Within SALBA’s membership the wine 
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 It was never clearly indicated to SALBA why the EU insisted on their exclusion from the negotiating table, 
but Kruger says it was most likely because SALBA was associated as representative of direct commercial 
interests. What the EU delegation failed to grasp (or ignored) was that SALBA also represented the technical 
expertise in the South African delegation and that their exclusion resulted in a significant handicap to the 
South African delegation going forward. Conversely the EU were able to provide technical expertise 
unattached to any specific industry or commercial undertaking.  
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producers are the larger exporters in the association. A big business player such as SAB 
Miller tends to go it alone, but will join with SALBA on some initiatives such as the ARA 
joint initiative as SALBA and SAB are both major funders of the initiative (ARA 2010).111 
 
The SA-EU Wine and Spirit Agreement was adopted by the EU on January 21, 2002 
(although it remains to be ratified by South Africa’s Parliament) (European Parliament 2001).  
The agreement supplements the TDCA concluded in 1999. It covers various aspects of rules 
of geographical origin and provisions protecting non-geographical denominations especially 
those relating to designations for fortified wines, such as port and sherry. It was agreed that 
the implementation of the agreement would be phased in over a period of five years from 
notification of both parties that completion of the necessary procedures has taken place. At 
initial stages of the negotiation the industry was a full participant in the negotiations as part of 
the South African delegation, but the EU objected. South Africa was allowed one technical 
and one legal expert in the negotiating room. The agreement was finally concluded using 
shuttle diplomacy going back and forth between the negotiations and various industry experts 
to get the necessary technical input (Int: Kruger 2009). Prior to the negotiations the DTI and 
DAFF discussed initial positions and then sat with industry to get technical input.  In the end 
SA had four negotiators and Brussels had between 10 and 12 in the negotiation. 
 
There are enormous industry frustrations around the final outcome of the agreement. 
Australia, the US, Chile and Argentina have all finalised agreements with the EU subsequent 
to the one with South Africa, with more favourable terms (DTI 2005). Although the final 
agreement has yet to be ratified by the South African Parliament many businesses in the 
industry have already commenced implementing the changes to naming of their wines and 
spirits to conform to rules of origin, protection of geographic indications (GIs) and protection 
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 The ARA initiative is the Industry Association for Responsible Alcohol use in South Africa.  
167 
 
of manufacturing techniques agreed with the EU during the negotiations (Int: Kruger 2009). 
This puts South African businesses at a disadvantage if the agreement is not finally ratified as 
they will incur significant expense rebranding their product lines (possibly unnecessarily). 
The negotiations were around some highly technical issues such as the reverse osmosis 
process which South Africa is not allowed to use; but Australia negotiated their agreement 
allowing them to use these processes. 
 
Despite this example of functioning consultation and co-operation, it appears to be an isolated 
example as well as highly dependent on key relationships between business/ industry 
representatives and government departments. Kruger (Int: 2009) indicated that much of the 
cooperation and consultation between business and the DAFF at the ATF is dependent on the 
personal input and drive of particular people in the DAFF, which may not be as good if these 
key personalities were no longer there.  
 
The resurgence of the State and ANC dominance in NEDLAC 
 
Adam et al (1997: 148)contend that the ANC government soon acquired a greater confidence 
in their economic policy-making ability after the elections of 1994, so that they felt able to 
implement macro-economic policy without extensive consultation and thus the role of 
NEDLAC was diminished within 2 years of being established. This would imply that the 
influential role played by business, as discussed in Chapter Three, began to wane as the 
ANC-led government gained strength and the expertise lacking during the early stages of 
transition. The relationship between government and business appeared to become 
increasingly conflictual (Kornegay and Landsberg 1998).112  Nattrass (1999) posits that the 
decline in cordiality between business and government can be traced to the Truth and 
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 See in particular Handley (2008) for a discussion of the benefits to South Africa of ‘constructive 
contestation’ between business and government. 
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Reconciliation Commission business hearings where business failed to admit any culpability 
in the apartheid system and in fact claimed to be a victims of the system itself.  
 
Business disunity and the obstruction of racial disharmony 
 
In the view of many of the business interviewees, NEDLAC is just a talk-shop and is 
dominated by unions (Int: Alfeld 2009; Chance 2009; Draper 2009; Droski 2009; Tshiqi 
2009). From the interviews conducted it is clear that business feels that by virtue of the 
unions being part of the tripartite coalition that makes up the ruling ANC, they have 
preferential access to lobby government before the meetings so that by the time the issue is 
being discussed in NEDLAC, government and the unions speak as one voice and business is 
attacked from two sides and perceived as being recalcitrant or obstructive. This leads to 
business not attending because they no longer want to sit there and be told off constantly. 
Essentially, government is perceived by business as leaning towards the left with their 
alliance partners in the trade unions and because of the historical mistrust in the relationship 
between business and government, where business is tainted by the ‘white capital’ label, 
business cannot lobby to any great effect.  “These guys on the labour side (of the NEDLAC 
table) have (such) an overwhelming influence on government that, you know, you start off – 
in golf-terms – with a handicap, a very serious handicap before you even play. NEDLAC is a 
talk-shop and we’re not being listened to, so why go?” (Int: Tshiqi 2009). Loraine Lotter 
(Chemical and Allied Industries’ Association (CAIA) and Business Convenor for NEDLAC 
Trade and Industry Chamber) does not even regard NEDLAC as a consultation mechanism. 
Instead she typifies activity at NEDLAC as more of a negotiation process:  “There is no 
consultation process – government brings a decision to negotiate with whomever it is, India 
or MERCOSUR, and business has no input to the agenda setting process, which is a political 
decision” (Int: Lotter 2010).  
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Carim (DTI Chief Negotiator) disagrees that NEDLAC is simply a talk-shop. He maintains 
that there is genuine policy debate and dialogue where all FTAs and PTAs are negotiated and 
the details defined through intense and extensive consultative processes at NEDLAC  at a 
technical level looking at tariffs at a sectoral level (Int: Carim 2009). The level of negotiation 
extends not just to what South Africa wants to get out of an agreement but what concessions 
are likely to be required and what is the likely impact of such concessions. Sometimes that 
means that when negotiations commence agreement is not reached, as in the free trade 
negotiations with the US, where the two parties were simply too far apart to reach agreement.  
At other times agreements such as the MERCOSUR and EFTA agreements were thoroughly 
discussed in NEDLAC and were successfully concluded. Critics of NEDLAC contend that 
this may be so, but NEDLAC representatives have yet to see the substantive results of the 
agreement (and in some cases the agreements remain to be signed despite having been 
concluded some months ago).  
 
 Faizel Ismail (head of the South African delegation and permanent representative to the 
WTO) agrees with Carim that government have consulted extensively with business and 
other social partners through NEDLAC about the WTO and in particular the Doha 
Development Round, on issues to do with industrial tariffs among others (Int: Ismail 2008). 
There is, however, agreement among those interviewed that there is room for improvement 
and that government would benefit from more input from academics, research institutions 
and think tanks. The DTI also questions whether NEDLAC is in fact drawing in the right 
business representation, hinting that big business is largely excluded from NEDLAC’s 
consultation processes and if they participated there may be scope for helping to shape things 
(Int: Zalk 2009). Interviewees all pointed to a general lack of trade capacity across all 
constituencies.   
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The business perspective on consultation more broadly 
 
A fundamental problem for business in interacting with government, at any level, is the lack 
of trust (Int: Grant 2010; Spicer 2009; Parsons 2009; Rhomberg 2009; Tshiqi 2009). The 
breakdown in the relationship between business and government is evident in many of the 
interviews conducted – business is not seen to support government and government is 
regarded as bureaucratic and unresponsive by business. Input to trade diplomacy is best 
achieved by business acting in concert or collectively as this protects government from being 
seen to be favouring particular firm-level interests; hence the call for ‘business to speak with 
one voice’. This further explains why BUSA is increasingly being adopted as government’s 
interlocutor of choice.113 Both representatives of the DTI and DIRCO as well as business 
interviewees refer to the need for a greater focus on economic goals in South Africa’s foreign 
missions; they are perceived by business to be mainly politically. According to 
representatives of the large business associations BUSA and BLSA, business would like to 
see South African embassies playing a more facilitative role - introducing South African 
businesses operating in foreign markets to one another to learn from others’ experiences 
especially in places where the language barrier makes it difficult like Angola or Mozambique 
or the DRC and providing better market intelligence (Int: Grant 2010; Parsons 2009; Spicer 
2009).  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The consultative role of business is premised not in the institutional functions or structures of 
consultation but the agency of personalities and the relationships that have been established. 
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 BUSA as the government’s interlocutor of choice is reinforced by statements made during a recent 
parliamentary question and answer session in which President Zuma specifically refers to BUSA as the 
organiser of business representation at state visits where business accompany the President on formal visits 
including business leaders as members of the delegation (National Assembly 2010). “The delegations that go 
abroad... are determined by the DTI and BUSA. Other business people go on their own” (Zuma to the National 
Assembly 2010). 
171 
 
This chapter has argued that South African business is still mired in the historical mistrust by 
government of white capital interests.  Despite evidence of a highly engaged business sector 
during the political transition, business and government have become increasingly polarised. 
The research has found that consultation between government and business on trade 
diplomacy is patchy and sometimes dysfunctional. The reasons for this relate in part to the 
historical mistrust between business and government, but also to institutional failings within 
government. These failings can be understood first, with regard to inter-departmental 
competition and failure to co-ordinate across many departments. In the second instance the 
institutional failure extends to the official consultative mechanism of NEDLAC which is 
where discussion between government, business and labour ostensibly takes place on a range 
of social and economic issues, including trade under the auspices of the Trade and Industry 
Chamber.   
 
The chapter analysed the widely held view among business that the NEDLAC process is 
unhelpful and poorly managed. Business perceives government to be disinterested in their 
input and perspectives and closer to the views of labour. The net effect of this has been to 
find business withdrawing from the consultation process on trade diplomacy (especially big 
business such as the corporations represented by BLSA).114 Consequently, all business 
sectors (large corporations as well as SMMEs) seek to find alternative avenues for pursuing 
their positions. The findings of the research are supported by research conducted by 
Grobbelaar and Besada (2008: 101) into South African business in Africa, where they 
identify the need for a “much closer and continuing dialogue... between the South African 
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 For a listing of BLSA members see http://www.businessleadership.org.za/members.php accessed 17 April 
2012. BLSA members represent the top MNCs with interests in South Africa  including foreign investors in 
South Africa such as Vodacom, Xstrata, South African Breweries (SAB Miller), Total SA, Nedbank, TATA Africa 
Holdings, Sasol, Sappi and BHP Billiton. 
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Government and the South African private sector”.  Despite the relative failure of domestic 
consultation, business is not silent on these issues.  
 
 The chapter has explored both the constraints and opportunities for business acting in a 
consultative role in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy. Despite some very 
significant weaknesses and obstacles to a functional consultation and the constructive 
contestation that exists between business NSAs and government, the research did find an 
important consultative role for business. Whilst it is not possible to enumerate this 
consultative role purely in terms of diplomatic outcomes, there is significant evidence of 
ongoing interaction that forms part of the process of consultative diplomacy.115  The 
limitations of consultation, however, provide the impetus for business to seek additional 
mechanisms or modes of engagement in economic diplomacy. The next chapter focuses on 
the second mode of engagement for business NSAs: a supplementary role. The chapter 
discusses in greater detail the South-South focus of South Africa’s foreign policy agenda and 
the mirroring of this in South Africa’s trade agreements and negotiations.  In particular the 
chapter reveals the supplementary role of business in supporting and facilitating South 
Africa’s regional and bilateral goals as well as in other fora representing South Africa’s 
engagement with the South.  
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 See discussion in chapter one, section 1.1 defining economic diplomacy and the importance of recognising 
diplomacy as process and not reducing our understanding of diplomacy to simply identifying diplomatic 
outcomes.  
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CHAPTER SIX: MODES OF DIPLOMACY, THE SUPPLEMENTARY 
ROLE OF BUSINESS  
6.1  Introduction 
A supplementary role in MSD is evident when NSAs pursue domestic objectives 
simultaneously with their international ones, working in conjunction with government 
diplomats or officials (Hocking 2006). MSD is a useful lens for exploring contemporary 
diplomatic processes where representation is not formal or fixed but rather occurs as and 
when needed. It is in such circumstances that we find evidence of business NSAs engaging in 
what this research identifies as a supplementary role in diplomacy.  The preceding chapters 
analysed the extent of business engagement at a domestic level in economic diplomacy where 
the consultative role of business NSAs was identified. This chapter analyses the extent to and 
ways in which business engages along-side government actors in economic diplomacy, 
through bilateral state visits and through various other mechanisms such as IBSA, BRICS, 
the G20 and the WTO. There is evidence of South Africa’s significant economic expansion 
into Africa and increasing trade links with other large emerging developing economies such 
as Brazil, India and especially China. At the same time, as Chapter Four has demonstrated, 
South Africa’s foreign and trade policy is focused on forging links with other economies of 
the South, especially Africa (DTI 2010c).  
  
As Chapter Three has demonstrated South Africa’s significant trading partners have shifted 
from Europe and the US to China.  In tandem with South Africa’s broader South-South 
diplomatic agenda, business is engaging very directly in economic diplomacy initiatives 
along-side formal trade missions and processes but also as commercial diplomats in their own 
right. South Africa has invested considerable energy in engaging with other developing 
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countries while maintaining historically strong links with existing trading partners such as the 
EU and US. Much of this focus has been regional (through SADC and SACU) and along-side 
the rest of Africa. Balancing this dichotomous agenda of aligning with the South while 
pursuing economic interests with the North requires considerable skill, which balancing act is 
described by Taylor and Williams (2006) as unsustainable. This chapter focuses on South 
Africa’s bilateral relationships with the South and explores the notion of hegemony in Africa 
through the lens of economic dominance and private sector engagement in the region.   
 
Following on from the theme in the previous chapter this chapter examines how the 
government further balances its reliance on corporate interests in expanding trade and 
investment into Africa with the natural antipathy towards white capital and historical mistrust 
arising out of apartheid era domination. The chapter explores tensions created between 
business and government as business actors pursue a direct role in South-South economic 
diplomacy, both along-side and independently of government, bypassing formal trade 
diplomacy initiatives and establishing relevant diplomatic relationships in their own right.   
 
 6.2 South-South diplomacy – sites of diplomatic engagement 
South-South engagement is an important element of achieving development goals for the 
developing countries (G-77 2004). South Africa is placing increasing importance on South-
South economic relations and hence the trend to negotiate more PTAs with countries in the 
global South, without neglecting the importance of established trade partnerships with 
economies of the North (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2010; Ismail 2011). This policy 
priority is also reflected in the FTAs South Africa has embarked on negotiating in the post-
apartheid period, including those with strategic partners such as Brazil, India, Nigeria and 
China (Ismail et al 2001: 13). As far as South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy goes, 
Africa is its major priority (Alden and Soko 2005: 369).  The DTI’s  “butterfly strategy”, 
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where South Africa is the head and Africa the body of a butterfly, is intended to  open up 
trade for South Africa from Africa to “wings” of the Americas and East Asia (Vickers 2003: 
29).  As Lipton (2009: 335) explains: “South Africa regards African economic development 
as essential for its own prosperity and security.” Some argue that this commitment to the 
South is an ideological expression of solidarity with the South, at the expense of South 
Africa’s economic interests (Mills 2008).  
 
China became South Africa’s biggest import partner and largest export destination in 2009, 
coming from nowhere in just five years. The same trend has been evident with India; from 
very little trade six years ago, India is now South Africa’s 8th largest trading partner. In 
Africa, Angola is a very significant trade partner, chiefly because of oil.  It seems the shift in 
South Africa’s economic interests towards the South also mirrors broader foreign policy 
objectives. It is not possible, however, to draw conclusions that foreign policy objectives are 
driving economic trends or vice versa. In fact, Ismail contends that South Africa’s foreign 
policy objectives are primarily driven by values and integrity derived from its anti-apartheid 
struggle (Ismail 2011). He contends that these underlying values are premised on principles 
outlined by Nelson Mandela, such as human rights, justice, respect for international law, 
peace, the interests of Africa and international cooperation on economic development 
(Mandela 1993). The confidence of the government in the processes of South-South 
engagement is borne out by South Africa’s recent membership of the so-called BRIC axis, 
bringing South Africa into the fold of the largest global emerging economies (Jopson 2010). 
Again, this represents a significant boost to South Africa’s international credentials and not 
necessarily indicative of economic clout. Such diplomatic manoeuvring is useful to China as 
well as South Africa, providing potentially useful alliance power to South Africa that 
economic or market power alone cannot support. South Africa’s growing economic role in 
the region is driven by the corporate sector, with one media commentator reflecting that 
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South Africa is the “corporate captain of Africa” by virtue of the fact that it has more pan-
African companies than any other African country (Financial Times 2010, February 1). It is 
this economic dominance in Africa that makes South Africa an attractive partner to the 
BRICS. DIRCO argues that South Africa’s inclusion in the BRICS is as a result of its 
commitment to multilateralism and making the global political economy more fair and just 
(DIRCO 2010d).  
 
Zuma’s comments in June 2010, at a Business Interactive Session in India, where South 
Africa is seeking to negotiate a preferential trade agreement with India, reinforce this 
strategic vision. He was speaking during a State visit, accompanied by a large business 
delegation aiming to build stronger trade links with India, when he suggested that a 
partnership between India and South Africa would contribute to developing countries of the 
global South being able to change the existing global order: “It will contribute to our shared 
vision of a new world order, in which countries of the South are able to assume their rightful 
place among the family of nations” (Polity 2010, June 4). He referred to a shared ideological 
vision and colonial history that binds the two nations, but reiterated that the most important 
element was the economic relationship: “for it is in the economic sphere that this relationship 
is going to be most keenly felt”.  
 
Tom Cargill (2010) cautions that there is a potential shift in the global balance of power from 
West to East, as Africa (with 40 % of the global raw material supply chain and a large 
population of 1 billion potential consumers) is being courted by China and other developing 
countries such as Turkey, South Korea and Brazil. He highlights that the influence of the G8 
has diminished because of an over emphasis on aid and the relative neglect of developing 
business and private sector linkages.  By contrast, G20 emerging economies have fostered 
entrepreneurialism and fostered business opportunities with African countries.  Others are 
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also beginning to respond to the strategic threat posed in Africa to the traditional dominance 
of Europe by developing economies such as China, which has become Africa’s biggest 
trading partner and a major source of investment. The traditional Africa-France summit held 
in 2010 included business representatives for the first time, with some 230 African and 
French companies attending this usually political event.  
 
This does not detract from the importance of industrial countries, they are still significant 
players, but in terms of economic growth and opportunities the centre has shifted. This in turn 
leads to questioning the powerful players in IFIs such as the World Bank (WB), WTO and 
IMF. If the major economic growth in the world is happening in Brazil, India or China should 
not these countries have a greater say in the decision-making of global institutions? These 
countries, like South Africa, are beginning to form common interests around issues such as 
agricultural reform in the WTO and ensuring that rules are not shaped by the interests of only 
the developed countries. This is evidenced by the burgeoning number of coalitions of 
developing countries in the WTO such as the Africa Group, NAMA 11, the Like Minded 
Group (LMG) (Narlikar 2003).116 Even though developing countries will have different 
emphasis, such as industrial products for China, agriculture for Brazil and services for India, 
they still share a common goal in having a more equitable power distribution in the 
multilateral fora. In his book on Reforming the WTO, Ismail (2009: 3) (Ambassador 
Permanent Representative to the WTO, South Africa Permanent Mission) asserts that “the 
G20 and NAMA 11 have begun to articulate and defend the interests of other developing 
country groups, even where this would require them to adjust their own narrow self-interest 
and transcend their narrower welfare interests. This process has laid the basis for the building 
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 The LMG was a coalition of developing countries opposed to the launch on the Doha Round and dissolved 
after the Round was launched, to be replaced by other issue-based coalitions such as TRIPS and public health 
and NAMA (Narlikar 2003).  The NAMA 11 is a coalition of countries established to oppose the rules being 
proposed on non-agricultural market access (NAMA). The NAMA 11 comprise Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Namibia, Philippines, South Africa, Venezuela and Tunisia (TWN 2006). 
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of common platforms and a united front against attempts by their major trading partners to 
foist unfair deals on them”. He goes further to claim that “the current impasse in the WTO is 
a reflection of the strength of developing countries, not their indifference. Today, developing 
countries are a force to be reckoned with. They can negotiate, are technically competent, and 
they are organized”(Ismail 2007: 139). South Africa’s South-South agenda is thus evident 
across a range of diplomatic sites even within the WTO. 
This section now turns to the various locations and sites of diplomatic engagement beyond 
trade agreements where South African business is engaging in a supplementary role.  
 
NEPAD Business Foundation 
 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was born out of earlier initiatives to 
revive Africa’s fortunes through the establishment of a kind of ‘Marshall Plan for Africa’ 
raised in discussions with the G7/8 countries under the auspices of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) (Taylor and Nel 2002; Herbst and Mills 2003). 117 NEPAD was 
intended to encourage aid and trade from developed countries in exchange for enhanced 
governance from among African countries, through instruments such as the Peer Review 
Mechanisms (Mayaki 2011, November 2). It was situated within the African Union (AU) 
which was a key project for South Africa to implement good governance, security and human 
rights standards across Africa (Alden and Soko 2005: 384).  Such endeavours are the 
embodiment of South Africa’s ideological commitment to pan-Africanism and an agenda to 
attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Africa by showing compliance with global best 
practice in governance both political and economic (Nnadozie et al 2008: 170). The faith that 
other African countries have shown in South Africa’s ability to represent the region more 
broadly (while admittedly contested in some countries) is largely based on the extension of 
South African economic interests across Africa (Brummerhoff 1998: 38). This extends 
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 The OAU was later replaced by the AU in July 2002 (AU 2010). 
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through a wide variety of sectors, not confined to mineral extraction (as most other foreign 
investment into Africa tends to be) and attributable to the expanding South African media 
presence through M-Net and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (van der 
Westhuizen 2001: 67). The South African government under Mbeki openly courted the active 
involvement of business as crucial to the success of NEPAD and this was demonstrated by 
the fact that most of South Africa’s top companies were signatories to NEPAD and signalled 
their support at the 2002 WEF Africa Summit in Durban (Dlamini 2004: 173). Large 
corporations such as Sasol, SABMiller, Anglo American, Absa, DeBeers, Eskom and Sanlam 
are all members of the NEPAD Business Foundation (NBF). According to Shaw and van der 
Westhuizen (1999) large-scale infrastructural projects under NEPAD are connected to the 
economic expansion of South Africa into the rest of Africa as corporate actors seek market 
expansion opportunities beyond South Africa and previously state-owned monopolies were 
privatized and needed to grow. NEPAD also has international reach and includes 
constituencies outside of South Africa such as the African Business Roundtable, The 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), The Commonwealth Business Council, The 
Corporate Council on Africa (US), The Canadian Council on Africa, and the International 
Business Leaders Forum (UK) (NBF 2010).  
 
The NBF does not compete with BUSA for policy space as the NBF focuses exclusively on 
Africa, working primarily around private sector participation in NEPAD’s infrastructure 
projects. The NBF is structured around 16 strong sector groups; whereas BUSA is organised 
in terms of thematic interests.  As far as economic diplomacy is concerned both BUSA and 
NBF interact with members of the Diplomatic Corps. NBF organise an annual ambassadorial 
dinner providing business members with the opportunity to interact directly and at a high-
level with members of the diplomatic corps based in South Africa. “This is an opportunity to 
meet with Ministers and senior Embassy staff, including Ambassadors from other countries” 
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(Int: Tshiqi, 2009). This range of activity is evidence of business-government diplomacy, 
described by Susan Strange (1997) and also an example of MSD in action where 
communication is not only state-led but more inclusive and transparent (Wiseman 2004).  
 
The clusters of the NBF are project focused and provide access to institutions such as the 
ADB and the WB. These initiatives enable smaller South African firms to link into big 
infrastructure projects being financed by the big development banks such as the building of a 
power station in Ethiopia. In this sense the NBF provides a facilitative function in diplomacy. 
The economic diplomacy that takes place both through the NBF as well as through joint 
initiatives with the WB (diplomacy into multilateral financial institutions) affords a vital 
opportunity for businesses in countries like South Africa (NEPAD 2009).  Business 
engagement in NEPAD through information sharing, promoting trade and investment and 
private sector involvement in sustainable development projects, demonstrates a significant 
breadth and depth of engagement in economic diplomacy.  
 
IBSA Dialogue  
 
The informal interaction between India, Brazil and South Africa was formalised in 1993, with 
the establishment of the IBSA dialogue, through the Brasilia Declaration,  which aims to 
create a FTA between the 3 countries in order to increase trade and investment flows between 
the parties (Botha 2004: 298). Since 2003, there have been five IBSA Summits, the latest 
summit being hosted in South Africa in October 2011 (Campbell 2011, October 18). Trade 
between the IBSA parties has risen from US$7 billion in 2005 to US$16.1 billion in 2010. 
The partners are aiming for US$25 billion by 2015 (IBSA 2010). In addition, foreign 
ministers meet annually under the auspices of the Joint Commissions of the Forum, most 
recently held in New Delhi on the 7th and 8th of March 2011 (IBSA 2011). IBSA is a 
plurilateral forum that has emerged in response to multiple crises in the global economy and 
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as an expression of the increasing influence of the large emerging developing economies of 
the South (Chenoy 2010). 
 
The strategic relevance of IBSA to South Africa extends beyond the idealism of South-South 
collectivism. India is South Africa’s 6th largest export destination in 2010 (by projections) 
and was the 6th largest in 2010, with a value of R22.6 billion – more than double the figure 
for 2007 and accounts for 4% of South Africa’s total exports (DTI 2011a). Brazil (as part of 
MERCOSUR) remains an untapped market as South Africa’s 25th biggest export partner with 
0.9% of exports at a value of R2.9 Billion (lower than in 2008 and 2007). South Africa 
imports 3.7% of its total imports from India, which is the country’s 8th biggest source of 
imports at R20.7 billion (DTI 2011a). Brazil is South Africa’s 16th biggest source of imports 
at R10.59  billion, both countries significantly less than in previous years (DTI 2010a). There 
is significant scope for improving trade opportunities in both countries for South Africa. 
 
The major focus for South African corporations in Brazil is through mining interests, and 
financial services have been a major driver of economic relations with both India and Brazil 
(Soko 2006: 11). India is attractive to many South African corporations seeking to expand 
further into the region’s markets such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. 
India has a shared colonial history with South Africa which makes company law more 
familiar (Int: Chance 2009). A number of South African firms have established operations in 
India, such as Shoprite Checkers, Anglo American, De Beers, Old Mutual, Sanlam, SAB 
Miller (Old Mutual 2009; The Times of India 2010, August 17; Bloomberg BusinessWeek 
2011; Shoprite 2011a; Anglo American 2011c). South African companies with investments in 
Brazil include, SAPPI, Standard Bank, AngloGold and Safmarine (Soko 2006; AngloGold 
Ashanti 2010; Safmarine 2011; Standard Bank 2011, June 8; SAPPI 2011a). There are still a 
number of unexploited opportunities in both India and Brazil, especially around the export of 
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capital equipment (particularly in the mining and agricultural sectors). The IBSA trio is also 
represented at several other influential fora in the world, including the G20, the BRICS, the 
WTO and the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) of the climate change 
negotiations. 
 
Business NSAs interviewed agreed that there needed to be better inclusion of business in 
negotiations around IBSA. This was being addressed through the IBSA Business Council, 
which comprises five member organisations of the IBSA Business Council – Associated 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham),  BUSA, Confederation of Indian 
Industries (CII), National Confederation of Industry of Brazil (CNI) and Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) (Nath 2006). 
 
BRICS 
 
South Africa became a member of the BRICS group in December 2010 (DIRCO 2010d). Not 
all commentators regard this to be appropriate, not least the originator of the BRIC acronym, 
Jim O’Neill (chief economist of Goldman Sachs) (O'Neill 2001). In his recent article on 
BRICS O’Neill (2010, August 27) points out that South Africa was not included in his 
predicted ‘Next 11’ emerging economies (Egypt and Nigeria were) on the basis that, with a 
population of just under 50 million, South Africa was too small. Middle power theories 
would argue that this approach is too econometric, and that South Africa has played an 
influential role in global governance processes (such as participation in the BASIC group 
during the climate change negotiations) including the Doha Round of the WTO and as a 
powerful country in Africa deserve a ‘seat at the table’  (Schoeman 2003; Lee 2006).118 Of 
course, O’Neill did not identify these countries as an organisation or institution, the BRIC 
acronym symbolised economies that he predicted would exceed the GDP growth of the G7 by 
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 South Africa, in coalition with China, Brazil and India formed the BASIC negotiating group during the 
Copenhagen COP 16 UNFCC Summit, on climate change (The Climate Group 2010, January 26). 
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2050. The BRICS, however, had different ideas and coalesced to form a political coalition 
that is likely to challenge the ‘old’ economic powers of the OECD during the coming 
decades. This is most evident in the recent courting of China and other large emerging 
economies during the G20 summit on the global economic crisis by Eurozone politicians 
seeking a commitment for a bailout to relieve financial pressures on them (Williams 2011, 
November 4).  
 
The first official summit took place in June 2009 in Yekaterinburg between Russia, India, 
Brazil and China, with the stated objective of reforming global financial governance and 
promoting the role of developing countries in global affairs (Bryanski 2009, 26 June).  When 
South Africa joined in 2010, the BRIC became BRICS, and President Jacob Zuma 
represented the new member at the first BRICS summit in April 2011 in Sanya, China 
(News.xinhuanet.com 2010, April 14). 
 
Qobo (2010, April 17) argues that joining the BRICS is contrary to South Africa’s stated 
commitment to values such as human rights and multilateralism because the BRICS is not 
founded on idealistic values but rather mercantilist interests in the pursuit of commercial 
advantage.   In this perspective, the tensions South Africa faces between solidarity with 
Africa and idealistic values and its global aspirations are evident. According to critic O’Neill 
the members of the BRICS "don’t have the same interests. The wealth per head is very 
different, the politics is very different, and the philosophy and their natural economic edge is 
different” (Bloomberg 2011, April 13). Some fear that South Africa’s invitation to join the 
BRICS was part of China’s strategy to access African mineral wealth and use South Africa as 
a diplomatic asset in doing so (Grynberg 2011, October 24). BRICS membership may hold 
dangers for South Africa, but there is certainly opportunity too in persuading China of to 
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allow easier market access not just for commodities but also for manufactured and 
beneficiated goods.  
 
Given that South Africa has only just joined the BRICS there is little to say about business 
participation in this forum. Like many, business is waiting to see how South Africa manages 
its role in BRICS and where potential advantages may arise (Bisseker 2010, November 18). 
China’s official visits to South Africa do yield fruit for business, such as then vice-President, 
Hu Xintao’s visit in 1999 which contributed to commercial relations between China and 
Sasol, which continue despite recent set-backs in their Coal-to-Liquids project (Bloomberg 
2011, September 12). 
 
World Trade Organisation 
 
South Africa was a founding member of the GATT in 1947 and a signatory of the Uruguay 
Round (UR) of multilateral trade negotiations that launched the WTO with the signing of the 
Marrakesh Agreement in 1995, replacing the GATT (WTO 2011c). The establishment of the 
WTO was based on a set of compromises and trade-offs in a grand-bargain (Ostry 2000). The 
WTO also saw the inclusion of a far wider agenda of issues beyond the horse-trading of 
tariffs and subsidies, such as investment, intellectual property rights and services (Narlikar 
2005b: 23). The objective of the WTO is to promote free and fair trade and to level the 
playing field for developing country participants. Critics of the WTO argue that asymmetry in 
the multilateral bargaining system mean that the organisation has a long way to go in 
achieving its lofty ideals (Jawara and Kwa 2003). Earlier discussions in this thesis have 
referred to South Africa’s post-apartheid engagement in global governance and 
multilateralism as part of its re-engagement with international society and the importance for 
South Africa’s aspirations of involvement in the WTO. Ismail (2007; 2011) has documented 
South Africa’s position in the WTO over several years as Ambassador Permanent 
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Representative to the WTO for South Africa. He has consistently presented South Africa’s 
credentials as committed to the values and goals of promoting a fairer and more just global 
governance system and representing the interests and needs of developing countries.  
 
During the Doha Round South Africa has maintained strong positions on a number of key 
issues. First, South Africa was a key supporter of the launching of the Doha Round as a 
development round, despite criticism from the Africa Group and the LMG that it was being 
co-opted to the neo-liberal consensus (Erwin 1999). Second, is the important role played by 
South Africa and other developing countries, supported by global health NGOs, in the trade-
related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and public health declaration (WTO 2003). The 
campaign managed to get cheaper access for members to Aids drugs that were subject to 
expensive patents (Odell and Sell 2006). Third, South Africa was influential in the formation 
of the G20 in response to the joint text on agriculture tabled by the US and the EU in August 
2003 and which would reduce the ambitions of the round on agriculture. Together with 
Brazil, China, India and Argentina, South Africa and others formed a coalition seeking better 
terms in agricultural trade within the global system (Clapp 2006). Despite the comprehensive 
proposals put forward by the G20 on agricultural reform a revised text by the Chair of the 
group called the Derbez text did not address the G20’s points of concern (Narlikar 2005b). 
An impasse has been reached in the Doha Round between Japan, The US and the EU on one 
side and developing countries on the other about trade distorting subsidies for agricultural 
products and an unwillingness to reduce tariffs on agricultural exports (ODI 2008). The G20 
coalition continues to press its position and has extended engagement beyond the WTO (see 
the G20 and the global economic crisis referred to earlier) (Narlikar and Tussie 2004a). 
Fourth, as the chair of the Committee on Trade and Development Special Session (CTDSS) 
Faizel Ismail, representing South Africa, made a significant contribution to the Doha Round 
in addressing concerns of small and vulnerable economies (SVEs). The CTDSS facilitated 
186 
 
the negotiation and drafting of a text on SVEs calling for members classed as such to be 
granted additional flexibilities (ICTSD 2009). In addition the CTDSS managed to secure a 
link in the Hong Kong Ministerial declaration between ambitions on NAMA and agriculture 
(WTO 2005b: para 24). Finally, perhaps the most significant contribution of the South 
African contribution to the Doha Round has been its role in promoting the interests of the 
NAMA 11. South Africa as the coordinator of the group has actively promoted the NAMA 11 
position in the WTO and also performs a facilitation role between the NAMA 11 group and 
other developing country coalitions (Vickers 2009).  All the IBSA countries are also 
participants in the NAMA 11 group, supporting flexibilities for developing countries and a 
better balance between NAMA and other issues under negotiation. It is also on the issue of 
NAMA that South Africa has achieved its greatest social cohesion within its NEDLAC 
processes as previously discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
The role of business broadly in the Doha Round is difficult to assess, due to the nature of the 
WTO ministerials process. The WTO is essentially a state-led process and business 
involvement is more easily evidenced as part of the delegations or through specific interest 
groups advising and lobbying their respective governments on issues of particular concern 
(Narlikar 2005b: 40). The section later on in this chapter headed business NSAs and the 
WTO explores the extent of South African business engagement in WTO ministerials.  
  
6.3 Africa – fearing the South African (economic) hegemon? 
In tandem with the renewed focus on South-South relations, South Africa sees its foreign and 
economic policy as inextricably bound up with the fortunes of Africa (Dlamini-Zuma 2001).  
This commitment to the continent is further reinforced by the policy decision in 2003 to 
further relax exchange controls for South African firms investing into Africa from US$79 
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million to US$ 331 million per project compared with US$ 165 million per project outside of 
Africa (Games 2003: 14-15). Thabo Mbeki is often associated with promoting the notion of 
the Africanism and his call for an “African Renaissance” (Gevisser 2009: 136). The African 
Renaissance is “anchored in a chain of economies which, with time, might become the 
African equivalent of the Asian Tigers... (where) South African capital is destined to play a 
special role through the development of trade, strategic partnerships and the like” (Vale and 
Maseko 1998: 279).   Although the term African Renaissance found expression chiefly in 
association with Thabo Mbeki, his successor Jacob Zuma appears to have adopted the spirit 
of what South Africa was trying to achieve in relation to Africa having conducted more visits 
to African countries in his first year as President than the Mbeki administration in its first 
year, with fewer visits to European ones (Breuton 2010).  
 
There is significant debate on the issue of whether South Africa does indeed constitute a 
regional hegemon in Africa, and this fear is especially acute with regard to the economic 
expansion of South African firms into Africa and particularly into Southern Africa  (Cling 
2001; Daniel et al 2003; Alden and Soko 2005: 368). The extent of South Africa’s hegemonic 
ambitions or expression can be explored through the loci of the institutionalised relationship 
of South Africa through regional cooperation in SACU and SADC on the one hand and the 
‘privatised’ relationships of South Africa on the other,  through its multinationals and 
parastatals, which are supported by the government. The expansion of business and economic 
interest into Africa is a significant element of South Africa’s post-apartheid political 
economy (Kganyago 2008: 148). South Africa is both an important foreign investor into 
Africa as well as a significant trading partner in the post-apartheid era (Games 2004). In more 
recent times, the focus on South Africa’s perceived hegemonic ambitions has been diffused 
as a result of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) as well as the increasing 
interest in Africa from India and Brazil (Lapper 2010, February 8).  
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South Africa’s regional dominance 
 
As the largest economy in Southern Africa by far, South Africa is also the largest foreign 
investor in Southern Africa and maintains a significant trade surplus with the rest of the 
Southern African states (Alden and Soko 2005: 374 & 381). Exports into Africa from South 
Africa have grown from $1.3 billion in 1994 to $7.6billion in 2006 and $10.9billion in 2009 
(DTI 2009).  South Africa’s economy is also far more diversified that its regional 
counterparts, where Angola is heavily dependent on oil exports. In terms of OFDI South 
Africa has a strong focus on the services sector, mainly telecommunications, finance, 
electricity, trade and transport and storage (UNCTAD 2008: 13). As a result, South African 
OFDI and trade expansion do have a significant  impact on neighbouring countries and others 
in the region (Arora and Vamvakidis 2005). When analysing company specific statistics there 
is some disagreement over the nationality of certain companies with historical roots in South 
Africa but which have changed their listing to an exchange abroad, thus confusing further 
whether investments from such companies are truly South African in origin (Goldstein and 
Pritchard 2008: 125).  
 
UNCTAD World Investment Report (2009: 132) adopts the view that companies such as 
SABMiller, which moved their headquarters to the UK in 1999, cannot be considered a 
developing country MNC as a result of this. Had they remained based in South Africa, they 
would have been the largest developing country food and beverages processor. This research 
is taking a broader interpretation of what constitutes a South African MNC, contending that 
any company with its historical beginnings in South Africa should be regarded as a South 
African company. Otherwise, if the narrow perspective were to be applied, it would be 
difficult to determine the nationality of many American or European corporations (Nolke and 
Taylor 2010). Chapter Seven provides a more in-depth analysis on South Africa’s MNCs. 
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However, data provided by the SARB (2008) shows that FDI from South Africa into Africa 
increased from $1.2billion in 1996 to $8.5 billion in 2008.  Several very large investments 
were made during this period. For example an investment worth $2.2 billion in the Mozal 
aluminium smelter (European Investment Bank 2001), the Sasol pipeline worth $1.2 billion 
in Mozambique (Madobombe 2007) and the merger of AngloGold with Ghana’s Ashanti 
Goldfields worth $1.4 billion (AngloGold Ashanti 2009). This level of investment is not 
particularly common and it is the smaller investments of other sectors, rather than the large 
extractive and energy sectors, such as retail (Shoprite Checkers), financial services (Standard 
Bank and Hollard), agro-business (sugar production), railways, utilities, breweries 
(SABMiller) and telecommunications (Vodacom and MTN) that are more typical of the 
investment pattern into Africa (McGregor's 2004; Rumney 2006). Most of South Africa’s 
OFDI is directed outside the southern African region; only around 10 percent of this went 
into Southern Africa between 1997 and 2007 (Draper et al 2010: 6). UNCTAD (2009: 67) 
reported that South Africa’s intra-Africa OFDI was shifting away from Southern to West 
Africa, reflecting growing corporate interest in opportunities in Nigeria. United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) found in a report published in 2003 that 40 % 
of foreign investors in Africa invested under $1 million per project (UNIDO 2003: xii). 
Despite the fact that only 10 percent of South Africa’s total OFDI is going to Africa, given 
the under-development of the private sector on the continent this translates into significant 
influence (UNCTAD 2004: 22-23).  
 
Of the top 100 companies in South Africa 92 have a footprint in the rest of the continent (Top 
500 2010). The nature of South African corporate investment into Africa is a mixed strategy 
of green field investments and mergers and acquisitions often associated with privatisation; 
parastatals most frequently invest via concessions with a time limit attached of around 15 
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years (Bloomberg 2008, December 4).  A common strategy is to seek local partnerships as a 
risk mitigation mechanism, to access tricky licensing procedures or to capitalise on important 
relationships with government officials in order to get knowledge about particular operating 
environments. In some instances companies are required to take on government partners, 
especially countries with patrimonial capitalist leanings, such as Ghana or Zambia (Handley 
2008: 137-241).  A number of companies are particularly active across the whole continent 
and not simply in the SADC ambit: ABSA Bank, AngloGold Ashanti, Barlow World, Sasol, 
Vodacom, MTN, Tongaat Hulett, Shoprite Checkers, Unitrans, Standard Bank, Game Stores, 
Southern Sun, Illovo Sugar, Debonnairs, Dimension Data, Nandos, BHP Billiton, Engen and 
SABMiller (Grobbelaar and Besada 2008: 19).  
 
South Africa is by far the most active in its immediate neighbourhood within the SADC 
members but is beginning to extend to previous virgin territory such as North African 
countries in Nigeria, Mali, Senegal and Egypt  (South Africa Foundation 2004). As much as 
70% of South Africa’s FDI into Africa remains in the SADC member states (Goldstein and 
Pritchard 2008: 127). This has much to do with language barriers and familiarity (from a 
shared colonial history) and in countries further North, South African investment tends to 
mirror traditional foreign investment through extractive industries and trade, with the notable 
exception of telecommunications (through ventures such as MTN in Nigeria and Ghana) and 
energy supply (Daniel and Lutchman 2006).  
 
Significantly, South Africa’s economic expansion is largely driven by the private sector, 
despite initiatives by South African parastatals such as Eskom, Transnet and South African 
Airways, which investments remain substantially less than that of the private sector. 
Grobbelaar and Besada (2008: 20) note that “South African corporates ...do not benefit from 
risk cover or other support, direct or indirect, from the South African government”, a finding 
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supported by the responses in interviews conducted for this research. Interviewees with 
external operations in Africa confirmed that firms have substantial interaction with the 
governments of recipient countries who play a crucial role in establishing an environment 
conducive to business (Int: Alfeld 2009; Bone 2008; Chance 2009; January-Bardil 2009; 
Nikolaou 2009). 
 
Private sector re-engagement  
 
The re-engagement of South Africa in the global economy after the landmark democratic 
elections in 1994 marked the beginning of a new era following decades of isolation and 
which coincided with the end of the Cold War and the triumph of the imperatives of 
neoliberalism (Dlamini 2004: 170). The political economy of South Africa at the time of 
transition meant that South African firms began to face increasing domestic competition 
which resulted in their seeking opportunities outside the country (Muradzikwa 2001: 9). The 
isolation of the apartheid era had also resulted in a number of large corporations becoming 
cash rich with few new opportunities for investment and the consolidations that occurred 
immediately after transition led to further capital gains through the sales of non-core assets 
and operational rationalisation creating further reserves seeking investment opportunities 
(Goldstein and Pritchard 2008: 133).  
 
Slow domestic growth, coupled with investment funds and incentives to expand abroad, all 
resulted in an outward focus for South African capital. The familiarity of the African context, 
as well as the relative strength of the Rand in African economies compared with OECD 
markets made Africa a more attractive destination for outward FDI from South Africa.  South 
African firms were able to capitalise on their strengths of available capital, technical expertise 
and skilled managers to take advantage of opportunities wrought by the gradual opening of 
African economies (Daniel et al 2003: 368). South Africa’s dominance was further reinforced 
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by numerous other multinational corporations such as Rio Tinto and the Tata Group (from 
India), using the country as a launch-pad for initiatives into the rest of Africa, exploiting 
South Africa’s relative infrastructural strength and knowledge of Africa to support these 
initiatives. According to Dhawan, Tata Group Africa’s CEO, “it was clear even in 1994 that 
South Africa would be the engine that would drive the rest of Africa, and indeed be the 
benchmark for the rest of Africa” (Quoted in Russell 2010, June 6: 22). The launch of 
NEPAD (which was championed by South Africa) has been a further driver in consolidating 
South Africa’s economic expansion into Africa, as the initiative by African countries to 
eliminate corruption and poor governance in exchange for trade, aid and investment (NEPAD 
2011).  
 
There have been other drivers of South African expansion that apply more generally to firms’ 
anywhere engaging in FDI and these too were found to apply to South African firms 
investing into Africa (BusinessMap 2003: 12).  These are: market driven motives, such as 
penetrating a new market (e.g. Shoprite Checkers or Vodacom and MTN); resource-seeking 
FDI, such as mining mineral deposits or accessing gas supplies (e.g. Sasol’s development of 
gas fields in Mozambique); efficiency-seeking FDI where resources or labour inputs offer 
cost or productivity benefits (e.g. Mozal’s establishment in an industrial free zone with 
various export processing incentives on offer); strategic asset-seeking investment where a 
company seeks to consolidate its global position through broader expansion (such as 
SABMiller and BHP Billiton or Tongaat-Hulett’s investment in two sugar mills in 
Mozambique to take advantage of preferential access to the EU market for Least Developed 
Country sugar-producers) (Grobbelaar and Besada 2008: 24-25). 
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6.4 Analysing the supplementary role of business NSAs  
South African firms have been welcomed by many African leaders as saviours of the 
continent’s economic future (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan 2001: 74).  There has, on the 
other hand, been equal ambivalence and downright animosity towards South Africa corporate 
expansion into Africa (Wamae 2002, February 17: 335; Obadimu 2003, September 13; 
Lipton 2009). Nigeria and South Africa have courted and fallen out with one another several 
times in the period following Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 (Landsberg 2004: 176). 
Acrimonious business dealings have not enhanced the relationship, with a deal facilitated by 
Mbeki and Obasanjo for SAA to acquire a stake in Nigeria’s national airline going sour when 
the offer was not reciprocated for Nigeria to purchase a 10% share in SAA (the South African 
national airline) should the airline be privatised (Alden and Soko 2005). In the 
telecommunications sector a licence granted to a consortium headed by Eskom was cancelled 
due to unresolved differences and Vodacom withdrew from Nigeria after accusing the 
country of inadequate corporate governance standards (Games 2004: 61). Both countries 
accuse the other of not allowing reciprocal market access to one another. South African 
companies are still viewed with suspicion by African government elites particularly in the 
arena of privatisation of parastatals and this limits the extent of South Africa’s economic 
hegemony in the continent (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan 2001).  Concerns about South 
Africa’s dominance in the region are exacerbated by the uneven outcomes resulting from 
regional integration within SADC. For example, bilateral trade with Tanzania in the past 20 
years has exploded from a virtually zero base in the mid-1990s to US$ 10.85m in trade flows 
and US$500m in investments (accounting for 35% of South Africa’s FDI into Africa) in 2010 
(DTI 2011a) . Such is the extent of this investment that Tanzanian’s refer to the “South 
Africanisation of the Tanzanian economy” (Alden and Soko 2005: 29). Criticism is also 
levelled at South African business in the retail sector especially within SADC (for example 
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Ghana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania and Namibia) due to the lack of local product 
sourcing as well as the perceived anti-competitiveness of many South African retailers in the 
region (SADC 1996; Farfan 2011). 
 
The relationship between South African business and foreign governments is a key element 
of corporate expansion in the region. Without exception, business representatives interviewed 
indicated they all found access to foreign governments and high ranking officials relatively 
easy in recipient markets. They are even welcomed into institutional relationships such as 
becoming members of Botswana’s Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower, the 
primary forum facilitating interaction between business and government in that country, 
giving access as well as a voice to South African business (BOCCIM 2011). Even in Mali, 
where business has found it more difficult in practice, South African firms such as 
AngloGold Ashanti and Eskom have been invited to sit on the Presidential Investors’ 
Advisory Council alongside other local and foreign economic actors including representatives 
of the World Bank and IMF (US Department of State 2010, May 12).  This body too 
facilitates dialogue between business and government at a high level, with interim working 
groups at a public-private level around stimulating foreign investment, allowing access to 
ministers and heads of departments not afforded to smaller players. Managing these 
relationships requires a lot of time and money, and South African firms invest in building 
relationships through partnerships with local firms as well as by appointing former 
government members to boards, again something easier for big business but a greater 
obstacle for SMMEs venturing farther afield.  There is also a role for business in educating 
governments on how to create a business-friendly environment (Grobbelaar and Besada 
2008: 92-93).  
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Apart from the animosity of certain countries to corporate South African expansion described 
above, there are also formidable regulatory, governance, logistical, infrastructural and 
cultural challenges facing South African investors. With regard to the economic diplomacy 
conducted by South African firms in this context, the biggest threat to success is corruption 
and bureaucratic red-tape (Int: Alfeld 2009 and January-Bardill 2009). Most South African 
companies operating abroad have an anti-corruption policy, but not paying bribes can result 
in catastrophic consequences for an investor, such as loss of licences and contracts (Games 
2004: 73). This is more of a threat to the smaller companies, since big investments generally 
involve government partnerships. For example, in Mozambique, Sasol was able to use its 
clout to obviate bureaucratic delays in customs by obtaining the support of the government 
for creating its own customs terminal (Int: Alfeld 2009).  Grobbelaar (2004: 39) reports that 
in Mozambique it was evident that “investments...politically sanctioned by both governments 
(South Africa and Mozambique) receive greater action and support”. Another difficulty is 
import duties and restrictions in host countries, where South African firms often source their 
inputs from South Africa and face high duties, thus increasing the cost of doing business in 
these locations. Furthermore, complicated tax regimes and unreliable legal systems with 
uncertain property rights all increase the risk and cost of FDI into Africa (Draper et al 2010). 
 
At a political level, South Africa’s hegemony is constrained by African leaders who fear 
being overshadowed by South Africa and a tendency to associate liberal governance precepts 
(such as those espoused by Mbeki) with the West and thus un-African or somehow 
“imperialist” (Schoeman 2003: 364; Gumede 2007: 224; Lipton 2009: 333). This anti-
imperialist  rhetoric has been most skilfully employed by Mugabe, as is apparent from the 
warmth of his reception at African gatherings such as the World Council on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in 2002, or the AU meeting in Maputo in 2004 (Ngubentombi 
2004).  
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There is also the risk for the South African government that the behaviour of South African 
companies in Africa reflects somehow on South African policy or may be interpreted as 
official government policy. This is especially true where government perceives business NSA 
to be playing a supplementary diplomatic role. For example a letter received by Sasol on the 
new appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the government hoped they 
could rely on Sasol to behave as a responsible representative of South Africa, the country 
(Int: Alfeld 2009). This expectation leans very close to the (unintended) delegation of 
diplomatic function to South African businesses investing and operating beyond the borders. 
The comment by Zink (1973: 64-67) some decades ago holds true today of South African 
(and in fact all) MNCs : that business, especially MNCs, are political actors. This 
interdependency with business and the risk for the South African government in pursuing its 
own agenda within the region, that corporate behaviour can so easily be conflated with 
government policy, is strong evidence of the supplementary and at times substitution roles 
that business NSA have in South Africa’s economic diplomacy.  
 
Business also plays a supplementary role in formal regional institutions such as SACU and 
SADC, although this is fairly limited. Whilst SACU has no formal business representation, 
informally there is a some business activity in the form of workshops and discussions, 
especially on clothing and textiles in Lesotho (Mathis 2005). Business has difficulty getting 
access to meetings of SACU – initially BUSA was invited to attend meetings, an invitation 
subsequently rescinded (Int: Grant 2010). There was no reason given, although BUSA’s view 
is that the South African government would probably be happy, but the other countries in 
SACU are not comfortable (Int: parsons 2009). 
 
The uneven nature of trade flows within the SADC area is cause for concern, for some. For 
example the massive increase in bilateral trade between South Africa and Tanzania from a 
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virtual zero base to US$433 million in 2000 has resulted in fears of the “South Africanisation 
of Tanzania” (Nyirabu 2004: 29). These arise out of the initial ethos of the SADC agreement 
that regional integration should allow for reciprocal access to South African markets from 
other SADC members (Marais 1998: 136). Despite attempts by South Africa to address the 
concerns by allowing for asymmetrical industrial tariff reductions and infant industry 
protection provisions, institutional weakness in SADC hinders the integration process.  
Jealousies between non-SACU members of SADC also contributes to tension within the 
group (Alden and Soko 2005: 377). SADC, unlike SACU, does have formal business 
involvement, through the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(ASCCI) (ASCCI 2011). ASCCI was established in 1992 and represents 18 National 
Chambers of Commerce, trade associations and employers’ organisations in each of the 14 
member countries of SADC. South African business participates through its own chambers of 
commerce who are members of the SADC ASCCI (SADC 2011). The organisation’s aims are 
to promote business-friendly policies within the region and work closely along-side national 
governments as well as the SADC Secretariat. Although there are few examples of what has 
been achieved to date as a result of the ASCCI. Where there has been business engagement 
both in SACU and SADC business is playing a supplementary role to their national 
governments working with the governments of other SADC countries. 
 
Business NSAs and the WTO  
 
Business has attended all the WTO ministerials in the last few years, with BUSA as its 
representative. According to BUSA representatives, South Africa has always been very 
progressive in its representation, including civil society, parliament, trade unions and 
business. BUSA’s most important role has been in building up parliament’s capacity on these 
issues.  In July 2009 a dinner with Pascal Lamy at NEDLAC was hosted by two Ministers: 
Rob Davies (Minister for Trade and Industry) and Ibrahim Patel (Minister of Economic 
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Development) to which business, labour, community and parliamentary representatives were 
invited. 
 
At ministerials BUSA and other participants of the South African delegation are able to give 
their feedback. There are daily morning briefings and report-backs with extensive informal 
interaction with ministers: “Like a South African HQ”. Each morning a specific topic is 
selected and there is a briefing on this and they discuss the South African position in detail. 
BUSA/business had full access to all formal meetings other than ‘Green Room’ processes. 
Business representatives are registered as full delegate status and not just as observers. This 
was true of the Hong Kong meetings as well as the July and December 2008 ministerials. 
BUSA is “critical in providing analysis and input at all points.”   Many other countries do not 
give business and labour delegate status (Int: Grant 2009). 
 
At the July 2009 meetings BUSA also interacted a lot with other industry representatives. 
This was the first time that BUSA had engaged in meaningful business-business diplomacy 
and was the occasion at which BUSA issued a joint statement as business on NAMA with 
India and Argentina.  On one occasion BUSA (the only African business representative) 
conducted further business-business diplomacy at an event to meet other industry 
representatives attending the ministerial - largely from developed countries. Other BRICs 
were also represented and BUSA already have formalised business-business links with some 
of these through the IBSA dialogue.  BUSA also conducted meetings with the EU, French, 
the US and the Services Coalition (a business organisation in the services industry) in a clear 
instance of business to government diplomacy. Where BUSA has attended WTO Ministerial 
Conferences and other negotiations it is certainly in a supplementary role to government. 
 
However, other than the involvement of BUSA at WTO meetings there is no other evidence 
of business engagement in WTO negotiations as part of the negotiating delegation. During 
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the interviews conducted with business as part of this research the predominant theme that 
resonated among business respondents was that while negotiations taking place within the 
WTO were important to business and that cognisance was indeed taken of the issues being 
negotiated, essentially the WTO process and agreements are an external factor to which 
business responds rather than a strategic opportunity for intervention (either for protectionism 
or liberalisation). This is certainly changing as BUSA is becoming increasingly active (and as 
is evident from the discussion of BUSA and the WTO above). BUSA  issued their first 
statement as business in relation to the WTO as a joint statement with business associations 
from two other developing countries, Argentina’s Union Industrial Argentina (UIA) and the 
CII, protesting the anti-concentration proposals in the NAMA negotiations (BUSA 2009). 
This is significant both because it constitutes a first statement from South African business 
with regard to WTO proceedings, but also because it aligns South African business with other 
developing country business interests.  
 
Some of the reason for this apparent reticence on the part of business can be put down to the 
lengthy and protracted nature of negotiations in the WTO. The Doha Round has been in 
progress for a painstaking eight years already, with little prospect at the time of writing of 
reaching conclusion in the next 12 months. Similarly, the Warwick Commission (2007: 11) 
found that the proliferation of PTAs was in part a result of the same factors: “frustration with 
slow decision-making in the multilateral regime”. In essence the WTO remains a negotiating 
forum for national governments and their representatives. The format and structure of WTO 
negotiations make it impenetrable for individual firms to access and reinforce the crucial role 
of consultation and access to national negotiating institutions. In addition the time frames for 
reaching agreement are far too long for most firms which is why WTO processes and 
outcomes tend to be regarded as external environmental factors to be managed but not 
necessarily shaped or influenced. As Pigman and Vickers (2010: 24) put it “global firms have 
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argued that the overly politicized process of negotiations and the endless cycling of proposals 
seriously lag the business cycle and dynamic new market developments”.  
 
One area where private sector involvement in the WTO should be apparent is in the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (DSM), where non-state actors are able to participate in cases through 
amicus curiae briefs (Pigman and Vickers 2010: 16). This is also an arena where power 
politics should also be less likely to hold sway and thus potentially a very useful avenue for 
developing countries to pursue their interests, although for various reasons this has so far not 
been the case (Lee 2004b: 126; Narlikar 2005b: 95). These include the costs of bringing a 
dispute as well as the fact that remedies are achieved through sanctioned retaliation, which is 
very difficult for developing countries to implement meaningfully (Jawara and Kwa 2003: 6). 
A review of dispute cases involving South Africa reveals that South Africa has not been a 
complainant in a single case so far and has been a respondent in three cases (WTO 2010b).119  
Mosoti (2006) reflects that in its first decade, Africa has been largely absent from the DSM 
and this trend is mirrored in the statistics from developing countries more broadly (Shaffer et 
al 2003: 13). It is unclear why this should be so in the case of South Africa and would 
warrant further research by a WTO scholar.120 
 
Business and Official State Visits 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, economic diplomacy is a key priority for DIRCO (DIRCO 
2010c: 82-84). As part of the strategy to achieve this objective DIRCO are engaging actively 
with business on foreign policy issues and are conducting economic diplomacy training 
programmes across a range of departmental levels, nationally, regionally and locally (DIRCO 
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 One from India for anti-dumping duties on pharmaceutical products, one from Turkey for anti-dumping on 
blanketing and one from Indonesia for anti-dumping on uncoated wood-free paper. This avenue then also 
indicates a lack of involvement in the WTO from private sector actors. 
120
 This issue is not considered directly relevant to the argument this thesis is putting forward on the role of 
NSAs in economic diplomacy and hence is not pursued further.  
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2010b). In the period since Jacob Zuma became President, South Africa has conducted a 
number of official State visits, including visits to Angola, Brazil, Zambia Germany, India, 
Russia, China, Egypt, France and the UK. On these visits he has been accompanied by some 
very large business delegations. For example in August 2010, the business delegation to 
China numbered 371 and in June 2010 when visiting India the number was 226. These visits 
provide opportunity for all three of Stopford and Strange’s (1991: 19)  triangular diplomacy 
linkages to occur. Governments link with their counterparts, but business NSAs are also 
given the opportunity to link with foreign officials and governments as well as other 
corporate actors. Another unanticipated benefit for business NSAs performing this sort of 
supplementary role is the opportunity to network and socialise with their own government 
representatives and engage in informal consultation or lobbying.  Key sectors represented on 
the delegations include agriculture, financial services, infrastructure, mining, oil and gas, 
tourism, transport, health, construction, automotive components and pharmaceuticals. 
 
This study revealed that business NSAs are active participants in state visits both to pursue 
commercial interests, but also to be seen to be supporting government initiatives and gaining 
“brownie points” (Int: an anonymous business response).121 There is a feeling from big 
business that government has an expectation that they will attend and if they do not this is 
taken as a negative comment on business support for the government, so big business 
participate on a ‘need to be seen’ imperative. As is evident from the number of business 
delegates who have supported State visits in the 2009/10 period (some 1200 delegates over 
11 state visits), business NSAs are clearly engaging in a supplementary role in South Africa’s 
economic diplomacy (Grant 2011: 7).  
 
                                                      
121
 A number of interviewees gave similar responses, but did not want to be identified, for obvious reasons. 
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However, there are also obstacles to participation. A number of interviewees found the way 
that state visits are organised and coordinated makes participation difficult. As business 
delegates must fund their own participation, they like to be able to have some input regarding 
the planned objectives or even schedule of activities. Alfeld (Int: 2009) was candid in his 
report of Sasol’s attendance at the State visit to Brazil, in October 2009. Sasol, an energy and 
chemicals company had hoped to meet their counterparts at Brazil’s Petrobras. However, the 
DTI had neglected to arrange an activity in the city where Petrobras is head quartered and no-
one had advised Petrobras that Sasol representatives were part of the South African 
delegation. Such strategic oversight creates enormous frustrations for business NSAs.  The 
biggest obstacle to participation is the short notice given to potential delegates (sometimes as 
short as three days). The problem with this poor planning is that it is impossible to arrange 
senior level representation at such short notice, furthermore, many destination countries 
require visas to be issued which cannot be done with only a few days’ notice (Int: Alfeld 
2009).  
 
It is clear then that there are a number of points of tension around State visits. First is the 
competition between organisations over who organises business participation. BUSA, as the 
government’s chosen business representation, is jointly tasked with the DTI to arrange 
business delegations for state visits, but other business organisations seek to be involved to 
gain some input to the strategic processes in arranging these (DTI 2011b). Second, there is 
interdepartmental competition between DIRCO and the DTI over who leads the State visits as 
well as between government and business over the setting of strategic goals for these visits 
(Grant 2011: 9). Third, a number of interviewees observed that there appeared to be very 
little strategic thought to formal State visits, which means these are driven by broader 
political issues with business seemingly attached as an after-thought (Alfeld 2009; Draper 
2009; Grant 2010; Maasdorp 2009; Mapai 2010; Soko 2009; Spicer 2009; Vapi 2009). 
203 
 
According to these business interviewees, events are often poorly planned, with little thought 
about an agenda or strategic objective for business participation from an economic diplomacy 
perspective. The result is that when business does attend, it tends to be a scramble trying to 
make arrangements to connect with relevant counterparts in the host country. Fourth, the lack 
of organisation at the DTI is not improved with BUSA’s assistance, which does not have a 
full database of South African business, relying on chambers (which are themselves 
inadequately resourced) to disseminate information (Off the record comment by business 
representative, 2009).122 Finally, there is a perception among business interviewees that the 
state visits seem more geared to SMMEs and that it is not good for the country’s broader 
image to confuse the business sectors by having big business participate along-side “basket 
weavers and potters” at such occasions (Int: Spicer 2009). Business delegations on State 
visits tend to “represent SMME’s - more as if SA Inc is a flea-market rather than representing 
the true blue-chip industry that constitutes the backbone of SA’s economy” (Off the record 
observation by business representative, 2009). 
 
Some companies seem to have been overlooked entirely and have never been invited to 
attend state visits, such as Absa (Int: Maasdorp 2009). It is hard to believe that such an 
occurrence is an oversight given the size of the company and the central role played in the 
economy, so this may point to the levels of disorganisation and poor planning in the DTI. 
Business people interviewed varied in their reactions to the value of State visits and the 
business delegations that attend these. BUSA maintain that there is no selection involved, and 
that attendance as part of a business delegation is on a first come first served basis (Grant 
2011). However, there is so little communication with business about planned visits that 
business representatives often do not know about a planned State visit until it is too late (Int: 
                                                      
122
 Some interviewees requested not to be directly cited in the thesis, although all interviews agreed to be 
listed by name. Other interviewees were happy to be cited but some made “off the record” comments during 
the interview that they did not wish to be attributed to them directly.  
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Tshiqi 2009).  Interviewees generally agreed that State visits are arranged to a government 
agenda and thus present limited opportunity to seek proactive commercial opportunities. This 
reflects hangover concerns from the consultation process between government and business 
generally as discussed in Chapter Five. When visits are arranged to key or strategic markets 
then relevant business people tend to participate more actively. Clearly to capitalise more on 
the supplementary role of business there needs to be an improvement in consultation 
processes too. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the political and commercial importance of Africa to government 
and business in South Africa. The chapter began by outlining the diplomatic focus in South-
South engagement and identified a number of sites of engagement where business operates 
along-side government in a supplementary role in pursuing economic diplomacy objectives.  
The chapter then discussed South Africa’s role in Africa and the regional dominance of the 
country politically and especially through corporate expansion in Africa. South African 
business is highly active on the continent and is a crucial partner with the South African 
government for achieving its objectives in developing the African relationships and further 
ties with the South, despite the sometimes complex relationship between business and 
government. The relationship with business actors is not without constraints, as South Africa 
must deal with the region’s fears of its dominance and economic hegemony especially 
prevalent among those states that bore the brunt of the apartheid government’s policies in the 
sub region. It has been with some difficulty that South Africa re-negotiated the SACU 
agreement and gained entry to the SADC community and South Africa continues to tread a 
fine line between pursuing her own interests and managing the expectations of her regional 
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trade agreement partners. At times this is in conflict with the commercial interests and roles 
played out by South African business in the region. 
 
The discussion above has argued that the private sector is a key part of South Africa’s ability 
to achieve her political goals within the global South. This is particularly true of NEPAD, 
where corporate involvement is crucial to the objectives of achieving investment and trade 
flows. Finally, the supplementary role of business in supporting official State visits was 
analysed. Business attends state visits to be seen as supportive of government, and where 
possible to gain commercial advantage. Some have benefitted from the opportunity to access 
ministers and officials from South Africa in a relaxed environment and with a ‘captive 
audience’ (Int: Alfeld 2009). Grant (2011) also points to this phenomenon in her report on 
State visits as a tool of economic diplomacy. In a televised interview on Beyond Markets 
shown in October 2010 in South Africa, Futhi Mthoba, President of BUSA, also refers to the 
opportunities presented for business delegates attending foreign state visits to connect more 
informally with government ministers in a way that is not possible when at home (Mthoba 
2010). Infrequently, state visits afford an opportunity for business delegates to make 
connections with government ministers from host countries that prove useful at a later date. 
As Mthoba indicates trade and investment are business activities and it is the role of 
governments to create an enabling environment for business or remove the impediments to 
business. To achieve this means that governments need to understand the drivers and 
dynamics essential to a conducive business environment. Meetings between government 
officials and business delegations create the space for this understanding to develop.  
Business also finds the opportunity to network and establish contacts with important business 
interests in the host country. This demonstrates that business in a supplementary role (as part 
of the delegation on state visits) is engaged in a process of both business to government and 
business to business diplomacy.  
206 
 
 
It is evident from the analysis that as private sector actors move beyond South Africa’s 
borders they begin to engage directly in commercial diplomacy processes both in terms of 
business-business diplomacy as well as in terms of business-government diplomacy. Whilst 
this can be measured in terms of diplomatic outcomes it is more broadly observed in the 
processes of diplomacy and the building of relationshoips and ongoing intercations between 
business and foreign governments that the supplementary role of business in economic 
diplomacy is most closely observed. 123 For example during the October 2010 visit to Egypt, 
110 business delegates accompanied President Zuma, including First National Bank, PetroSA 
and Seacomm. Mthoba (Mthoba 2010) reports that PetroSA connected with important 
potential partners in Egypt as well as forging key relationships with energy ministers. It is 
possible that the subsequent award of exploration rights in Egypt’s Gulf of Suez to PetroSA 
was partly a result of the establishment of diplomatic ties during the 2010 state visit (Africa 
Oil and Gas 2011).  
 
The supplementary role of business analysed in this chapter makes a very important 
contribution to the research question posed in this thesis as well as contributing highly 
relevant empirical evidence that business as NSAs matter in economic diplomacy and so 
advancing the emerging literature on this in broader economic diplomacy literature. When 
assessing the extent to which and ways in which business engages in South Africa’s post-
apartheid economic diplomacy, this chapter has demonstrated that business is highly engaged 
although not necessarily in formal trade negotiations. Despite the fact that business finds 
consultation with government limited at times, private sector actors remain willing to be part 
of the bigger South African diplomatic effort in the region. Business support diplomatic 
                                                      
123
 Refer again to section 1.1 in chapter one, which highlights the importance of diplomacy as process and not 
just outcomes. 
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efforts such as state visits where possible, even though there are not as many commercial 
advantages as business would like. The pattern of business directly conducting commercial 
diplomacy in both a supplementary and substitutive role, which emerges in this chapter, is 
carried forward into the next chapter. Chapter Seven analyses the entrepreneurial role of 
business in South Africa’s economic diplomacy as diplomatic activists often adopting go-it-
alone strategies in pursuing economic diplomacy in their own right.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: MODES OF DIPLOMACY, DIPLOMATIC 
ENTREPRENEURS 
7.1 Introduction 
A MSD approach emphasises diplomatic agency, roles and relationships rather than structural 
aspects of the international system. A multistakeholder perspective  enables us to explore a 
different dimension of diplomacy – the relationships between states and other entities 
(Wiseman 2004). Thus far this study has explored two modes of business engagement in 
economic diplomacy, a consultative and a supplementary mode. The focus of this chapter is 
on the entrepreneurial mode of engagement conducted by business NSAs. Entrepreneurial 
modes of engagement refer to corporate actors initiating diplomatic encounters and adopting 
an activist role in relationships with the state, as well as other NSAs. This encompasses Firm-
State and Firm-Firm diplomacy at bilateral as well as a multilateral level. An entrepreneurial 
mode makes a distinction between diplomacy that is state-driven and includes or is directed at 
business NSAs, and diplomacy initiatives driven by business NSAs.   
 
In the preceding chapter the research has covered domestic and South-South fora for 
interaction. In both instances business has engaged in a particular mode of diplomacy that 
was closely linked to the diplomatic initiatives of the state actors.  In contrast, entrepreneurial 
diplomacy is conducted by business NSAs - mainly big business – and refers to the more 
prevalent role of South African MNCs on the global stage. The chapter begins with a review 
of the primary sites of global diplomatic activity for South Africa’s MNCs. Then the 
discussion traces the actors or corporate agencies that constitute South Africa’s MNCs and 
explores the depth and breadth of their engagement in the international system. Finally, the 
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chapter analyses the entrepreneurial role of corporate diplomacy in South Africa’s diplomatic 
landscape.  
 
The difficulty of accessing formal consultation within NEDLAC as well as the historically 
difficult relationship between white capital and the ANC government mean that big business 
has continued to pursue its commercial agenda by means of go-it-alone diplomacy. This has 
not led to abandoning all government relations and this strategy is often accompanied by 
endeavours to include South African diplomats as far as possible in what one interviewee 
described as ‘flag follows trade’ diplomacy (Int: Alfeld 2009). Entrepreneurial diplomacy 
does not occur in place of other diplomatic modes of engagement rather the three modes are 
coterminous. The chapter builds on the contention of the previous chapters that the historical 
context and the structural conditions within which big business (primarily white owned or 
controlled) seek to operate in the global economy have resulted in big business engaging in 
an entrepreneurial mode of diplomacy as corporate diplomats.124   
 
The analysis explores the implications for South Africa’s economic diplomacy of South 
Africa’s global corporate players as MNCs on the world stage. The chapter analyses the 
extent to which South African MNCs have expanded their sphere of influence in the global 
political economy and the ways in which they engage in the global arena. It expands on the 
entrepreneurial role of business that is reflected in go-it-alone strategies where business 
NSAs act as de facto diplomats. This extends to business sometimes acting as precursors and 
introducers of South Africa into markets. This mode of engagement is a crucial contribution 
to our understanding of who is conducting economic diplomacy and to what ends. It certainly 
supports the claim this thesis advances, that NSAs are highly relevant units of analysis in 
economic diplomacy.  
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 The term corporate diplomacy to refer to business engagement in economic diplomacy was first used by 
Susan Strange (1992: 14). 
210 
 
7.2 Sites of diplomatic activity – a global stage 
There is a breadth of literature on business NSAs in global governance which was reviewed 
in Chapter Two. This literature refers to the role of business on the global stage and is a 
precursor to the notion of business NSAs as entrepreneurial or corporate diplomats in the 
international arena. This section will explore a number of important sites of diplomatic 
activity where business NSAs, including South African business, are engaging in diplomatic 
processes. Such diplomatic activity ranges from building relationships with government 
officials in potential new markets, lobbying for business-friendly policy environments and 
access to licensing processes as well as participating in developing governance structures 
around good corporate citizenship and governance (self-regulation). The first and most 
obvious site of corporate diplomacy is the WEF. 
 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) 
 
The WEF is fundamentally a multistakeholder forum with the self-expressed purpose of 
bringing together leaders from governments, business, academia and civil society to discuss 
global issues of an economic, political and social nature (WEF 2011a). According to Pigman 
(2007: 1) it is a “multistakeholder vision of global governance”.  The forum was started by a 
group of European business men in 1971, who met under the auspices of the European 
Commission in Davos, Switzerland. The first meeting was chaired by Charles Schwab, at that 
time a Professor at the University of Geneva. Initially the forum focused on management 
issues and promoted a stakeholder approach. As time went on, the group began to include 
other economic and socio-political aspects affecting the world. Political leaders were invited 
to the Davos gathering for the first time in 1974.  Shortly after that, in 1976 the European 
Management Forum became a membership-based organisation, with the leading 1,000 
companies of the world constituting the first members. In the first decade of existence the 
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organisation expanded to hold annual regional meetings as well and in 1979 began to publish 
its annual “Global Competitiveness Report” (Sala-i-Martin 2011). In 1987, the group became 
the WEF and now produces two additional annual reports, the Global Risks Report  and  The 
Global Gender Gap Report  as well as numerous regional scenario reports (Hausmann et al 
2011; Van der Elst and Davis 2011) . The launch of the WEF ‘brand’ also saw the broadening 
of its scope, to provide a platform for settling international disputes, such as the milestone 
agreement between Greece and Turkey with the Davos Declaration in 1988 and the meeting 
between East and West Germany to discuss reunification (Lowe 2009, January 22). Latterly, 
in the 1990s and 2000s the WEF expanded its scope to include annual regional summits as 
well as creating knowledge networks for young politicians, business leaders, academics, 
media professionals and artists - called Young Global Leaders (WEF 2011b). Another 
community for business was established in 1998 as a sub-meeting within the annual Davos 
session for heads of business associations and UN organisations to meet, called the Business 
Consultative Council. The WEF became so much an accepted part of the global scene, that by 
2000, the Financial Times had a dedicated section on its website for the WEF (Financial 
Times 2011, January 30). 
 
What critics and analysts ask about the WEF is whether it is actually a forum for 
multistakeholder engagement or in fact an actor on the international stage itself (Lundberg 
2004). Anti-globalisation protesters have mounted vociferous  actions against the WEF with 
one group, called ‘O20-Shut down the WEF’, claiming that the WEF is the “nearest thing that 
globalisation has to a world headquarters” (O2O - Shut down the WEF 2011). Anti-
globalisation protesters direct their ire at the WEF, because they regard it as the embodiment 
or tool of MNCs. For anti-globalisation activists MNCs are, in Bhagwati’s (2004: 440) 
evocative phrase, “the B-52s of capitalism and its global reach”. It is out of this movement 
that the World Social Forum was born in 2001 in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Teivainen 2002). 
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Pigman (2007: 54) maintains that the forum is both a venue for diplomacy as well as a 
diplomatic actor in its own right. As the facilitator of dialogue it is a forum, but when 
diplomatic outcomes are achieved it also enhances the WEF’s institutional goals thus 
fulfilling its own diplomatic objectives. At best the identity or nature of the WEF is 
contested, the conflicting views between how it perceives itself and how others see it 
(Surhone et al 2010). The reach of the WEF is extensive, with some 49 different programmes 
within five themes: economic growth, environmental sustainability, health for all, social 
development, and financial systems. South African business leaders have been actively 
involved in WEF summits. Maria Ramos, is one example, who when still Group Chief 
Executive of Transnet Limited, was one of the co-chairs of the Davos 2009 meeting (WEF 
2009).  
 
Many of the business interviewees attend Davos and the Africa Regional Summit and they 
identified their aims as first, to seek commercial opportunities and second, to lobby (Int: 
Alfeld 2009, Bone 2008; Chance 2009; Davies 2009; January-Bardill 2009; Maasdorp 2009; 
Mapai 2010; Moyo 2010; Nikolaou 2009; Parsons 2009; Spicer 2009). WEF Africa provides 
the opportunity for African-focused fora to actively engage with their customers or influence 
funding for infrastructure in potential new markets. For example, Aspen attend with the view 
to being able to meet the South African President and other ministers which is often difficult 
to fit in at home, as well as heads of multilateral institutions such as Pascal Lamy (Int: 
Nikolaou 2009). BUSA do not attend Davos as it is too expensive for most of their members.  
They rely on large business members to give one of their seats to a BUSA person, whereas 
WEF Africa is a lot more accessible.  
 
Interviews revealed that attending WEF meetings provide excellent networking opportunities 
and are very beneficial to “getting together with the ‘movers and shakers’ in the world” 
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including government ministers (Int: Tshiqi 2009). During the Mbeki era this sort of event 
was taken very seriously and the entire South African cabinet would attend. Many 
interviewees commented like-wise that WEF meetings are an opportunity to meet with 
Ministers from your own country as well. The events are also a good opportunity to meet 
with other business people and “hear about things before they actually hit the radar screen” 
(Int: van Vuuren, 2010). The various summits create important opportunities for high-level 
relationship building and positioning (Int: January-Bardill 2009). South African firms, such 
as Absa through Leslie Maasdorp, are also involved with the Global Agenda Council (part of 
the WEF), which meets annually on issues to do with economic growth and development 
(Global Agenda Councils 2011).  Maria Ramos, CEO of the Absa Group, and Michael 
Spicer, Vice-President of BLSA, are council members of the Future of Africa Group. 
 
All business representatives see tremendous business value in attending the WEF Davos 
meetings. It presents an opportunity to meet with the Chairmen and CFOs of many top 
clients. It also acts as a platform for dialogue parallel to the Davos agenda, and is a key 
opportunity to meet with the Governors of Central Banks and Ministers of Finance of other 
countries. It is clearly evident from this level of engagement that business is conducting early 
diplomatic relationship building, lobbying and bridge-building during these meetings; in 
short, engaging in entrepreneurial diplomatic activity. Dialogue at Davos focuses on big 
questions for business such as climate change and sustainability as well as, in the recession,  
sharing ideas, enabling companies to get a sense of the market and access islands of 
excellence and best practice.  
 
It is interesting that many of the business representatives interviewed see the WEF as the best 
example of co-operation between South African business and government and this is apparent 
in the form of a ‘Team SA’ approach (Alden and Soko 2005: 385). Interviewees often 
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referred to the ‘SA Inc’ mind-set that dominates participation in WEF events. WEF summits 
appear to be the one time when there is a co-ordinated effort to market South Africa in a 
cohesive manner; business and government representatives gather at the beginning of the 
summit to decide on a common approach and moves beyond the ‘us’ and ‘them’ rhetoric so 
common to other business-government interactions (Dlamini 2004: 176). 
 
The WEF, according to some, is an institution that is challenging diplomacy studies as to the 
nature of diplomacy and which actors engage in diplomacy (Pigman 2007: 52). The evidence 
from this research into South Africa’s business engagement in economic diplomacy confirms 
this challenge. The WEF “serves as a venue for diplomacy at various levels and enables  
building interpersonal relationships, thinking about the future, solving problems and 
resolving disagreements” (Pigman 2007: 51).  There is extensive evidence of South African 
business engaging in diplomacy at a number of levels during WEF events, through business-
business, business-government, and business-international organisation interactions.  
 
Climate Change COP 17 
 
In 2011 business leaders launched the COP17 CEO Business Forum as a vehicle to engage 
with climate change governance around mitigating the effects of and adapting to climate 
change (Financial Mail 2011). The initiative is a coalition of CEO’s from South Africa’s top 
40 companies, including Eskom, Sasol and Impala Platinum. Their goals are to improve 
knowledge about climate change, to participate in policy discussions around tackling climate 
change and ensure that business concerns are taken into account as South Africa makes 
commitments to a low carbon economy in international negotiations and addresses issues of 
job creation and competitiveness. This project is ad hoc and issue responsive and will disband 
after the COP17 meeting in South Africa. The focus of its activities will be to engage with the 
Government’s white paper on National Climate Change Responses and any carbon tax 
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proposals (DEAT 2011).  Business has responded to the cabinet approved white paper with 
some reservations, especially questioning the country’s commitment to industry specific 
reduction targets, which many regard as too ambitious for the current levels of development 
in South Africa, with high unemployment and extreme poverty (Mail and Guardian 2011, 
November 14). Business leaders from the Chamber of Mines and Sasol have accused the 
government of reneging on an undertaking not to include specific reduction targets without 
further business consultation (Parliamentary Working Group 2011).  
 
The COP17 meeting is scheduled to take place in Durban between 28 November and 9 
December 2011 (Nkoane-Mashabane 2011). The South African government has clearly 
indicated its willingness to engage with social partners including industry and business, 
organised labour, civil society, and the scientific community (National Climate Change 
Response 2011). Furthermore, the climate change response initiative is actively encouraging 
business to engage international counterparts in the debate to promote a better understanding 
of the interests of business in developing countries (National Climate Change Response 
2011). The COP17 CEO Business Forum is one response to that exhortation. Through this 
forum, CEOs are engaging with BUSA, the National Business Initiative, the ICC and the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD 2011a; ICC 2011b). The 
forum has been meeting monthly and will contribute to the COP17 conference financially. At 
the conference businesses will have access to stalls to showcase their climate change 
initiatives and will organise dialogue and networking opportunities between local and 
international businesses around issues relating to climate change (Financial Mail 2011). 
Certainly the venue of the COP17 conference in Durban has served as an impetus for 
galvanising business action. Although business, as discussed above, is disappointed with the 
government response to its input so far (Mail and Guardian 2011, April 22). Whilst it is still 
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too early to find evidence of business-related diplomatic outcomes in the Climate Change 
arena, there is wide-spread evidence of business activity and engagement around diplomatic 
processes.125 
 
Interviews revealed that business representatives acknowledge the growing importance of a 
business response to mitigating and adapting to climate change although they are concerned 
about the business risk posed by persistent regulatory uncertainty. Their expectations of 
COP17 are that some landing be reached that will result in greater clarity regarding 
measuring, reporting and verifying carbon emissions. There is a strong sense that business is 
taking the initiative both locally, engaging with policy-makers at home, as well as 
internationally, engaging other business leaders (Mail and Guardian 2011, November 14). 
One example is the release of a position paper by the Institute of Directors in 2010, which 
highlights an acceptance of the science of climate change, the impact of social and economic 
disruption as a result of climate change and the need for a long-term and equitable strategy 
for responding to the challenges of climate change (IOD 2010). The position paper further 
states that inaction is inexcusable and that the issue of climate change is linked to a number 
of other key social issues, such as sustainable consumption, human rights and democratic 
values, which are crucial factors in the world’s ability to resolve the threat posed by climate 
change. Business is of the view that COP16 in Cancun had restored faith in the climate 
change negotiations after the disappointment of Copenhagen (WBCSD 2011a). 
 
B20 and the G20 
 
The Seoul B20 was established to provide a forum for global CEOs to become involved as 
active participants in the G20 discussions (Seoul B20 2010). The B20 is a parallel event that 
forms part of the G20 Summit with the purpose of engaging the international business 
                                                      
125
 See the section in chapter one that discusses the definition of diplomacy and highlights diplomacy as 
process and not simply outcomes. 
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community in producing recommendations and committing to common solutions to current 
problems (Cannes B20 2011a). The first B20 Summit that accompanied the Seoul G20 
meetings was the precursor for what appears to be becoming a fixture on the G20 agenda. 
The Seoul B20 Summit in 2010 held roundtables on four topics: trade and investment, 
finance, green growth and corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
 
The Cannes B20 held in 2011 was organised around 12 topics crucial to business and a 
priority for the G20. The proposals drafted by the 12 working groups over the months 
preceding the November 2011 Cannes G20 Summit were tabled at the official G20 Summit 
of Heads of Government and States. At the Cannes G20 Summit 2011, the B20 met with the 
government leaders on the 2nd and 3rd of November prior to the G20 meetings of 3rd and 4th 
November (Rowley 2011, November 3).  The B20 presents itself as a representative group 
due to the breadth of industry and regional representation on the 12 working groups and 
membership panel (Cannes B20 2011a). South African business represented on the B20 
companies working groups included Absa group Limited (Maria Ramos), Anglo Gold 
Ashanti (Mark Cutifani), BUSA (Futhi Mthoba), Torque IT (Mthunzi Mdwaba). The working 
groups give priority to issues of global financial and economic regulation, global governance, 
environmental issues, development, trade and investment, and anti-corruption. In addition to 
the individual corporate participants and national business organisations, other groups such as 
the WEF, the OECD Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC), and ICC G20 
Advisory Group are partnered with the B20 initiative (Cannes B20 2011b). The over-riding 
theme to emerge from the B20 was to entreat governments to look beyond the euro-zone 
crisis, focus on economic growth and job creation, and stabilising the international monetary 
system not just the Euro. Hosting the event in France at such a crucial point in the euro-
zone’s sovereign debt crisis determined that such calls would inevitably fall on deaf ears and 
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the failure of the summit was eventually determined by the inability to resolve a bail-out for 
the beleaguered Euro (Plowright et al 2011, November 5).  
It may seem that global issues are removed from the economic diplomacy agenda of South 
African MNCs and business generally. Not so. The anti-corruption working group was 
convened by Futhi Mtoba of BUSA, which included a joint anti-corruption conference with 
the OECD in April (OECD 2011).  South Africa had wide representation at the Cannes B20 
Summit, 2011, including South African participants such as Maria Ramos, of Absa, and Mark 
Cutifani, of AngloGold Ashanti. BUSA was present as one of the 20 business organisation 
members from each of the G20 countries, representing South Africa. Given the scope of 
issues addressed and the high level of government and business representatives present, the 
B20 Summits provide a unique opportunity for business to engage directly in corporate 
diplomacy and as active participants in global governance architecture. Being present at the 
shaping of global institutions and rules, in the form of a G20 forum, is significant evidence of 
business’s entrepreneurial diplomatic role in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. Again, 
assessing the final impact of such engagement in diplomatic process is hard to gauge. 
Diplomacy cannot be measured simply on the outcomes of engagements. Diplomacy is a 
process (often incremental) and as such does not negate the importance of various roles in 
diplomacy. Simply by being part of the diplomatic process that is occurring at the B20 
summits business is engaging in diplomacy, irrespective of the outcomes.    
 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and other international business organisations 
 
The (ICC) was founded in 1919 as an international advocacy group that proclaims itself the 
‘voice of world business’. The organisation champions the causes of economic growth, job 
creation and prosperity, through open markets for goods and services and the free flow of 
capital. The ICC’s description of its goals and activities are typical of corporate diplomacy in 
that the advocacy that ICC engages in is directed specifically at situations where governments 
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and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) are making decisions that “crucially affect 
corporate strategies and the bottom-line” (ICC 2011a). This they achieve through political 
advocacy and lobbying while providing member organisations with a range of practical 
services including arbitration through the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) and policy 
advocacy across a range of sectoral interests from anti-corruption through competition and 
transport and logistics (Kelly 2005: 259). The ICC is structured in a similar way to IGOs, 
with a World Council, comprising business executives as delegates, based on a federal 
structure of delegates representing National Committees and which meets bi-annually. The 
ICC is represented in member countries by a National Committee, which then represents 
national concerns in the ICC World Council, so that these are aggregated into a global 
business or industry perspective. The work of the ICC is further complemented by various 
Commissions which research and respond to specific international and government 
initiatives. The list of issues covered by the ICC are reminiscent of the concerns promoted by 
other international business bodies such as the WEF and the B20: banking practices, 
competition policy, financial regulation, trade and investment policy, anti-corruption, 
environment and energy, corporate social responsibility, taxation and intellectual property. 
The ICC is a strong proponent of free markets and as such a staunch supporter of the WTO 
negotiations.   
 
As mentioned earlier, the ICC is also highly engaged in the COP17 process as well as the 
G20 via the ICC G20 Advisory Group (Trade Finance 2011, October 19). The ICC is also 
committed to numerous projects under the auspices of the UN (ICC 2004). The Global 
Compact, officially launched in July 2000, was also an ICC initiative achieved jointly with 
the Secretary General of the UN at the time, Kofi Annan. The purpose of the UN and global 
business initiative is to promote human rights, improve labour conditions, fight corruption 
and protect the environment (UN Global Compact 2011). The Global Compact is a 
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multistakeholder initiative that includes stakeholders beyond business, such as labour, civil 
society, governments, academia, cities, and research bodies.  The South African Global 
Compact Local Network in South Africa is coordinated by the NBI. On the Global Compact, 
45 South Africa companies are involved directly and along-side the NBI including, 
AngloGold Ashanti, SAPPI, Sasol, Eskom, Barloworld, Deloitte and BUSA, and academic 
representatives such as the University of South Africa ( UNISA)  as well as various 
government departments (ICC 2009b). 
 
The ICC’s participation indicates that the organisation is far more a diplomatic actor (or 
aggregated actor) than it is a forum for action. The ICC is a forum only in so much as it 
provides an aggregation point for pulling together the positions and views of national 
committees in over 120 countries across a broad spectrum of industries. From there the ICC 
lobbies and pursues policy objectives as a diplomatic actor on the global stage. There is an 
ICC national committee in South Africa with a wide range of members including individual 
businesses as well as business associations. BUSA and the NBI are both affiliated to the ICC. 
South African firms concerned about global industry regulation issues such as investment 
rules, financial regulation or environmental issues tend to give expression to such issues 
through the national committee of the ICC located in Johannesburg. For example the 
Chemical and Allied Industries Association makes regular representations to the ICC through 
the South African chapter on issues relating to the international regulation of the chemical 
industry (Int: Lotter 2009). One of the outcomes of this diplomatic engagement has been the 
launch of the chemical industry’s global initiative called “Responsible Care”. This is a 
voluntary programme to which companies become signatories to raise safety, health and 
environmental standards within the industry in order to eliminate risks and promote 
sustainable development (CAIA 2010). Another example is the role played by the 
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Information Technology Association (ITA), a member of both the ICC and the World 
Information Technology and Services Alliance (WITSA) which itself is a member of the 
ICC. One of the key issues that the ITA has been promoting through the ICC as well as 
WITSA is the protection of intellectual property rights and the reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers to IT goods and services (ITA 2008). The ICC held a major conference in 
March 2012 in Geneva on the WTO and the need for a conclusion to the Doha Round under 
the rubric of a call for a business-led agenda on trade liberalisation and to launch its World 
Trade Agenda (CMBD 2012). This is obviously as a result of multiple processes including 
from many larger member economies but demonstrates the enhanced access that smaller 
business associations and companies in countries such as South Africa can participate in at 
for a such as the WTO, through participation in the ICC. As members of the ICC’s South 
African national committee, companies and business associations act as a conduit to the 
South African government, alerting them to concerns raised around international business 
interests as well as filtering back at international level issues relating to South African 
business interests in the international arena (ICC 2012). Participation in the ICC provides an 
additional forum for South African business to engage in economic diplomacy, consistent 
with a MSD approach, which maintains that representation patterns are likely to be 
multilateral in vision and across multiple diplomatic sites (Hocking 2006).  
 
The Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) 
 
 The BIAC was founded in 1962 and is an independent international business advisory body 
to the government policymakers at the OECD. Its members comprise business organisations 
from the 34 OECD member countries as well as observer organisations representing business 
and industry from non-member countries (BIAC 2011a). BUSA is one of these. One of 
BIACs policy groups is the Africa group, which coordinates input to the OECD on activities 
within Sub-Saharan Africa as these relate to the OECD-NEPAD initiative and the OECD’s 
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Enhanced Engagement with South Africa. As such the group participates in annual OECD-
NEPAD Ministerial events as well as NEPAD’s Peer Review Processes (BIAC 2011b). 
 
The BIAC performs a similar advocacy role to the ICC and promotes business interests 
through policy advocacy and research and information. This is achieved through global fora, 
direct government consultation, committees and working groups. The organisation promotes 
industry consensus in order to achieve a coherent position when lobbying for a particular 
issue. By virtue of this process and its direct lobbying initiatives the BIAC, like the ICC 
should be regarded as a diplomatic actor rather than a venue for diplomatic processes.  
 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) 
 
The WBCSD is led by a group of CEOs from companies concerned about sustainability in 
communities and the environment, established in 1992. The organisation promotes its agenda 
through thought-leadership and effective advocacy (WBSCD 2011c). The primary purpose of 
the organisation is to promote knowledge sharing around corporate best practice for business 
and sustainability issues.  The council also works closely with the ICC to influence climate 
change negotiations. Apart from three corporate members of the BIAC, Eskom, Mondi and 
Anglo American (which is listed as a UK company due to its listing on the LSE), the NBI is a 
regional representative for South Africa at the WBCSD, representing some 130 national, 
MNC, and business associations (WBCSD 2011b) .  Primarily then, the WBCSD is a forum 
for business-business diplomacy around sustainability and knowledge sharing.  
 
The GRI is a disclosure framework for sustainability information and was originally the 
brainchild of the Boston CERES non-profit project, in 1997. In 2001 the GRI was separated 
out as an independent institution and a second set of guidelines was launched in South Africa 
at the World Summit for Sustainable Development during 2002. A third draft of reporting 
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guidelines (G3) was disseminated for public comment in 2006 which returned some 270 
responses. After a decade in existence the GRI has a network of some 30,000 operating 
across 70 countries (GRI 2007). Around 1,000 organisations participate in voluntary 
reporting on sustainability usually as part of their annual reports in triple-bottom-line 
reporting that includes economic, social and environmental aspects of corporate performance, 
going beyond the normal financial reporting (King 2009: 15).  
 
The GRI reporting framework sets out guiding principles and performance indicators against 
which organisations measure their economic, social and environmental performance. In 
addition the GRI has drafted various sector specific guidelines for different industries. These 
are developed by an international multistakeholder group of sectoral or industry experts with 
broader feedback from other constituencies (GRI 2011). At present the GRI is headed by 
South African Director of the Association of Business Administrators of South Africa, 
Mervyn King. Most of South Africa’s large corporations include some form of GRI reporting 
in their annual reports, with varying degrees of detail (Bezuidenhout et al 2007: 52-53).126 
Doing so is part of their corporate governance commitment but is also an element of their 
reputation management as civil society becomes increasingly adversarial in their criticism of 
MNCs. This form of diplomacy could be referred to as corporate public diplomacy as firms 
seek to enhance their global reputation through reporting initiatives. Sometimes engagement 
with community stakeholders fulfils a community diplomacy goal but this was not pursued 
further in this research given the focus on economic diplomacy.127 What has also emerged 
from the above discussion is that many of the above fora or sites of diplomatic engagement 
have overlapping interests, activity and membership. This results in a patch-work of 
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 See for example Anglo American (2010), Sasol (2011b), ABSA (2010) , Investec (2011), Nedbank (2011a), 
SAPPI (2010), and Impala Platinum (2011). 
127
 Community diplomacy may be a new as yet undefined form of diplomacy and as such would warrant 
further exploration by other diplomacy scholars. 
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overlapping networks that serve to intensify and reinforce the input and engagement of 
business participants in such diplomatic processes.  
 
7.3 Corporate agency – mapping South Africa’s MNCs  
The World Investment Report 2004, estimated that there were some 900 South African 
MNCs by 1999 and in 2002 seven of these were in the top 50 developing country MNCs in 
the non-financial services sector (UNCTAD 2009: 22-23). In addition, there were some 2 044 
foreign companies based in South Africa, using the country as a base for their regional 
activities. In a report published on 1 June 2010, the Boston Consulting Group reviewed 
corporate activity in Africa, arguing that Africa’s top 40 companies are emerging as global 
competitors rivalling the performance of EMNCs from the former BRIC countries before 
South Africa joined. The average growth rate of some 500 African companies has been 
around eight percent since 1998, and having established themselves regionally now seeks to 
expand beyond the continent. FDI by African companies have grown by 81 percent since 
2002, twice as fast as Latin America and Asia. South Africa boasts 18 of the top 40 
companies identified by the report. These are regionally strong companies such as: Shoprite 
Checkers (a food retailer with operations in 17 African countries), Vodacom 
(telecommunications) and multi-continental firms with at least ten percent of their assets 
outside Africa represented by Bidvest Group (an international trading and distribution 
company), Aspen Pharmacare (the largest generic drug manufacturer in the Southern 
Hemisphere), MTN Group (telecommunications), Murray and Roberts (construction), 
Naspers (media), SAPPI (paper and pulp), Sasol (energy), Standard Bank Group (financial 
services and Africa’s most valuable banking brand worth US$ 1.3 billion and ranked 82 in 
the world)) and Steinhoff International (industrial conglomerate).  
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The report further categorises global players which refer to MNCs with more than half their 
assets off-continent, all of which in the top 40 were founded in South Africa but are now 
based in London and listed on the London stock exchange.   These are Anglo American 
(natural resources, world’s largest platinum producer), SABMiller (largest brewer) and Old 
Mutual (financial services with 30 operations overseas). The moniker for these emerging 
power-houses in Africa given by Boston Consulting Group (BCG) is the ‘African Lions’ 
meant to draw parallels between these and the ‘Asian Tigers’ referring to fast growing 
companies in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea.  While South African MNCs 
have greater international representation at board level than most other developing country 
MNCs, they tend to have fewer foreigners at senior management level, and only 21% of top 
executives are foreign. The growing strength of these companies both in South Africa and the 
rest of the continent point to an emerging African capitalism, that BCG predict bodes well for 
the private sector in Africa (Are et al 2010).  
 
The disparity between those companies now based offshore and those more regionally 
dominant can be attributed to the uneven pattern of industrial development characteristic of 
the apartheid political economy (Goldstein and Pritchard 2008: 129).  The end of apartheid 
enabled a re-engagement with global markets following the isolation of sanctions. This 
combined with the early liberalisation policies of the new government, and most other 
African economies, and increasing domestic competition both enabled and pushed South 
African business to look further afield. These economic imperatives were further enhanced 
by the political rise of South Africa’s international profile. 
 
When reviewing the scope of South Africa’s MNCs it is relevant to take account of 
UNCTAD’s 2004 report, which reports that all seven of Africa’s MNCs on the list of top 50 
MNCs from developing countries are South African: SAPPI Limited, Sasol Limited, MTN 
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Group Limited, AngloGold Limited, Naspers Limited, Barlow Limited and Nampak Limited 
(UNCTAD 2004). Table 7.1 provides an overview of the scope and reach of a selected 
number of South Africa’s MNCs including those with dual stock exchange listings.  
South Africa’s MNCs in Africa– depth and breadth 
 
South African MNCs operating in Africa benefit from financial assistance provided by the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) and the Export Credit Insurance Corporation (ECIC). All of these institutions have 
had their mandate broadened to SADC and then the rest of Africa. The IDC supports some 89 
projects in 28 African countries (Mondi and Roberts 2005: 205).  The participation of the 
IDC in certain projects has also provided an implicit political risk insurance which has proved 
crucial to persuading other investors to commit, such as the IDC’s 24% stake in 
Mozambique’s Mozal aluminium smelter (a JV with BHP Billiton and Mitsubishi) (Castel-
Branco and Roberts 2005: 13-18).  
 
Large projects involving energy resources in Africa often involve partnerships with foreign 
governments, such as the Sasol investment in developing gas fields in Mozambique which 
requires the ability to negotiate highly politicised environments (Daniel and Lutchman 2006: 
502). As discussed in Chapter Six, South African companies expanding into Africa must 
achieve a delicate balance of association with the South Africa government, at the risk of 
being associated with the perceived economic domination and exploitation of a regional 
hegemon, whilst at the same time being the protagonists of this very exploitation. 
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Table 7.1 Selected examples of South Africa’s MNCs 
Company INDUSTRY BRANDS LOCATIONS LISTINGS 
Anglo American  Mining DeBeers Diamonds 
AngloGold Ashanti 
Anglo Platinum 
Anglo Base Metals 
Mondi 
60 Countries in Europe, Africa, 
Asia, Australia, South 
America, North America 
Nasdaq, London Stock 
Exchange (LSE)  and 
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) 
Nedbank Corporate, business 
banking 
Nedbank Corporate 
Nedbank Capital 
Nedbank retail 
South Africa and United 
Kingdom 
JSE 
Sasol Energy Sasol Mining 
Sasol gas 
Sasol Synfuels 
Operations in 30 countries in 
Africa, Asia, Europe, North 
and South America 
New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE)  and 
JSE 
Shoprite Checkers Food Retail Shoprite 
Checkers 
Hungry Lion 
House and Home 
17 Countries in Africa JSE 
SABMiller Food and Beverages  
One of world’s largest 
Brewers 
Miller Genuine Draft 
Peroni Nastro Azzuro 
Pilsner Urquell 
60 Countries in Europe, Africa, 
North America, South America 
and Asia 
LSE and JSE 
Aspen Pharmacare Pharmaceuticals Branded and generic 
pharmaceuticals in 
approximately 100 
countries world-wide 
South Africa, Australia,  
Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Mauritius, Dubai, Germany 
and Hong Kong 
JSE   
MTN Telecommunications MTN Botswana, Cameroon, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Republic of 
Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, 
Iran, Afghanistan, Benin, 
Cyprus, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
Guinea Republic, Liberia, 
Sudan, Syria and Yemen.   
JSE 
 
Source: Company websites.128 
It is politically sensitive for the South African government to be seen to be promoting South 
African business interests too strongly and this means that some interviewees accuse the 
government of being unsupportive (Int: Grant 2010; Lotter 2009: Spicer 2009; Parsons 2009; 
Worral 2009).  A further point of concern for recipient countries as well as the South African 
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 Anglo American (2011a); Nedbank (2011b); Sasol (2011a); Shoprite (2011b); SAB Miller (2011); Aspen 
Pharmacare (2011); MTN (2011). 
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government, is that South African MNCs may seek to invest in Africa as a way of seeking 
lower environmental and labour standards (a criticism levelled at other MNCs universally) in 
a ‘race to the bottom’ (Grobbelaar and Besada 2008). However, there is strong evidence that 
South Africa in fact exceeds the requirements of corporate governance throughout Africa, are 
required to meet the exacting standards of international investors as well as the requirements 
of the South African government at home (Chabane et al 2006: 560). This is also evident 
from the large number of South African corporate signatories to the GRI, discussed above. 
Particularly relevant to the global South African MNCs is the pressure to conform to a triple-
bottom-line approach, incumbent on companies listing on, for example, the London or New 
York Stock Exchange such as SABMiller, Dimension Data, Anglo American and Old 
Mutual.  Other pressures include the codes of conduct embodied in Corporate Governance 
initiatives like the King Committee on Corporate Governance (in South Africa) at the 
instigation of the South African Institute of Directors. However, this does not mean that 
South African companies do not still fail to maintain rigorous corporate governance 
standards, as illustrated by questionable activities undertaken by mining companies in the 
DRC and Equatorial Guinea (Daniel and Lutchman 2006: 507).  
 
Unlike MNC investment from OECD countries which is limited to energy and mining, South 
African OFDI is far broader in spectrum ranging from services (in banking, 
telecommunications, retail, tourism, transport and electricity) to commodities (oil, mining and 
gas), agriculture (food and farming) and manufacturing (steel, metals), thus ensuring that the 
impact of such investment has a wider and deeper scope in recipient economies (Rumney 
2006: 6).  South African investment is also extensively seen in infrastructural development, 
which although not technically recognised as OFDI, contributes significantly to the economic 
development of these countries as well as providing important capacity building (skills 
transfer) (Goldstein and Pritchard 2008: 127). In addition, it is mooted that certainly some of 
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these projects would not have happened without the South African private sector (Gelb 2006, 
June 6).  
 
7.4 Analysing the entrepreneurial role of corporate diplomacy 
Interviewees from business universally pointed out that South Africa has no common national 
interest such as Brazil or India seems to have cultivated. “The problem in SA is that there is 
no consensus on developing a common national interest” (Int: Mapai 2010).  
 
The lack of capacity within DIRCO and South Africa’s embassies to provide support in 
commercial diplomacy has resulted in business driving the economic diplomacy agenda in 
many countries, for example Sasol’s activities in Uzbekistan (Izundu 2011). This is taking the 
form of business hiring the diplomatic skills they require through the appointment of former 
diplomats in public affairs and government relations roles. In some instances, especially in 
Africa, MNCs are adopting the functions of diplomats representing South Africa’s reputation 
abroad. This is extending to some firms facilitating and introducing South Africa’s diplomats 
to their counterparts in new countries in ‘flag follows trade’ diplomacy. 
 
Business hiring former diplomats 
 
There is a growing trend among South African companies to employ former diplomats and 
government officials. At MTN, one of the interviews conducted was with Nozipho January-
Bardill, MTN’s Executive Director of Corporate Affairs, a former Ambassador to 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein and the Holy See based in Berne from 2001 to 2005 (MTN 2011). 
She was also Deputy Director General, Human Capital Development and Head of the 
Foreign Service Institute, which is where heads of missions and young diplomats are trained 
for overseas missions. Sasol has appointed Haiko Alfeld as General Manager for Group 
Government Services, who was based in Geneva for some time as the Head of Africa for the 
230 
 
World Economic Forum (SASOL 2011a).  These sorts of appointments point to the need 
within the corporate sector to buy-in the expertise, protocols and networks that diplomats 
from various areas have. Absa Capital and Barclays Capital have appointed Leslie 
Maasdorp, a former ANC policy-advisor and Deputy Director General of Public Enterprises, 
as Vice Chairman. Maria Ramos, former Group Chief Executive of Transnet Limited, 129 is 
now Group Chief Executive of Absa Group Limited,130 a subsidiary of Barclays PLC. She 
was also formerly Deputy Director-General of Financial Planning in the Department of 
Finance and the Director General of the National Treasury, until 2003.  
 
What we are observing in the practices of South African MNCs, allied to the hiring of former 
diplomats, is the establishment of what Pigman and Vickers (2010: 7) refer to as “functional 
analogies of the foreign ministries of nation-state governments”. The implication of which, is 
that non-state actors increasingly engage in diplomacy as actors in their own right. This is the 
epitome of the entrepreneurial diplomacy characteristic of South African business 
engagement in economic diplomacy. A similar trend is evident in the parastatal sector. The 
representatives interviewed for this thesis at Telkom, were responsible for stakeholder 
management and government relations respectively (Int: Mthintso and Plaatjie 2010). The 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange has also recently appointed a Director of Government and 
International Affairs (JSE 2010).  The appointment of former diplomats to fulfil functions of 
government relations or international affairs on behalf of their corporate masters is evidence 
of business increasingly hiring in the protocols and experience of these diplomats to perform 
similar diplomacy functions on behalf of the business sector. This sort of strategy is clearly 
evidence of MSD in action, where business as NSAs are increasingly participating in 
economic diplomacy processes, not only as stakeholders but also as producers of diplomacy 
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 Transnet is a state-owned South African freight transport and logistics service provider. 
130
 Ramos was appointed to the ABSA role in March 2009. 
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by engaging former diplomats to assist firms in producing diplomatic outcomes. Examples of 
such diplomatic outcomes would be the awarding of exploration rights in Egypt’s Gulf of 
Suez in 2011 (Africa Oil and Gas 2011) or the signing of an investment agreement between 
Sasol and the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, Investment and Trade for the 
Uzbekistan government on the 19th of September 2011 (Sasol 2011, 19 September).  
 
Business as de facto diplomats  
 According to Alfeld (Int: 2009) “due to the structural under-resourcing and the apparent 
disorganisation of government in consulting with business, this creates a situation in which 
business in essence becomes a diplomatic actor in their own right. There is a definite move 
from business to engage directly with counterpart government officials in countries where 
they are seeking opportunities. Alfeld (Int: 2009) notes that “especially in energy - most 
countries keep a very close interest or stake or even outright ownership of energy resources”.  
For Sasol, engagements for potential investments outside South Africa are negotiated with 
governments as opposed to partner companies or pertain to JV (joint venture) partnerships 
with parastatals, and this requires business to conduct diplomacy directly with foreign 
governments. For example Sasol are talking directly to the Indonesia government about coal 
beneficiation using a Coal to Liquids (CTL) plant making liquid fuels out of Coal. Another 
instance is Sasol’s negotiations with Uzbekistan via an Uzbek government-owned Gas 
Company to build a Gas to Liquids (GTL) plant. Sasol representatives met with President 
Islam Karimov on September 19, 2011 after a joint venture between Petronas and Sasol to 
build a GTL plant was signed on July 17, 2011(Izundu 2011). In both these instances, Sasol 
representatives are negotiating directly with foreign governments.  
Interviews also indicated a perception from business that there is a corresponding expectation 
from DIRCO for business from South Africa to be a responsible representative of the country 
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(Int: Alfeld 2009; January-Bardill 2009; de Villiers 2009). Corporate South Africa therefore 
is deemed to be representing the country in terms of their social responsibility and labour/ 
environmental practices. This very representation is an act of diplomacy, whetehr it results in 
specific or measurable outcomes or not. Representation is a crucial element of diplomacy as 
process.131 This issue is especially sensitive in Africa where there is sensitivity to South 
Africa’s image as a regional bully or hegemon.132 “If a company wants support it must not 
disappoint the government. Safety standards, human rights and environmental standards must 
be upheld.  BHP Billiton sees safety as a brand-issue and hence its commitment to the Global 
Compact” (Int: Mapai 2010).  This level of sovereign expectation indicates that government 
diplomacy functionaries are increasingly recognising the joint role that various stakeholders 
have to play in South Africa’s economic diplomacy.  
 
Aspen Pharmacare is another example of go-it-alone diplomacy, although they continue to 
develop relationships with key government departments and to overcome the obstacles 
presented by consultation difficulties. As the largest generic drug manufacturer in the 
Southern Hemisphere they had some concerns about the TRIPs agreement in the WTO. 
However Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) flexibilities for public health concerns provided 
under article 31F, did create space for the company.  Aspen chose to speak directly to patent 
holders and negotiated terms for generic drug production directly (both for anti-retrovirals 
and anti TB drugs) rather than engaging in an adversarial relationship such as India had done. 
Aspen opted not to embarrass the government and potentially scare off foreign investors. In 
this sense the company pioneered voluntary co-operation in the generic drug sector and have 
developed a strong leveraging position in multilateral relationships with MNCs and their 
                                                      
131
 Refer to section 1.1 in chapter one defining economic diplomacy and the importance of diplomacy as 
process.  
132
 See Chapter Six for more on South Africa as a regional hegemon and corporate behaviour within this 
context. 
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R&D departments (Int: Nikolaou 2009).  The DTI and Department of Health were supportive 
of their initiatives although not overzealous (Int: Nikolaou 2009).  Consultation was not easy 
especially due to the AIDS issue and the political landscape around AIDS under the Mbeki 
regime and Aspen had to be very careful about their tone, although they did consult 
extensively with the Department of Health. Given the sensitive nature of this issue at the 
time, with the Mbeki government facing severe criticism over its position on AIDS and the 
use of anti-retrovirals it is not surprising that little evidence is available of an official 
response to the Aspen process other than the views of protagonists in the matter (Carter 2008, 
November 27). They received no help with their first two voluntary licenses, but by the third 
one civil society groups had taken some ARV companies to the competition commission 
tribunal, making the issue very public which helped Aspen to negotiate more favourable 
terms (TAC 2011).  
 
MTN operates within a highly regulated industry, requiring one-to-one interactions at a 
senior government level with ministers of Communications and ministers of Finance. It is 
therefore important for MTN to be proactively aware of and informed about legislative and 
regulatory processes in every country where it is operating. For example, in Cameroon where 
government was discussing various policy processes that could influence the 
telecommunications sector, MTN engaged directly with that policy process in a “respectful 
and transparent manner” (Int: Vapi 2009). 
 
To operate in various countries MTN executives and staff require visas to access many of 
these locations and this means that much of the job of the Corporate Affairs manager entails 
investing in and maintaining good relationships with the ambassadors of these countries 
based in South Africa. MTN focuses on having a “robust government relations strategy” (Int: 
January-Bardill 2009).  This also entails keeping foreign embassies advised about their 
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activities in the host market as well as “acknowledging that government relationships are 
critical to developing their (MTN’s) business”. MTN is currently seeking to enter the 
Angolan market. They have engaged in discussions with the South African Ambassador to 
Angola to gain access to Angolan ministers to tap into existing political structures to build 
mutually satisfactory relationships. By nature of these discussions it is often difficult to 
obtain corroborating evidence of claims made during interviews about discussions with 
specific ambassadors or official representatives. However, MTN’s CEO Sifiso Dabengwa, 
announced at a press conference in March 2012, MTN’s interest in pursuing a license in 
Angola should such a privatisation opportunity become available (TeleGeogrpahy 2012, 
March 9).  
 
As far as the dynamic with the South African government is concerned MTN also pays 
attention to nurturing this relationship abroad, getting to know the South African 
Ambassadors in the countries where they operate, advising the South African embassy when 
they plan to explore a new potential market. There has always been a traditional separation 
between business and government. Government will not seek business input in shaping 
international policies and business tends to be cynical about government initiatives. South 
Africa has not developed a stage where business can meaningfully influence multilateral 
agreements. Whilst business could be operationally useful to government in helping to shape 
international trade agreements they are not being regarded as a resource. For instance, the 
Bharti deal with MTN, which was not concluded, could have been useful if South Africa had 
been negotiating with India around ways to make the business environment more conducive 
to cross-border deals with other emerging markets (Moola 2009).133  Due to the complexity 
of the deal and the extent to which market access issues had a role to play, greater 
                                                      
133
 A failed merger attempt with Bharti of India generated enormous interest in the South African market.  
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government support for MTN from the South African government may have assisted in 
sealing the deal (Wadhwa 2009, May 26).  
 
Flag follows trade 
All of the above points to the trend evident in the interview process of big business pursuing 
its own economic diplomacy agenda or ‘Go-It-Alone’ strategies, as part of an entrepreneurial 
mode of engagement in economic diplomacy. Although South Africa is a developing country, 
or a large an emerging market, it has powerful international business interests with strong 
interests in diplomatic economic policy. This is evident from the above discussions of the 
extent and breadth of South African corporate diplomacy across a range of fora and 
initiatives, including the WEF, COP17, the B20, the ICC, the WBCSD and the GRI. 
Interviews with business representatives revealed that business are extensively engaged in 
multiple diplomatic processes. 
 
Interviews confirm that the size of big business means they do not require much government 
assistance and they have the flexibility, the means, and the market-intelligence to a large 
extent – in terms of market access, negotiating channels in markets – to operate as free agents 
(Int: Alfeld 2009; January-Bardill 2009; Spicer 2009; Maasdorp 2009). Whereas, smaller 
companies, especially those newly emerging and wishing to expand into Africa, have a far 
greater need for government support – in the sense of expanding the market – in gaining an 
understanding of the political-economic dynamics of those markets. Big business does not 
need government to pursue their commercial interests. “Big companies go to China, India or 
the US and get on with their business – they operate in a global market” (Int: Carim 2009).  
However, several interviewees lamented the lack of strategic cohesion across South Africa’s 
economic diplomacy and called for a more co-ordinated ‘SA-Inc’ approach to South Africa’s 
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broader economic diplomacy initiatives (Alfeld 2009. Davies 2009; Grant 2010; Parsons 
2009; Rhomberg 2009; Spicer 2009; van Vurren 2010; Worrall 2009).  
 
Sasol pursues an agenda of trying where possible to work with whatever diplomatic 
representation exists in host countries, for example in Indonesia, in order to achieve an air of 
respectability. The South African ambassador in Indonesia is involved and fully apprised of 
developments on their various projects. In Uzbekistan there is no South African diplomatic 
representation at all. Sasol has been working with a non- resident ambassador in Turkey 
keeping him informed as there is no government to government framework with Uzbekistan. 
There is no Bilateral Investment Protection (BIP) Agreement in place to safe guard Sasol’s 
venture in Uzbekistan. Given that Sasol intend to make a $1b-$2b investment this represents 
a significant risk.  As a result Sasol has been lobbying the South African government to 
formalise its relations with Uzbekistan and get a BIP in place. This is a prime example of 
‘flag following trade’ rather than trade following flag. These sorts of gaps are what lead to a 
‘go-it-alone’ diplomacy and an entrepreneurial role for business. As CEO of Anglo 
American, Cynthia Carroll (2008), puts it: “while companies are important economic and 
political actors they still need good government”. 
 
Other interviews confirmed that in many instances the South African government is 
perceived as a mitigator of risks – in the sense of providing risk insurance - for South African 
companies. The result is that companies have to be aware of the underlying business 
opportunities and investment is driven by profit considerations. MTN’s expansion into 
Nigeria is a prime example of positive intervention the South African government achieving 
a relaxation of exchange control regulations to facilitate investment into the region (Nweke 
2006, August 25). The size of MTN’s initial Nigerian investment, at US$2b, spurred 
government to relax exchange controls – as an indirect support measure, rather than a direct 
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support measure (Muller 2007, October 4). The fact that the South African government does 
not provide risk insurance does not mean that investments are taking place without any 
insurance support. South African companies use the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) and are extremely cautious about their investments (Int: Paxton 2009).  
 
The go-it-alone strategy pursued by numerous South African corporate actors operating 
abroad supports a MSD approach that indicates diplomats as boundary-spanners with a multi-
directional flow of information. When flag follows trade, and business adopts an 
entrepreneurial mode of corporate diplomacy, leading diplomatic process it is not necessarily 
in isolation from sovereign diplomats. Frequently, as evidenced by Sasol, corporate diplomats 
actively seek to include sovereign diplomats - multiple stakeholders indeed.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
In examining the final mode of entrepreneurial diplomatic engagement, this chapter has 
found that business NSAs will pursue diplomatic objectives through various fora, as 
producers of diplomatic processes and outcomes. Business pursues a commercial agenda by 
engaging in go-it-alone diplomacy wherever necessary. That does not diminish the preference 
for greater support and assistance from the South African government when operating 
abroad, not least in order to provide some kind of investment or political risk insurance, but 
also to act as a resource for business.  
 
South African MNCs are a significant source of FDI for Africa and are important partners in 
a number of infrastructural projects in the region, supporting wider business objectives in 
these countries. That means their clout and influence is indisputable, making South African 
MNCs important NSAs in the international political economy. As such, big business, in the 
form of EMNCs and operating in markets where South Africa has no diplomatic 
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representation, will endeavour to include South Africa’s diplomats in their activities as far as 
possible. This approach turns the normal sequence of trade following flag around so that in 
these cases flag follows trade and business becomes the primary ‘diplomat’ introducing the 
government diplomat to their counterparts instead of the other way around.134  
 
An entrepreneurial mode of engagement finds expression in go-it-alone strategies, as well as 
business-led initiatives such as the ICC, WBCSD, the B20 or the GRI. The chapter has 
demonstrated that business is certainly not simply a consumer of diplomacy and often 
produces economic diplomacy outcomes. Due to the lack of capacity within South Africa’s 
DTI and foreign missions, and as a result of the on-going impact of racial politics in South 
Africa around capital ownership, business must find alternative avenues for achieving their 
commercial goals abroad. In expanding trade and investment opportunities business has 
found itself undertaking commercial diplomacy directly. South Africa’s MNCs, in pursuing 
commercial objectives, engage in corporate diplomacy at both bilateral and multilateral level 
through institutions such as the WEF, frequently behaving as de facto diplomats and 
representing South Africa abroad. 
 
These factors, taken together, are a significant feature of NSA engagement in economic 
diplomacy and further the argument of this thesis around the importance of NSAs and in 
particular private sector or business in studying economic diplomacy. The use of a MSD 
framework has enabled a clearer analysis of the extent to and ways in which business are 
engaging in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy.  
  
                                                      
134
 With thanks to Haiko Alfeld (Sasol) for this insight during an interview in 2009. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
The contemporary dynamics of economic diplomacy cannot be understood by solely focusing 
on states as the primary unit of analysis. In the economic diplomacy landscape, states seldom 
operate as the primary agents of change in a vacant field, but rather jostle with a series of 
NSAs, especially business NSAs, for position, leverage and influence. This thesis has 
examined who the main actors in South Africa’s economic diplomacy are and where the main 
sites of diplomatic engagement are located. Rather than passive supporters of state efforts at 
economic diplomacy, this thesis has clearly shown how corporate actors operate as active 
consumers as well as producers of diplomatic outcomes.  
 
8.1 Towards a multi-centric view in IR and diplomacy studies 
The introduction to this thesis set out clear parameters for the contribution the thesis makes to 
broader debates in economic diplomacy, arguing that agency needs to receive greater 
attention in analysing diplomatic processes without neglecting structure. The thesis used an 
empirically rich study to demonstrate the theoretical contribution of this research to 
diplomacy studies.  
 
The thesis has explored the question: to what extent and in which ways does South African 
business engage in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy? As such, the thesis 
has engaged specifically with the economic diplomacy literature, using a MSD approach to 
challenge conventional state-centric diplomacy literature and, in so doing, has built a case for 
including business as NSAs in the study of economic diplomacy. This further speaks to the 
notion of agency in economic diplomacy, arguing that NSAs are agents of diplomacy as both 
consumers and producers of diplomatic outcomes, challenging the market-centric view that 
tends to privilege structures over agency in IR.  
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An important contribution of this research has been to add empirical depth to the MSD 
approach thus enhancing our understanding of contemporary diplomatic practices. Finally, 
the research provides much needed reference to the diplomatic activities of NSAs in 
emerging economies or developing countries.  
 
8.2 Empirical Depth 
The empirical data presented in this thesis supports the emergence of corporate diplomacy, 
where business as NSAs are highly evident in South Africa’s economic diplomacy, both as 
consumers and producers of economic diplomacy. This thesis has illustrated how corporate 
actors may perform at least three roles with respect to economic diplomacy: i) a consultative 
role, informing, adapting to and shaping the evolution of state-led initiatives; ii) a 
supplementary role, providing essential support for state-led diplomacy initiatives; and iii) an 
entrepreneurial role, as initiators of diplomatic actions.  
 
These modes of engagement, encompass a range of directions of activity, so that there is also 
clear evidence of the triangular diplomacy evinced by Stopford and Strange (1991). Not only 
is diplomacy happening at a state-state level but also in the dimensions of firm-state and firm-
firm diplomacy. The modes of engagement evident in South Africa’s corporate diplomacy are 
also linked to the important themes of South Africa’s broader diplomatic agenda and context. 
The consultative role of business is both constrained and enabled in different ways by the 
particular historical context of South Africa’s political economy. This argument supports a 
strategic relational approach in which agency and context are interactive as well as co-
constitutive of international society (Jessop 1996).  
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A supplementary role is evident in the bi-lateral engagement of South Africa’s South-South 
agenda of engaging more broadly with Africa and other large developing countries through 
the IBSA dialogue, BRICS and SADC and SACU. The political agenda is mirrored by or 
mirrors the economic expansion of corporate interests into Africa and further afield. How 
effective a supplementary role is depends to a great degree on how well the business-
government relationship is managed in each situation. This too is affected by the nature of the 
constructive contestation apparent in South Africa’s business-government relationship, which 
is historically complex and sometimes conflictual.  
 
The consultative mode of engagement reflects the hugely complicated interaction between 
business, capital-ownership, race and representation, and politics. The sometimes conflictual 
relationship between business and government is informed by the historical wounds of the 
past and creates opportunities for new business interactions with government. It also presents 
challenges for representation to government and who gets heard in consultative processes. 
  
8.3 A MSD approach to diplomacy 
As this thesis has shown, the existing literature in diplomacy studies has several important 
limitations, especially analysis from a realist perspective. Alternative approaches that take 
cognisance of a variety of actors or stakeholders in diplomacy such as MSD, polylateralism, 
and three-dimensional diplomacy offer a more comprehensive and complete means of 
understanding the complexity of current diplomatic practices.  Chapter Two expanded on the 
rational realist perspective, elucidating the tendency in realist traditions to relegate all actors 
but the state as meaningless in diplomacy studies and the narrow focus of such scholars on 
the high politics of security in the international system as the primary objective of diplomacy. 
The main criticism of such approaches is to be found in the fact that they do not give account 
of the role of NSAs in IR more broadly and nor do they reflect the increasingly complex and 
242 
 
technical nature of contemporary diplomatic processes such as those occurring at the WTO, 
at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit or in fora such as meetings of the G20. 
Furthermore, such rationalist approaches tend to simplify the interests of the state into utility 
maximising rational actors, without providing any explanation for how interests shift and are 
influenced over time.  
 
Domestic theories attempt to provide insights into what is happening within states that could 
shape or influence their behaviour in diplomatic processes but do not go far enough in 
providing an explanation for why NSAs are increasingly participating directly in diplomacy. 
This then is the contribution of an emerging body of literature on multi-actor diplomacy. A 
middle-ground approach rejects the antithesis of realist perspective, the alternative 
perspective (or nascent school in Murray’s (2008) taxonomy) which holds that diplomacy is a 
non-state process (thus rejecting the state as actor in totality). Rather proponents of this multi-
actor diplomacy call for a recognition of a broader range of actors engaging in diplomacy but 
not to the exclusion of the state. Instead, approaches such as Hocking’s (2005) MSD or 
Scholte’s (1993) complex network of transnational actors  or Rosenau’s (1990) ‘two-worlds’ 
approach, focus on the observable practices of diplomacy including the interplay between 
state and NSAs, at various levels and across a broad range of issues including security but 
also extending to economic and environmental issues among others. The thesis has argued for 
the inclusion of economic issues in diplomacy studies specifically and arrives at a definition 
of economic diplomacy as: the interactions between states and NSAs in the international 
system at various levels around broad economic issues. By exploring the extent to and ways 
in which business as NSAs engage South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy this 
research has contributed valuable empirical evidence of the relevance of a multi-actor 
approach to diplomacy studies that also gives account of the economic in diplomacy 
practices. 
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8.4  The relevance of South Africa’s political economy 
In order to fully understand South Africa’s contemporary economic diplomacy it was 
necessary to give some background to South Africa’s economic history and the integral role 
played by business in the early development of the country’s economic and political 
structures. Early discoveries of mineral wealth in the country were to shape the future 
apartheid era in a significant manner. Chapter Three provided a brief review of the secondary 
literature that explains the crucial role of the mining industry in South Africa’s political 
economy and indeed its role in the broader international economy.  Industrial development 
was slow to come and the country remains mineral dependent to this day. The literature also 
implicates business and especially the mining industry in the early origins of apartheid and 
the on-going social ills associated with its lengthy dominance in South Africa’s political past 
and transition to a post-apartheid era (Yudelman 1984; Segal 2000; Meredith 2007).  
 
South Africa is a dominant player within Africa and the largest in economy on the continent, 
producing 24% of the continent’s GDP and  ranked 26th in the world in terms of GDP (IMF 
2012). However, South Africa contributes only a small share of the world economy at just 
0.5% and the country ranks as 29th in world in terms of GDP (IMF 2012). Despite this 
miniscule contribution, South Africa has recently joined the BRICs countries, on invitation 
from by China, and is widely considered to punch above its weight in international processes.  
 
As regards South Africa’s economic diplomacy, pre-apartheid and apartheid era trade policy 
was primarily protectionist and focused on import substitution largely as a result of economic 
sanctions in final years of apartheid. By the end of the apartheid era, South Africa was 
already in a serious financial crisis and this further galvanised business interests in seeking an 
end to apartheid. Business were thus at the forefront of negotiations about political transition 
with the ANC in exile. Despite a number of initiatives by liberal business during the 
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apartheid period, certain elements and industries within the business community had also 
benefitted from the apartheid system. This was to carry through into the new era and was a 
highly sensitive aspect of the TRC hearings during the immediate post-apartheid period. The 
complicated relationship between the emerging ANC government and business interests, 
against the back-drop of an on-going perception of business complicity in the oppression of 
apartheid, created the sub-text for the relationship between business and government going 
forward. Following the unbanning of the ANC and the party’s subsequent rise to power, the 
literature points to the significant role played by business in shaping the ANC’s post-
apartheid economic doctrine. Prior to their unbanning the ANC had formulated a socialist 
reform policy which included the nationalisation of broad swathes of the economy. In 
addition, the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, along with other factors can be 
attributed to influencing the ANC’s shift to largely neo-liberal market friendly policies, 
including international pressure, the role of IFIs and, domestically, a charm offensive by big 
business.  
 
From its earliest origins then the relationship between business and government during the 
post-apartheid era can be described as one of constructive contestation (Handley 2008), in 
which crony capitalism has been largely held at bay thus far by the historical mistrust 
between business and government arising out of the apartheid era. This legacy of racial 
politics remains a deep seam running through the relationship between business and 
government in South Africa. It is significant to the understanding of the extent to and ways in 
which South African business engage in economic diplomacy, because this relationship has 
resulted in business engaging very directly in economic diplomacy processes which is 
described by the foregoing empirical chapters of this thesis. In essence this constructive 
contestation, born out of the racial politics of oppression in South Africa, explains why 
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business has engaged to the extent that it has, in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic 
diplomacy.  
 
8.5 Stakeholders in South Africa’s economic diplomacy 
The research identified a large number of stakeholders participating in South Africa’s 
economic diplomacy. Within government, stakeholders were identified across a range of 
government departments.  NSAs engaging in South Arica’s economic diplomacy at different 
stages included political parties such as the ANC, trade unions through COSATU, various 
business and industry associations, think tanks and research institutes, and NGOs.   
 
An analysis of agency in South Africa’s economic diplomacy identified four important 
elements that inform and underpin the constraints and opportunities for business engagement 
in economic diplomacy. In short the agency of these actors creates the context in which 
business NSAs are both constrained and enabled as diplomatic actors. First, the analysis 
revealed that there were capacity constraints within government departments that were a 
limitation on the extent of consultation and engagement possible. This is exacerbated, in the 
second instance, by business concerns around interdepartmental coordination and lack of 
organisation from departments that claim to be leading consultation and diplomacy processes.  
Third, the research found that there was a high level of NSA stakeholder interaction. 
Research institutions and think tanks were found to be a very important element of the 
economic policy-making milieu and consultation process.  They were also useful catalysts for 
dialogue between the different stakeholders.  
 
Business stakeholders found their access to government and formal state-led diplomatic 
processes more constrained. In this regard, the fourth element of representation and the 
politics of race have made consolidation of business difficult and thus the coherence of a 
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business position has been difficult to achieve. Historical disadvantage and the imperative of 
redistribution through BEE have dominated the business discourse leading to dissension and 
diverting the focus away from issues of outward directed economic diplomacy. This lack of 
‘one voice’ in the business community has meant that consultation processes with 
government have been compromised and become more politicised than such interactions 
would be, ordinarily. Finally, the constraints facing business in interacting with government 
have also opened up alternative opportunities for business to engage in diplomatic processes. 
The study identified three modes of engagement that describe the ways in which and extent to 
which business NSAs are involved in economic diplomacy. 
 
8.6 Modes of Engagement 
Consultative 
 
The legacy of the apartheid era has carried forward into a relationship characterised by 
constructive contestation between business and government. The study identified four sites of 
consultation, primary of which is NEDLAC. Various other mechanisms included ad hoc 
theme-based government-led task teams, the ATF and specific industry fora.  A number of 
diplomatic tools are used by business NSAs in engaging in a consultative role, from self-
initiated lobbying to providing technical reports and research. Business NSAs have engaged 
in advocacy with ministers and government officials both formally and informally in 
whatever situation enabled them to gain access to policy-makers. There were limitations to 
domestic consultation which has also had an impact on the extent to which business engages 
in economic diplomacy processes, especially multilaterally. Whilst mechanisms for 
consultation exist their utility was variable and, in NEDLAC’s case, contested by the various 
social partners. Government stakeholders maintain that the mechanism functions effectively, 
while business tended to regard NEDLAC as a talk-shop, poorly organised, ill-supported (by 
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business and with low level government representation) and heavily weighted in favour of 
labour interests.  
 
The lack of consultation was not confined to government and business; inter-departmental 
coordination was regarded as extremely poor and departments sometimes highly competitive, 
engaging in turf-wars to the detriment of a unified position that would encourage a national 
dialogue or consensus necessary for effective diplomacy. As a consequence, in terms of a 
MSD approach, this has opened spaces for a multi-centric diplomacy where other NSAs take 
the lead in the absence of effective direction from government appointed diplomats.  The 
ATF was regarded as a model consultation process with broad participation at a meaningful 
level that has resulted in extensive engagement of numerous different stakeholders in 
diplomatic processes, from the WTO to bilateral negotiations. In this instance the role of 
individual agency in achieving a positive and coordinated outcome was critical.  
 
In other instances positive outcomes were less easily accomplished. A lack of capacity within 
the primary ministries involved in economic diplomacy, namely the DTI and DIRCO 
combined with a lack of co-ordination and common purpose have resulted in inconsistency of 
consultation. Again, this is consistent with the features of a MSD, which identifies a variety 
of participants in diplomacy incorporating multiple actors as producers of diplomacy. 
Government representatives also pointed to the absence of a unified position from business. 
Business disunity was grounded in the constant of racial disharmony and the post-apartheid 
imperative of transformation in South Africa’s capital structures.  
 
One of the critical reasons why government-business consultation was regarded as so difficult 
was the absence, until recently, of a unified ‘voice of business’ not tainted by the traditional 
segregation of white capital and the imperative of transformation in South Africa’s political 
economy.  Big business in South Africa remains largely controlled by white capital interests 
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and senior management. Despite BEE initiatives, transformation has tended to be slow in 
materialising and, where there has been transformation, it has favoured a relatively small 
minority of powerful black businessmen, concentrating control in the hands of a few. Again, 
the contested nature of business–state relationships supports the underlying principles of a 
MSD approach which highlights the clash of sovereignty as well as institutional tensions, not 
just within government institutions but also between business institutions as well.  
 
Supplementary  
 
A supplementary mode of engagement has emerged as a result of the convergence between 
South Africa’s political objectives and the economic drivers of commercial interests. South 
Africa’s dominance in Africa and the shifting power dynamics within the international 
system towards a greater prominence of developing countries or emerging economies point to 
an increasing trend towards South-South economic diplomacy.  It is at the bi-lateral level and 
particularly into Africa that business engages extensively in economic diplomacy activities. 
In the past three years, South Africa’s primary export destination has shifted from the USA 
and EU to China, and imports mostly from China. In line with global trends towards Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) and PTAs, South Africa is increasingly focused on negotiating 
PTAs with other developing countries, particularly in Africa. More than an ideological 
commitment to solidarity, this trend also reflects the economic goals of South African 
corporate interests. Such interests extend to the common ground between developing 
countries in the MTS on issues such as agriculture, NAMA and services as well as achieving 
a more equitable power balance in multilateral fora.  
 
The research examined the various sites of diplomatic engagement in South-South diplomacy 
beginning with the NEPAD Business Foundation, and including the IBSA dialogue, the 
BRICS and finally the WTO. This analysis established that South Africa is highly committed 
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to associating itself with other large developing countries, the agenda of developing countries 
generally and in Africa in particular. Whilst South Africa has demonstrated a middle power 
tendency to support multilateralism in the past, more recent evidence indicates that 
multilateralism is pursued as part of a broader development agenda. 
 
In terms of South Africa’s role in Africa, fear of the country’s dominance as a hegemon has 
resulted in a delicate balancing act for the government and by proxy for South African 
business expanding into neighbouring countries and beyond in Africa. It is this very situation 
which highlights the issue identified as a feature of MSD that the location of diplomacy criss-
crosses domestic and international arenas; South African corporations are increasingly 
expected to uphold corporate governance standards abroad as they do at home as part of their 
responsibility to represent South Africa in the rest of the world. Business is seen as 
representative of the state when operating in other countries significant evidence of a 
supplementary and even a substitution role for business diplomacy at times.  
 
It is the private sector that is driving South Africa’s continental expansion and often also the 
diplomatic initiatives that facilitate such growth. This is evidence of NSAs as both producers 
as well as consumers of diplomacy as they engage in a supplementary role both driving and 
supporting diplomatic initiatives.  Such corporate diplomacy is not always welcomed in 
Africa especially where South African firms are regarded with suspicion as a result of South 
Africa’s hegemonic status in the region. However, business representatives broadly indicated 
in interviews that corporate diplomacy is a universal feature of doing business in Africa and 
engaging with diplomats and other government officials and ministries was an integral part of 
doing business. This would indicate that a MSD approach which identifies the functions of 
various actors to compensate for deficiencies in the diplomatic process is not a one-way flow. 
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There is still an important role for official diplomats to play in supporting and protecting 
corporate interests.  
 
Institutions such as SACU, SADC and NBF welcome to varying degrees the involvement of 
business actors in negotiations. In this regard BUSA is providing a useful platform for 
aggregating business views and decreasing the threat to weaker negotiating parties within 
SACU and SADC, which do not have such well-developed (and effective) business sectors. 
The NBF is supported by and provides support to business in accessing influential decision-
makers, acting as facilitator to the World Bank, African Development Bank and key 
corporate actors as well as smaller businesses that benefit from higher level access than they 
might achieve individually. This highlights the feature of MSD where diplomats become 
boundary-spanners and facilitators of diplomacy and extends the feature to allow for NSAs in 
a supplementary role facilitating engagement on behalf of government and in their own right 
as well.  
 
Entrepreneurial 
 
An entrepreneurial mode of engagement extends beyond bilateral diplomacy for South 
African firms, to the role of big business in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. This role is 
evident in a go-it-alone corporate diplomacy in which flag follows trade.  Consultation 
processes, dogged by a sometimes conflictual relationship with government has made access 
to government difficult for business. As a result, business has sought alternative means of 
attaining economic goals through go-it-alone diplomacy. This is not something different from 
the corporate diplomacy discussed in the supplementary role, rather an extension of that 
process  wherein big business are engaging in the role not just of diplomat but also facilitator 
of diplomacy in a process in which flag follows trade. 
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This mode of engagement is most evident when the role of South Africa’s global corporations 
as EMNCs is analysed. South African MNCs have expanded their sphere of influence 
disproportionately to the size of the South African economy in the world.135 As facilitators of 
diplomacy, South African business is sometimes referred to as the driver of ‘SA 
Incorporated’ referring to the dominance of business as South Africa’s representation abroad. 
MSD maintains that the rules of diplomacy in terms of this approach are under-developed and 
that there is a clash of sovereignty and non-sovereign based rules. This is clearly apparent in 
an entrepreneurial mode, as South African MNCs blur the lines between sovereign actions 
and non-sovereign ones, especially when business actors such as Sasol introduce the South 
African Ambassador to his counterpart in Uzbekistan rather than the other way around. 
 
Big business was a key influence in South Africa’s early post-apartheid economic policy-
making; this followed on from the role played by liberal big business interests in negotiations 
with the then-banned ANC in the closing stages of the apartheid era. Big business has 
traditionally been in favour of trade liberalisation being more export focused (as key 
stakeholders in the industrial-minerals complex of the economy) and, already established as 
participants in fora such as the WEF, able to bring to bear their influence (as well as that of 
other business interests outside the country and IFIs) on the ANC at a crucial stage in the 
economic policy-making process. This is evidence of a highly networked sector that drew on 
the influence of external actors and also supported that influence during South Africa’s 
transition period. This supports the MSD assertion that diplomacy is located across domestic 
and international boundaries using multiple diplomatic sites.  The early influence enjoyed by 
big business seems to be waning with the Zuma administration and as a result is pursuing an 
aggressive go-it-alone agenda, without compromising a commitment to seeking government 
                                                      
135
 In the case of MNCs from South Africa this thesis uses the acronym EMNC synonymously with MNC when 
referring to MNCs from South Africa. 
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support and being seen to support government whenever necessary. The imperative to be 
‘seen to be supporting’ government’s economic diplomacy initiatives is widely 
acknowledged within the group of business representatives interviewed and testifies to the 
sensitive nature of the relationship between government and business.  
 
In exploring the entrepreneurial mode of engagement favoured by big business, a number of 
sites of diplomatic activity or fora of engagement on the global stage were identified.  These 
included the WEF, Climate Change at the COP17, the B20, the ICC and the WBCSD. 
Corporate agency, engaging in an entrepreneurial role in South Africa’s economic diplomacy, 
was also outlined to understand the depth and breadth of South Africa’s MNCs. South Africa 
has an enormous number of MNCs, at around 900. In 2002, seven of these were in the top 50 
developing country MNCs (EMNCs). Of the top 40 African MNCs 18 are South African. 
These represent a range of industries from financial services, to generic medicines and 
telecommunications as well as global players with dual listings on the London Stock 
Exchange. These African Lions as the BCG has named them, are akin to the Asian Tigers 
fastest growing companies in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea.  Despite 
having greater foreign board representation, South African MNCs have fewer foreign senior 
managers than other EMNCs.  
 
South African MNCs expanding into Africa enjoy institutional support from an array of 
organisations including the IDC, DBSA and the ECIC providing evidence of South Africa’s 
diplomatic agenda within Africa coinciding with the economic agenda of corporate South 
Africa. Contrary to fears that opportunities in the rest of Africa would provide a race to the 
bottom in environmental and labour standards, South African corporations are subject to 
stringent corporate governance and responsibility standards. These are driven both by 
pressure from the government on business to be responsible representatives of ‘brand South 
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Africa’ as well as from within business through engagement on various multilateral initiatives 
such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the Global Compact.  
South Africa’s largest corporations are represented by BLSA, which has traditionally had a 
high profile role in political engagement in South Africa during apartheid and the transition 
of 1994. Despite this, big business appears to be disconnected from the formal trade 
diplomacy processes in which South Africa engages such as in the WTO. This is likely to 
have more to do with the protracted nature of negotiations in the MTS than a lack of 
awareness of the significance of such negotiations.  Big business has a much lower tolerance 
of the inefficiencies of NEDLAC’s processes and a heightened sense of frustration at the 
institutional weakness apparent in the lack of capacity within key ministerial departments 
such as the DTI and DIRCO. As a consequence, big business tends to take the lead by 
pursuing economic objectives alone and engaging in direct economic diplomacy wherever 
this is necessary. This might be in the form of informal networking at events such as Davos 
under the auspices of the WEF or directly with relevant ministers responsible for decision-
making at the highest possible level, for example, the MTN licensing process in Nigeria. This 
tendency is further exacerbated by the perception widely held by big business that there is no 
common national interest similar to that pursued by India or Brazil.  
 
This go-it-alone diplomacy is being extended as business seeks to remedy its own lack of 
knowledge of diplomatic protocol, by hiring former diplomats to work within corporations as 
managers of government affairs and economic diplomacy, for example MTN, Sasol and 
ABSA Capital. In this way business buys-in the requisite expertise and networks of contacts 
inherent in the functions performed by these former diplomats.  This activity provides direct 
evidence of MSD in action as deficiencies in the diplomatic process are fulfilled not just by 
business or other NSAs supporting official diplomats but vice-versa, by employing diplomats 
to fill the protocol gaps that business experiences.  
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Business representatives in this context then act as de facto diplomats; such that in some 
instances flag follows trade, while business acts as the facilitator of diplomacy taking MSD 
beyond the role of NSAs as producers and consumers of diplomacy but entrepreneurs of 
diplomacy too.  Government interviewees suggested that better coordination with big 
business could result in a more strategic approach to South Africa’s economic diplomacy and 
the achievement of a national consensus on such diplomatic goals.   
 
8.6 Further research 
A number of important themes emerged from this research that would warrant further and 
more in-depth attention from future scholarship. First, extending the MSD framework to 
include an exploration of the role other NSAs such as labour, civil society, and research 
institutions and think tanks in economic diplomacy would be very useful research. Such an 
endeavour would enable scholars to determine whether the modes of engagement identified 
as significant for business NSAs hold true for other NSA groupings. Such research would 
also allow a more complete understanding of a MSD framework by including all the 
stakeholders identified (as well as any additional actors) and thus enabling a better analysis of 
how the different stakeholders interact on one another and perhaps shape the modes of 
diplomatic engagement further. It would also enable the identification of further possible 
modes of engagement relevant to different sorts of stakeholders. 
 
Another avenue for consideration in future research would be to do a comparative study of 
the MSD framework between South Africa and other BRICs or large developing countries. 
This kind of study would provide a meaningful set of contrasts that would confirm or deny 
the general applicability of the modes of engagement identified. This could be confined just 
to business NSAs or conducted along the lines of the further research suggested above, and 
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include a full multistakeholder approach. The value of a comparative study lies in the 
researchers’ ability to compare and contrast and so identify trends or repeating patterns, 
which would enhance the conclusions of this research by extending its validity across 
multiple cases. In particular a comparative study of South Africa with Malaysia might prove 
useful, as there are interesting parallels between the economic dominance of a minority ethnic 
grouping (Chinese) within Malaysia prior to its transition that could yield insights 
comparable with the South African post-apartheid experience. 
 
Finally, it would be interesting to test the modes of engagement identified as relating to 
business NSAs in economic diplomacy against other diplomatic processes, such as 
environmental diplomacy or human rights diplomacy. It would be interesting to observe 
whether MSD is applied as easily to different forms of diplomacy and to compare and 
contrast the different stakeholders engaging in different forms of diplomacy. Crucially, from 
an extension of this study, it would be useful to evaluate whether the modes of diplomacy 
identified here apply to other stakeholders and in different contexts.  
 
8.7 Conclusion 
Business matters in the contemporary global political economy – both as a result of the 
material resources business actors wield internationally and at home, and because of the 
shifting balance of power in recent decades between public authority and private authority in 
shaping the economic fortunes of different societies. Through a detailed and comprehensive 
analysis of the role of business actors in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic diplomacy, 
this thesis has built a compelling case that corporate diplomacy requires much greater 
scholarly attention – in emerging market economies as well as in developed economies- than 
it usually tends to receive.  
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Rather than passive supporters of state-led diplomatic initiatives, or simply ignoring 
economic diplomacy as an avenue for advancing business interests, the thesis has illustrated 
that corporate actors play a series of crucial roles with respect to economic diplomacy: i) a 
consultative role; ii) a supplementary role; iii) an entrepreneurial role. As a consequence, this 
research highlights the importance not simply of understanding how states and business 
actors compete over their preferred policy frameworks and outcomes but the need for much 
greater examination of how corporate actors and state actors cooperate in pursuit of 
diplomatic strategies that maximise the potential for economic diplomacy to function 
effectively in achieving their varying interests.  
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APPENDIX ONE: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Not available on electronic thesis. Please refer to Library hardcopy. 
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